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Introduction 
 
 
At its core, this dissertation is an ethnographic account about social change 
throughout and following a communal conflict on the Indonesian island of 
Ambon, which lasted from early 1999 until 2001/2002, and was fought 
between Christians and Muslims. This focus on social change differs from the 
majority of studies and debates on communal warfare in post-Suharto 
Indonesia - and Ambon in particular - which despite some notable exceptions, 
have generally started from the question: ‘why did people all of a sudden start 
to fight?’ Obviously, there is a wide range of answers to this question. For 
instance, there are scholars arguing that violence has always been an endemic, 
cultural feature in Indonesian society, due to the fact that Indonesians have 
learned ‘that they can be rewarded for violent behavior’ (Colombijn 2001: 
38). Another stream of literature emphasizes political transformations at the 
national level after the fall of Suharto in May 1998 and how these were 
connected with political maneuvering at the regional level in order to explain 
the start of communal warfare (Bertrand 2004, Van Klinken 2007). This line 
of thought is also present in many case studies of communal conflict (see 
Aragon 2001 on Central Sulawesi, Van Klinken 2001, Bertrand 2002 and 
Goss 2004 on Ambon, Bubandt 2001, 2004 on North Maluku and Van 
Klinken 2006 on West Kalimantan). Others see military-based provocateurs 
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as responsible for the eruption of communal violence in different places in 
Indonesia (Aditjondro 2001).  
 
The centrality of this ‘why question’ in much of the literature on post-New 
Order communal warfare can partly be explained by the very communal 
character of this violence. The term communal conflict refers to those cases in 
which civil populations persistently fight each other over a certain period of 
time. These conflicts are therefore different from classic interstate war or civil 
wars in which armed groups fight the state for separatist or other reasons. The 
persistent nature of communal conflict also puts it apart from short-term 
communal riots that only last a couple of days. Throughout and after the 
implosion of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia was confronted with a 
range of this sort of communal conflicts. Examples include Christian-Muslim 
bloodshed in Ambon in the province of Maluku (January 1999), and the city 
of Poso in the province of Central Sulawesi (December 1998). The province 
of North Maluku (August 1999) witnessed atrocious inter-religious warfare 
between Christians and Muslims and inter-ethnic violence among Muslims. 
Inter-ethnic riots between Dayaks and Madurese raged in Central (February 
2001) and West Kalimantan (January 1998) and Malay-Madurese violence 
affected West Kalimantan (February 1999). All these different cases of 
communal conflict were characterized by a high level of intimate violence 
(Kalyvas 2006). This means that violence played between brothers, 
neighbours coming from the same soil but divided along communal fault 
lines. Intimate violence therefore goes beyond class differences, is not aimed 
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at an external stranger or unknown occupier and strict divisions of roles 
between victim and perpetrator are blurred. The characteristics of these 
communal conflicts stands in contrasts to the traditional features of warfare 
during the New Order (1966-1998). During this 32-year period, conflicts such 
as the ones in East Timor, Aceh or Papua consisted of a civil militia fighting 
the centralist and military backed state. The ultimate aim of these armed 
groups was to gain independence or at least a far-reaching autonomy, an 
objective which was fiercely opposed by the Indonesian state. Apart from the 
killings of 1965/66, which ultimately ushered in a military dictatorship, 
during the 32-year New Order regime, communal conflict was present but 
never on such a massive scale as shortly after the fall of the New Order.1
 
 It 
therefore seemed as if the implosion of the New Order had forced scholars of 
Indonesian society to look for new frameworks in order to explain this new 
sort of civil unrest (Schulte Nordholdt 2003, Purdey 2004). 
 
1.1. Going beyond the why question 
 
The intimate character of these communal conflicts which, at first sight, 
lacked a clearly-cut ideological discourse or obvious economic motive, made 
many wonder why these people all of a sudden started killing each other. 
                                                          
1 The most notable exception is the province of West Kalimantan which already 
during the New Order experienced ‘sustained, non-separatist bloodletting’ (Davidson 
2008a: 11)  
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Obviously, there are examples of researchers departing from this basic 
question such as Bräuchler (2003) who elaborated on the use of cyberspace in 
the communal conflict, and Spyer (2002) who worked on the role of media 
and rumors. Nevertheless, these examples are few and in general, the ‘why 
people start to fight question’ remains central to the majority of the literature 
on the communal conflict in Ambon. Although this question is obviously a 
key in coming to grips with communal conflict, some deficiencies can be 
noted.  
 
First, the start of the conflict is too often taken as the endpoint of the analysis. 
Strong attention is paid to all sorts of historical socio-political and economic 
factors in the build up to the violence but little attention is paid to the 
particular genesis of the communal warfare. In a context of persistent warfare 
however, conflicting parties alter and new fields of contention and 
reconciliation come to the surface. In other words, the start of a conflict 
cannot be solely treated as an endpoint but should be understood as a process 
which constitutes new dynamics, logics and meanings (Kalyvas 2003, 2006; 
Keen 2002; Richards 2005). In a special issue of the Journal of Peace 
Research, different authors have elaborated why some conflicts last longer 
than others, instead of asking why conflicts simply erupt. A broad range of 
answers is given to this complex question. For instance, Fearon (2004) states 
that so-called ‘sons of the soil conflicts’ - similar to the sort of communal 
warfare described above - which involve a struggle to access land tend to last 
longer. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004) see a correlation between a 
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low per capita income and high inequality on the one hand and the endurance 
of civil wars on the other. Other accounts state that - quite logically - an 
effective state bureaucracy and a strong government army limits the 
likelihood and endurance of civil war (De Rouen and Sobek 2004, Herbst 
2004). All in all, this literature clearly illustrates how apart from the question 
why people start to fight, as much attention should be paid asking for what 
reasons people keep on fighting, how a conflict escalates in time and space or 
why new actors become involved or disengage from the violence. Illustrative 
in this regard for the debates about communal conflict in post-Suharto 
Indonesia is also that little attention has been paid so far to understand why 
the violence substantially subsided at a certain time.  
 
A second, even more important point, is that by solely focusing on the 
question why people start to fight, conflicts tend to be reduced to a story of 
violence and destruction. Yet, in any conflict region in the world, more is 
going on than killings and demolition. Although I do not intend to downplay 
the many horrible things that happen in these contexts, conflict cannot simply 
be reduced to destruction. Scholars such as Duffield (1998, 2001), Cramer 
(2006) and Keen (2008: 4-21) argue that this view of war as destruction goes 
back to the classic liberal interpretation of violence representing war (bad) as 
the distortion of a natural, peaceful order and has therefore come to be 
perceived as the antithesis of development (good). Nevertheless, as these 
authors rightly argue, all sorts of developments occur throughout warfare. 
This can be evidenced by a broad literature which studies how people, in all 
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possible ways, attempt to cope in environments characterized by chronic 
insecurity. This literature developed from the late eighties/early nineties 
onwards and is illustrative of how development studies have increasingly 
shifted their attention to the household and individual level of society, leaving 
behind overtly structuralistic, (neo-) Marxist inspired analysis’s of poverty 
and marginalization or top-down dependency approaches (Sillitoe 2002, De 
Haan and Zomers, 2005). Probably the most outspoken proliferation of this 
micro-perspective is the popularity of livelihoods analysis. Mainly initiated by 
Anglo-Saxon research and policy institutes such as DFID (Department of 
International Development), ODI (Overseas Development Institute), IDS 
(Institute of Development Studies) and IIED (International Institute for 
Environment and Development), this framework tries to explain how 
livelihood strategies are pursued by drawing upon a portfolio of assets to cope 
with a particular vulnerability context. Many scholars have employed this 
framework in order to understand how conflict affects particular livelihood 
strategies. A typical example is the Livelihoods and Chronic Conflict 
Working Paper Series, published by the ODI.2
                                                          
2 see: 
 Other examples where this 
livelihoods framework has been applied include Ohlsonn (2000) on 
environmental degradation and conflict, Korf (2004) on the warfare in Sri 
Lanka and Lautze and Raven Roberts (2006) on humanitarian issues. More 
recently, economists have also shown increasing attention to processes of 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/livelihoods-chronic-conflict-working-
papers.asp  
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social and economic change at the micro-level of society during conflict. A 
typical example of this interest is the recent EU founded MICROCON project 
and the related Households in Conflict Network (HICN), based at the ODI, 
where the majority of researchers start from a theoretical basis in institutional 
economics.3
 
  
This literature about how people at the micro-level of society attempt to cope 
in violent environments not only comprises a variety of theoretical 
approaches, but also covers a lot of different themes such as access to land 
and other natural resources (Korf 2003, Vlassenroot 2004, Kamungi, Oketch 
and Huggins 2005), food security (Cohen and Pinstrup-Anderson 1999, 
Flores, Kwaja and White 2005; Vlassenroot, Ntububa and Raeymaekers 2006) 
or labour markets and informal economies (Cramer 2006). It would lead us 
too far to discuss all the different theoretical underpinnings and varieties of 
issues that are touched upon in this wide literature. Moreover, some of the 
more specific debates concerning land access and forced migration, urban 
food security or the informalization of the economy in protracted warfare will 
be elaborated deeper in the different chapters. Suffice to say therefore at the 
moment that there exists a wide body of literature about how people attempt 
to cope throughout situations of protracted warfare, thereby effecting all sorts 
of societal transformations.  
 
                                                          
3 see: http://www.microconflict.eu/  and http://www.hicn.org/    
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1.2. Forced displacement and coping at the household level of society 
 
It is remarkable to note how few of these insights have been picked up by 
Indonesianists studying communal conflict in Indonesia and very little is 
known of how ‘ordinary’ people attempted to cope in these insecure and 
fragile contexts. This is also the case with regards to the violence in Ambon 
where little attention has been paid to how the eruption of violence in the 
beginning of 1999 brought about certain social transformations. Nevertheless, 
due to the high-intensity nature and the relatively long endurance of the 
violence, it can be expected that the recent conflict had a radical impact on 
diverse aspects of the Ambonese societal fabric. In contrast to the conflicts in 
West and Central Kalimantan which only lasted a couple of months, warfare 
in Ambon lasted for about three years. One reason for this longer endurance is 
the religious framing of the bloodshed. As I will explain in the next chapter, 
due to this religious framing, external people and groups in the whole of 
Indonesia felt related to these more universal identities. This ultimately led to 
the involvement of new armed groups, which considerably prolonged the 
violence. Another factor explaining the protracted nature of the conflict in 
Ambon was the fact that in those areas where none of the parties could chase 
the other out, violence simply continued. This was definitely the case in 
Ambon city. As a consequence, this conflict in Ambon lasted for about three 
years, making it a real protracted conflict and, although occurring in different 
waves, violence was intense during those three years. It can therefore be 
expected that this conflict led to some fundamental transformations in the 
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livelihoods of broad sections of society. Despite this evident observation, I 
only came across some Ambonese researchers who looked at the warfare in 
Ambon from this angle. Examples include the work by Pieter Ongen (s.d.) on 
petty trade, middlemen and trade networks and the work by Hermien Soselisa 
(2000) on the disintegration of collective inter-village resource management. 
This has led to the strange contradiction that despite the communal, intimate 
nature of the violence which involved many ‘ordinary people’, these ordinary 
people have been largely neglected in any analysis so far. This not only relates 
to the motives these ordinary people had to engage in the violence (Purdey 
2004), this also concerns the way these ordinary people attempted to cope in 
this insecure and volatile context.  
 
It was after this reading and interpretation of the literature on communal 
violence in post-Suharto Indonesia that I paid a first preliminary visit to 
Ambon in December 2004, without a clearly defined research question. Yet, 
although my knowledge of the Indonesian language at the time was utterly 
limited and this hampered any normal, social interaction, one of the first 
things which struck me were the very visual effects of migration. Simply 
standing on a hill, overlooking large parts of the island, relocation camps 
stood out like scars in the landscape. Due to the new, metal roofs of the 
houses that sharply reflected in the sun and the artificially, built-up nature of 
these camps, these places contrasted normal, historically established villages. 
Related to this visual prominence of relocation and IDP (Internally Displaced 
Person) camps were the stark, spatial religious divisions of the island. This 
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was particularly prominent in the city of Ambon where these religious borders 
ran just next to each other. So this whole issue of forced population 
movements, and the new fixed religious borders this had created, evoked all 
sorts of questions, not the least how this had affected existing patterns of 
socio-economic organization. Moreover, it struck me how little of all this was 
described in the literature, which strengthened my conviction to further 
elaborate on this aspect of social change through the angle of forced 
migration. At the same time, this first visit was particularly overwhelming, 
not only because of the heavy devastations and the huge military presence, but 
in particular the immense complexity of everything I heard and saw somewhat 
scared me. Although I had already gone through most of the literature on the 
conflict in Ambon, that first visit left me with the feeling I absolutely knew 
nothing. In those first preliminary conversations, people talked about 
believing in adat as a unifying force, which seemed incompatible with the 
idea I had about adat as customary resource management. Instead of speaking 
about Christians and Muslims, people started talking about Butonese and 
Bugis. Islands, villages, political figures were mentioned I had never heard 
of… So, at all different levels, I felt like an absolute beginner. It was only 
later that I realized this was an inevitable horde I had to take which is 
characteristic of all fieldwork in unfamiliar places (Grills 1998: 10-14).   
 
This preliminary visit made two important things clear. First, upon my return 
to Belgium, I started studying Indonesian through all possible means on a 
daily basis: courses on CD, children’s books and cartoons, asking 
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clarifications to a friend who spoke Bahasa Indonesia, travelling through 
Indonesia and trying to talk to people… This was completed by intensive, 
private language classes in Yogjakarta. Secondly, I agreed that this entry point 
of forced migration was indeed potentially interesting to better understand 
response mechanisms of civil populations in protracted warfare and how this 
brought about processes of social change. Conflict induced migration is a 
radical breakdown of the traditional way of living and a dynamic process in 
which access to alternative economic assets needs to be negotiated and places 
and related identities are re-imagined. In contrast to traditional, ‘old’ 
approaches which treated forced migrants as passive, voiceless victims or 
speechless emissaries, numerous studies from the nineties onwards have 
illustrated how forced migrants are proactive agents being able to make their 
own decisions (Malkki 1995a, Brun 2001, Refslund Sorenson 2001). 
Examples include how forced migration recreated social and economic 
interdependence (Jacobsen 2002), established new forms of identity (Colson 
2003), or facilitated processes of emplacement (Holm Pederson 2003). In 
sum, as Stephen Castles (2004:13) rightly argues, ‘forced migration needs to 
be analyzed as a social process in which human agency and social networks 
play a major part’, despite the fact this often deepens underdevelopment.  
 
However, I also had the feeling that in order to overcome the enormous 
complexity with which I was confronted in my first visit, I needed to start 
from a straightforward question and a concrete, delineated case study. I then 
returned to Ambon in the beginning of 2006 until March 2006 to conduct my 
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first fieldwork. I took the discussions about the start of the conflict largely as 
a ‘fait accompli’ and did not intend to contribute substantially to these 
debates. Instead, I focused on the basic question of how people attempted to 
generate income in one Christian and one Muslim IDP camp, situated in the 
city of Ambon (see chapter 4). In contrast to my first visit in December 2004, 
this research went relatively smoothly. Although I still opted to conduct my 
interviews with a translator, I could understand whole parts of the 
conversation and directly interact with the people. Moreover, people 
collaborated in the research with great enthusiasm and openness. This made it 
a pleasant experience in which I managed to collect a lot of data about the 
everyday workings of these camps and how the people living in these camps 
had attempted to cope with the year-long conflict that raged throughout the 
city.  
 
1.3. Land access, relocation and socio-political control  
 
At the same time, upon my return and attempting to write a coherent article, 
there were a number of things I became increasingly critical of. The approach 
I had employed was overtly agency-oriented. Many valuable insights have 
been gained through this angle. On the other hand, it was obvious that these 
attempts were constrained due to all sorts of structural factors which were 
beyond the control of these people. Moreover, the comparison between the 
two different IDP camps made clear that, despite the fact that these sites were 
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only situated a couple of kilometers away from each other, economic 
opportunities were spatially unevenly distributed. In this sense, I increasingly 
grew uncomfortable about utterly liberal notions of refugees ‘not recognizing 
the (new) opportunities available to them’ (Essed et.al 2004: 2), or seeing the 
poverty and deprivation with which the majority of forced migrants in the 
world are confronted with as ‘motive forces for innovative change and 
adaptation’ (Kibreab 2004: 23). This growing discomfort corresponded with 
some pertinent criticisms that more generally have been formulated of the 
downscaling of development studies. In too many cases, these micro and 
agency-oriented perspectives have been reduced to a myth of survival about 
the perpetual resilience of households in spite of severe structural constraints 
and tend to leave power relations out of the picture. This holds true for both 
the case of power relations within the household, as for broader, structural 
power relations ‘above’ the household, thereby also influencing intra-
household dynamics (Agarwal 1997, De Haan and Zomers 2005, Gonzalez de 
la Rocha 2007). In the methodology I employed in my first field visit, I 
attempted not seeing the household as a homogeneous unit by accounting for 
gender differences and how these had changed. Nevertheless, too little 
attention was paid to power relations above this household level. My first 
research trip therefore made me realize that more effort needed to be made to 
contextualize my findings. Although my initial ‘keep it simple and concrete’ 
approach had helped to come forward with relevant data, I realized that I had 
artificially closed myself off from the many external complexities which 
influenced the livelihoods of the people living in these camps. In practical 
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terms, this meant that I needed to speak to more people outside these 
delineated sites. For instance, as illustrated in the second part of chapter 4, 
through additional fieldwork, I have tried to contextualize some of the 
findings of my first research trip, by looking into what kind of actors gained 
control of food distribution in conflict-torn Ambon. I also attempted to 
contextualize these findings within a broader picture of how the violence 
affected Ambon economically. This was done by looking for data in statistical 
yearbooks and some other economic studies.  In the meantime, I increasingly 
wondered how the findings in these camps reflected more general social 
changes in Ambonese society. The tension between this micro-level approach 
in a number of delineated camps and looking at how some of these changes 
reflect broader social transformations has always remained a balancing act 
during my whole research. For instance, a question that I have particularly 
focused on, is how far alternative coping mechanisms at the household level 
of society are illustrative of the upward or downward social mobility of 
certain ethnic/religious/class based or other groups. This also meant that I 
needed a better understanding of power relations in Ambonese society and 
how these were distributed.  
 
Moreover, I sensed that I could no longer reduce displacement to being a 
byproduct of the conflict. Rather, it became increasingly obvious that 
displacement stood central to the violence and was potentially an interesting 
entry point to understanding why people engaged in the violent expulsion of 
whole communities. A question I struggled with in particular was how 
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massive displacement linked up with the story of contested state access after 
the fall of Suharto, which is considered by many as pivotal to the start of the 
violence (Bertrand 2002, Goss 2004, Van Klinken 2007). In other words, 
what were the motives behind the expulsion of tens of thousands of people 
and did they all relate to the issue of state access? In addition, I increasingly 
wondered what role natural resources played in explaining the eruption of the 
conflict and how this was potentially related to forced displacement. This 
issue of access to natural resources has always figured prominently in 
multiple discussions on the eruption of conflict. Examples include ideas about 
resource scarcity (Kaplan 1994, Homer Dixon 1999), the opinion that the 
dependence upon primary commodity exports increases the likelihood of 
conflict (Collier 2000), while others elaborate on the spatial distribution of 
resources (Le Billon 2001). Although these debates figured in discussions on 
communal violence in a forest rich area such as West Kalimantan (Lee Peluso 
and Harwell 2001, Lee Peluso 2008, Van Klinken 2008), this was never 
touched upon with regards to the warfare in Ambon and surrounding islands. 
Moreover, many authors have illustrated how access to natural resources is 
not only central to the beginning but also to the sustaining of the conflict. 
Armed groups establish their own alternative systems of control over natural 
resources which become important sources of income for these groups. 
Therefore, the establishment of these so-called war economies considerably 
prolongs conflict (Kaldor 1999, Reno 1999, Goodhand 2004).  
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Simply stated, I felt a need not to just tell a story about forced migration in a 
delineated IDP or relocation camp, but I intended to tell a story about forced 
migration in Ambon. In this sense, I adapted the focus of my research in the 
second visit in the first three months of 2007. This focus has largely been 
maintained in my subsequent visits in the last three months of 2007 and the 
summer of 2008. This change in focus also had a practical reason as the IDP 
camps I worked in, in 2006, were no longer there in 2007. Therefore I decided 
to start conducting research in four relocation camps scattered all over the 
island (see map No. 2). Instead of focusing on a broad issue such as income 
generation, I decided to elaborate on the question of land in these new sites. In 
all the interviews I conducted, there were three guiding questions I always 
kept in the back of my mind: (i) why, how and when were these communities 
forcibly displaced and how is this related to their inability/unwillingness to 
return to the place they were living before 1999, (ii) what sort of systems are 
used to access to land in these relocation sites, (iii) how does this affect the 
livelihoods of the people living in these camps. 
 
This new focus has enabled me to complement many of the deficiencies I 
came across in my first fieldwork. Land is inextricably linked with questions 
of authority and control. Having control over access to land means that one 
has control over the people which are dependent on this land access for their 
daily livelihood. In many cases, this economic control is converted into 
political power (Herbst 2000: 173-199, Huggins and Pottier 2005). Moreover, 
land access is contested, in particular in those regions where land is a scarce 
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resource. Based on fieldwork conducted in the sixties, the Dutch scholar Chris 
van Fraassen, already noted how in particular on the islands of Ambon and 
Saparua, many people were confronted with limited access to land and 
therefore were forced to search for jobs outside agriculture (Van Fraassen 
1971: 34). This increasing land scarcity was also noted by the legal 
anthropologist, Franz von Benda Beckmann, when conducting fieldwork in 
the Ambonese village of Hila in the eighties (Von Benda Beckmann 1990). It 
is therefore obvious that land access in Ambon has always been a politicized 
and contested issue, which makes it interesting to see how this interacted with 
the violence starting in 1999.  
 
Considering the first question of why, when and how these communities 
became expelled, displacement proved to be a fruitful entry point to study 
some of the motives to engage in the conflict. Due to the intimate character of 
the warfare, it has always been difficult to openly touch upon violence. My 
first efforts to discuss violence were often evaded by pointing to unknown 
provocateurs, stressing the peaceful nature of the Ambonese people or the 
opinion that it is no use talking about these issues and everybody should be 
looking forward and leaving the past behind. Some people simply stated they 
were fed up with thinking and talking about the conflict. Following Paul 
Richards (2005: 12) who states that less attention has to be paid on what 
exactly ‘triggered’ war, but we instead have to focus more on ‘how people 
make war and peace’, I considered it more fruitful to start asking how 
violence was conducted through the indirect angle of displacement, rather 
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than asking why it was conducted. This why question inevitably promotes 
‘motive talk’ (Prus 1998: 29) in which people feel obliged to justify their 
behavior to the researcher. Through this how question however, I managed to 
gather a lot of interesting information as to why violence was conducted 
against certain sections of society. In particular the observation that many of 
these displaced communities have been actively protected by some while 
attacked by others, was central to the insight that localized tensions to access 
natural resources have too often been neglected by scholars studying the 
violence in Ambon. These findings form the basis of chapter 3 entitled 
‘Explaining communal conflict. Agency, private opportunities and ‘ordinary 
folk’. This is the only chapter in which I directly engage in discussions about 
the eruption and subsequent escalation of violence in Ambon. How this is 
then related to the inability/unwillingness to return is elaborated in chapter 5 
entitled ‘I am more indigenous than you are. Recognizing customary tenure in 
Ambon’. Studying return confirmed, although in a nuanced and complex 
manner, how the conflict created opportunities for taking over land by more 
powerful groups in society. Moreover, it was obvious that since the ending of 
the conflict, attempts are being made to legally confirm some of the 
population movements as they were brought about by the violence. This 
whole issue of return also made me aware how access rights to land have a 
strong ethnic connotation and how ethnicity and religion always have 
interacted with each other in dynamic and complex ways in Ambon.   
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At the same time, despite the new focus of my research, I wanted to hold on to 
the original objective of studying social change at the micro-level of society. 
More particular, I have focused on the rather straightforward question of how 
relocation affected the livelihoods of relocated populations and how this was 
related to land access. In hindsight, this question was probably too vague 
considering the diversity found the in relocation sites studied. Nevertheless, 
two important findings have emerged. As rightly argued by many scholars, 
insecure access to limited land inevitably intensifies processes of 
impoverishment and social exclusion, in particular when opportunities for 
income generation outside agriculture are limited (Borras, Kay and Akhrim 
Lodi, 2005). This is particularly the case in environments characterized by 
conflict and economic decline (Pons-Vignon and Solignac Lecomte 2004, 
Taeb 2004), and specifically those who have forcibly migrated tend to be 
vulnerable to this (Jacobson 2005). This observation could be confirmed 
through my own research. However, as I will argue in chapter 6 entitled 
‘Relocation and access to land’, it is equally important to note that this has 
inevitably created profound frustrations. Although everybody lost throughout 
the conflict, as the popular opinion sometimes goes, some have lost more than 
others and the people permanently relocated are definitely among those who 
have lost a lot. This builds further on the findings put forward in chapter 3 and 
5 in the sense that the communal conflict invoked opportunities for certain 
groups to take over land and resources and this has inevitably led to the social 
exclusion and impoverishment of other groups.  
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1.4. Methodology 
 
This shift from displacement to relocation thus coincided with a change in 
methodological approach. All my fieldwork in Ambon has always been 
ethnographic in nature in a broad sense that I aimed to ‘engage the other and 
to learn their worlds, their ways of seeing, and their ways of doing and being’ 
(Grills 1998: 16). I do not intend to go deep into definitional discussions 
about the meaning of ethnography as ethnography has never been a matter of 
clearly defined methods, techniques or received procedures but rather a kind 
of intellectual effort (Geertz 1973: 5-6). A central part of this effort is 
fieldwork which implies that, at least in a purely spatial sense, attempts are 
made to get as close as possible to interpret certain social objects, concepts 
and structures. Like in most other cases of ethnographic research, all the 
fieldwork I undertook in Ambon has consisted of a traditional mix of 
observation, participation and interviewing. Under this broad cover however, I 
went through a fundamental shift from a rather rigid approach consisting of 
methods aimed at collecting quantitative data to a more flexible and purely 
qualitative approach. In my first fieldwork in 2006, I used a questionnaire in 
which I attempted to quantify income generation strategies among displaced 
communities. As argued by Cerwonka and Malkki (2007:168), quantitative 
data can perfectly be seen as ‘another form of situated knowledge’, which is 
therefore not by definition contradictory to the basic underpinnings of 
ethnographic research. Moreover, these quantitative data were based on own, 
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first-hand interviews and were completed with much qualitative findings.4
 
 
The discomfort after my first fieldwork therefore did not really concern this 
quantitative approach as such but rather, as I already stated, the limited 
contextualization of these data. To a certain extent, I had the feeling these data 
were disconnected. In some way, this was normal considering my still limited 
insight into broader social transformations in Ambonese society after that first 
field visit. Moreover, an additional problem I encountered was that gathering 
representative and solid quantitative data proved extremely time-consuming, 
in particular when working as an individual researcher with a limited budget. 
This problem of time was one of the prime reasons why I decided to solely 
focus on qualitative data in future research.     
Second, a much greater reflectivity was applied with regards to my initial 
research objectives and questions. It is probably the most important 
characteristic of research which is considered ethnographic that a high level of 
flexibility/adaptability/improvisation is displayed towards the initial research 
questions (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 28-32, Cerwonka and Malkki 
2007: 197-206). Although I always used the three questions stated above as 
guiding principles, I integrated many new and interesting observations arising 
from the fieldwork. Rather than following a straight line, many sideways have 
been explored which often led me far away from the stipulated trajectory. For 
instance, although I never directly alluded to these issues, when discussing 
                                                          
4 For a more in-depth analysis of this methodology, see chapter 4. 
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displacement and return, many people immediately started talking about their 
emotional bond with the place they were born, how they feel alienated since 
their expulsion... I quickly realized there was an enormous richness in all 
these narratives and emotions that could not be left out. A turning point in this 
regard was the observation that people in one relocation camp openly stated 
they wished to return home, despite the fact they enjoyed many economic 
advantages since their relocation. This observation was the starting point of 
some interesting lines of thought which resulted in chapter 8 ‘Repairing a 
broken order. Forced migration, adat and a purified present’. This chapter is 
also an illustration of how reflexivity as a basic attitude for any ethnographer 
is linked with a broader knowledge of a certain region. It struck me for 
instance how narratives of return bore many elements of a much broader 
reconciliation narrative that could be heard in Ambonese society. It is only 
after a sustained period in the field that these sorts of interesting links and 
connections can be made. Not coincidentally, it were thus the last months of 
my field research which proved to be the most interesting. It was also in those 
last months I increasingly came to realize I was no longer ‘recording the 
story’. The initial approach for my fieldwork was very much driven by a 
commitment to give voice to the ordinary Ambonese who had lived through 
this conflict. Almost unconsciously, I thereby attempted to efface myself as a 
researcher as it was not about ‘me’ but about ‘them’. Although I think and 
hope that I have always stayed true to this commitment, I realized I was 
constantly attempting to connect different observations, thereby constructing a 
personalized interpretation that cannot simply be judged as right or wrong 
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(Aunger 2004: 4-14). As already described by Malinovski in 1935 (cited in 
Cerwonka and Malkki 2007:171): ‘The observer should not function as a 
mere automaton; a sort of combined camera and phonographic or shorthand 
recorder of native statements. While making his observations, the fieldworker 
must constantly construct: he must place isolated data in relation to one 
another and study the manner in which they integrate’. Inevitably, this implies 
that on some of the interpretations I make in this dissertation, many people 
will fundamentally disagree.   
 
There is still another reason to view this dissertation as a personal 
interpretation rather than mere truth. Conducting fieldwork learns how 
complex certain social processes can be, and that some questions remain 
unsolved. In some (limited) cases, certain findings even do not fit in the 
general picture and contradict an apparently evident and established idea. For 
instance, much of this dissertation talks about spatial transformations and how 
religious minorities at a certain point became expelled. Nevertheless, when 
conducting interviews on the Christian market of Batu Meja in Ambon town, 
it was all of a sudden mentioned that throughout the conflict, there was one 
Muslim Butonese family who continued selling there. I double checked this 
story among other petty traders, and much to my astonishment, this was 
confirmed. Asking why this family was not chased away, people simply 
answered that everybody knew that they were good people and never meant 
harm to anyone. Although I think that this one story does not radically deny 
my findings about the religious clearings throughout the high-intensity 
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violence, this has always served as a warning that there always remain certain 
complexities which are inevitably overlooked.  
 
In some cases, flexibility and adaptation of my initial research question was 
unavoidable. For instance, in one relocation site, my approach of land access 
was quite useless, considering this community was very much focused on 
income generation in the city of Ambon. Nevertheless, I decided to continue 
working in this site and switched my focus to access to informal economies. 
Only towards the end of my research, I understood that the similarities with 
the other relocation sites were pertinent in a sense that in all four different 
cases, access to space to perform economic activities stood central. While in 
this particular case, this space was used to perform activities in the informal 
economy, in the other three cases, this space was used for farming. Evidently, 
this flexibility also stood central to the more ‘contextualized’ or ‘embedded’ 
approach I aimed for. Rather than seeing the relocation sites as ends in 
themselves, I wanted to use these as entry points which revealed something 
about social transformations in Ambonese society. Therefore, issues have 
been studied which are not immediately related to these four case studies. For 
instance, when I came across interesting insights about access to informal 
economies in one site, I attempted to broaden this issue for the whole city of 
Ambon. Therefore, markets and taxi stalls have been studied, even though 
displaced people are not directly linked to them (see chapter 7: Downward 
Social Mobility, Prestige and the Informal Economy). Another example is my 
work among a network of lawyers who were central in the making up of new 
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legislations to access land since the end of the conflict (see chapter 5: The 
Problem of Going Home. Recognizing Customary Tenure in Ambon) and the 
reconstruction I made about the violent expulsion of the Waai community in 
chapter 3.  
 
Lastly, a deliberate choice has been made to approach the three questions 
stated above from a comparative angle. Although any single case definitely 
has an intrinsic value to study, my trip in 2006 made clear to me that 
comparative research has some advantages. On the one hand, this potentially 
increases the generalization of certain findings (Lorenz 1998: 163-197). On 
the other hand, this potentially puts forward many interesting questions and 
explanations in an analytical sense.5 For instance, in my first research trip in 
2006, it became clear that more displaced Christian women became involved 
in informal petty trade activities, compared to displaced Muslim women. This 
observation made me search for explanations and ultimately pointed to some 
remarkable spatial transformations throughout the conflict. I intended to 
follow this line in my work on relocated communities.6
                                                          
5 This is also the case with some of the more innovative work on forced migration. 
See for instance Malkki (1995a) on the comparison between camp refugees and urban 
refugees in Tanzania. 
 Central to this 
objective was the fact that all four relocation sites were remarkably different 
from each other. First of all, a division was made between two Christian 
(Kayu Tiga and Hila-Tanah Putih) and two Muslim relocation camps (Iha-
6 These different sites will be discussed more in-depth in the different chapters. 
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Liang and Kate-Kate). One camp was constituted by an indigenous adat law 
community (Iha-Liang), one ‘in-between’ adat law community (Hila-Tanah 
Putih) and two non-indigenous communities (Kayu Tiga and Kate-Kate). Two 
relocation camps were in rural areas (Iha-Liang and Hila-Tanah Putih), one in 
a semi-rural area (Kate-Kate) and one was urban oriented (Kayu Tiga). Just 
like in the case of my work in the IDP camps, my entry point to these four 
sites was rather straightforward. I presented myself as a student (mahasiswa) 
from Belgium and asked community leaders (civil and religious) if I was 
allowed to conduct research on issues of migration and land access in order to 
write a dissertation.7
 
 In all four cases, the answer was positive although the 
level of cooperation among the four different sites was quite different.  
This comparative angle has put forward many interesting hypothesis’ and 
questions as I was forced to search for an explanation when encountering 
differences between different sites. In this regard, this had many advantages 
and I still consider this a good idea. The downside however is that this 
approach is time-consuming. In total, I spent about 6 to 7 months working on 
relocation. As I already spent about 3 months in the field in 2006, this means 
                                                          
7 In three cases, this access was smoothened as people I knew from a local NGO 
called Ekkaleo were involved in a small education program for children. However, as 
I conducted most of my research on my own and the activities of Ekkaleo were low 
profile and not outspokenly political, I never had the feeling people felt restrained in 
talking to me due to this connection.  
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that I spent between 9 and 10 months doing field research.8
                                                          
8 Now and then, these visits have been cut through by short stays in Yogjakarta to 
extend my visa. In these short stays, I followed additional private lessons in 
Indonesian language. I also integrated in a network of Ambonese students studying at 
the UGM (Universitas Gadjah Mada) which provided me with additional information 
and insights. 
 Although I had 
the feeling this was more than enough after my last field visit in 2008, 
considering the wide range of issues I cover in this dissertation, this period is 
in fact quite short. This thesis therefore differs from the more classic 
anthropological fieldworks consisting of at least 1 year of fieldwork in one 
and the same site. Moreover, although I visited all these relocation places on a 
regular basis, I never actually lived in these sites. In this regard, data based on 
classic participant observation are limited. There are instances in which I 
followed farmers to their fields, hung out in taxi stands and market places and 
plucked cloves until my thumb almost fell off, but these sorts of 
methodologies have not been utilized in a systematic way. Moreover, it is 
important to note that a substantial part of the information could not be 
gathered through participant observation as they concerned data on a conflict 
that by and large was over by the time I conducted the field research. 
Therefore, the majority of the information has been gathered using a diversity 
of rather classic interview techniques such as household interviews, individual 
interviews and focus group discussions. For these reasons, I have always felt 
hesitant to consider my research as ‘anthropological’ but prefer to see my 
work, as I already said, as an ethnographic account about social change 
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throughout and following a communal conflict on the Indonesian island of 
Ambon, through the angle of forced migration.   
 
 
1.5. Representation 
 
A final, short word needs to be said about the representation of my data. As 
the reader of this dissertation will notice, most of the chapters are based on 
articles which are either published, in press or under review. The prime reason 
for this is a pragmatic one, due to the pressure being currently put on Ph.D. 
students to publish in peer reviewed journals before completing their thesis. 
This publish or perish policy has meant that there is not one big argument 
being developed throughout the whole thesis. Instead, I have worked out one 
argument per chapter/article. As a consequence, this dissertation is ill-suited 
as a potential blueprint for a book. Nevertheless, I have attempted to upgrade 
the coherence by presenting the chapters and arguments in a chronological 
order. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the conflict as such. Chapter 4 concerns 
displacement throughout the conflict, while Chapter 5 relates to the question 
of why some communities could not return home once the conflict ended. The 
remaining chapters then broadly consider the societal consequences of this 
permanent relocation. I hope that, in this way, I managed to enhance the 
readability of this dissertation.    
 II 
 
  
The events 
 
 
This chapter aims to give a chronological overview of the events that came to 
be known in Ambon as the kerusuhan (unrest, troubles). As will be 
demonstrated in chapter 3, different narratives exist about the origins of some 
of the fighting that occurred. Yet, most people agree that the kerusuhan was 
set in motion on the 19th of January 1999, after a banal fight in the transport 
terminal of the city of Ambon.1
                                                          
1 The city of Ambon consists of 258.331 people of which there are 120.489 Muslims, 
122.407 Protestants and 15.175 Catholics. The province of Maluku consists of 
1.322.908 people of which there are 798.292 Muslims, 425.490 Protestants and 
94.180 Catholics, the rest are small minority religions (BPS 2007). The city of 
Ambon, situated on the island of Ambon, is the capital of the province of Maluku 
 Following this scuffle, many slumbering 
tensions erupted, thereby provoking a quick escalation of the violence over 
the many different islands the province of Maluku consists of. While it is 
relatively easy to point to the symbolic beginning of the conflict, it is 
impossible to define a fixed date for its ending. Rather, this should be 
understood as a gradual process which is still continuing until today. Also, 
what is considered as the kerusuhan cannot be seen as a period of constant 
warfare but should be understood as a communal conflict that occurred in 
different waves at different places. As will be demonstrated below, the town 
of Ambon witnessed several periods of relative stability. At the same time, 
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full-scale violence could abruptly erupt on the neighboring islands. It 
therefore makes sense to speak about a period of high-intensity, communal 
conflict that characterized Ambon and surrounding islands such as Haruku 
and Saparua from the beginning of 1999 until 2001. From 2001 onwards, 
large-scale collective violence was gradually being replaced by sporadic acts 
of violence conducted by radicalized minorities and the number of deaths and 
the scale of infrastructural destruction decreased considerably. In the 
beginning of 2002, a peace agreement was signed known as Malino II. This 
peace agreement not only illustrated the willingness of parts of the political 
establishment in Jakarta to end the conflict, it also showed how among broad 
sections of the Ambonese elite, there was a belief that talking to each other 
was more fruitful than fighting. Previously, similar initiatives often ended up 
being painful failures. For instance, in September 2000, president 
Abdurrahman Wahid invited a delegation of Christian and Muslim leaders to 
Jakarta to discuss possible ways of ending the conflict. As one of the 
members of the Muslim delegation, Thamrin Ely, recounted, trouble began 
even before their departure to Jakarta as the Christian and Muslim delegations 
insisted on taking different planes, both parties preferred staying in different 
hotels in Jakarta and ultimately, decided they did not wish to talk to each 
other with each side accusing the other of having ‘provocateurs’ in their 
delegation. Ultimately the Christian and Muslim delegations went back to 
Ambon without seeing each other. In contrast, at the beginning of 2002, it 
seemed as if both parties really understood the importance of talking to each 
other and coming to a shared, albeit vague, agreement. As the intensity of the 
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violence declined, from 2003 onwards, the first few brave souls carefully - yet 
systematically - started crossing the fixed religious frontlines.2
 
 This process 
came to a halt at the end of April 2004 when renewed fighting between 
Christians and Muslims erupted in the city centre of Ambon. Luckily, this 
short but intense outburst of violence only interrupted a slow but steady 
process of recovery and rapprochement between the two religious 
communities. 
As I explained in the introduction, the research project was primarily focused 
on aspects of social transformation and displacement due to the communal 
conflict, rather than the actual fighting. This chapter therefore does not 
pretend to contribute substantially to what is already known about the course 
of the violence in Ambon, although new data have been added to existing 
literature on the subject. First of all, I conducted a thorough study of 
Ambonese newspapers for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 which provided me 
with new insights and data about the progress of the conflict.3
                                                          
2 Until the last period of fieldwork in the summer of 2008, many people still 
expressed a deep unease of going to certain places on Ambon. For many Christians, 
the Muslim dominated Leihitu part of the island was still perceived as an unsafe, no-
go area. This was particularly the case for the dreaded village of Hitu, considered to 
be the home of fierce and radicalized Muslim fighters. Many Muslims living in 
Ambon city have never visited again the Christian neighborhood of Kudamati since 
the start of the conflict. 
 Furthermore, 
3 These newspaper articles have been consulted in the Moluks Historisch Museum, 
Utrecht. The majority of these newspapers have not yet been properly classified. An 
interesting document is a day to day collection of Ambonese newspaper articles 
(Christian and Muslim) that have been compiled by the Ambonese minister A.F. 
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the personal, slightly biased, but nonetheless interesting daily notes and 
observations from the Dutch priest and teacher C.J. Böhm who lived in the 
city of Ambon throughout the violence have been scrutinized.4
 
 Last but not 
least, many people have shared their personal experiences, emotions and 
opinions about what happened throughout this period. Some of this has been 
integrated in this chapter.          
 
2.1. Violence in post-Suharto Indonesia 
 
When the Suharto led authoritarian New Order imploded in May 1998 in the 
midst of a grave financial and economic crisis, it looked as if the Indonesian 
archipelago became engulfed in a wave of violence. Serious anti-Chinese riots 
broke out in the capital of Jakarta and Christian-Muslim riots erupted in 
diverse places such as Ambon, capital of the province of Maluku (January 
1999), North Maluku (August 1999) and the city of Poso in the province of 
Central Sulawesi (December 1998). Inter-ethnic riots between Dayaks and 
Madurese started in Central  Kalimantan (February 2001) while Malay versus 
Madurese violence erupted in West Kalimantan (February 1999). In the 
                                                                                                                                           
Manupessy. This document runs from January 1999 until August 2001 and consists of 
10 volumes totaling more than 2000 pages. 
4 The majority of these documents entitled ‘The situation in Ambon/Moluccas’ can be 
retrieved from the website www.malra.org/posko , later additions have been given to 
me by C.J. Böhm himself. The whole document runs from June 22, 2000 until May 
29, 2006. 
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meanwhile, existing separatist conflicts in Aceh and East Timor intensified. 
On top of this, the terrorist attacks of the Jemaah Islamiyah in Bali in October 
2002 and some minor bombings afterwards put Indonesia at the frontline of 
the US led war on terrorism. Despite the huge media coverage of the events in 
East Timor and the attacks conducted by the Jemaah Islamiyah, the violence 
between Christians and Muslims in the province of Maluku stood out as one 
of the most bitter, intense and prolonged conflicts in post-New Order 
Indonesia. Within this province, the city and the island of Ambon and some of 
the closest surrounding islands in particular were affected by a high-intensity 
conflict which lasted from 1999 until 2001, but even as late as April 2004, 
there were profound outburst of violence leading to dozens of deaths. Due to 
its longevity, it is fair to characterize the violence in Ambon as a protracted 
communal conflict. Moreover, the number of direct killings arising from the 
violence was high compared with those in other regions in Indonesia. 
Conservative estimates put this number at 2,023 (Varshney et al 2004: 39) in 
the province of Maluku for the period between 1990 and 2003.5
                                                          
5 As a comparison, the devastating terrorist attack of the Jemaah Islamiyah in Bali 
cost the life of 202 people. 
 Evidently, the 
large majority of these killings occurred during the high-intensity period of 
the conflict that started in early 1999. Because this assessment by Varshney et 
al (2004) is grounded on recorded deaths in newspapers, it is likely that the 
real number of direct killings was considerably higher. The International 
Crisis Group (ICG, 2002) estimates for example that by 2002, the number of 
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deaths due to the violence in the provinces of both Maluku and North Maluku 
had reached between 5,000 and 10,000. Even more revealing is the relative 
share of violent religious incidents. Out of 14 Indonesian provinces that have 
been researched by Varshney et al (2004), the province of Maluku alone 
accounts for 73.4% of religious incidents resulting in direct deaths. The lion’s 
share of these killings in Maluku occurred in and around Ambon.  
 
 
2.2. Riots, escalation and endemic conflict in Ambon 
 
Contradictory narratives circulate about what happened that famous January 
19,  1999. Yet, everybody agrees that a Christian public transport driver and 
some Muslim youths became engaged in a fight in the transport terminal in 
the inner city centre of Ambon (HRW 1999). This fight  quickly turned into 
major rioting between Christians and Muslims. Towards the end of the day, in 
multiple neighborhoods in Ambon town, Christians and Muslims clashed with 
each other, thereby causing heavy infrastructural damage. These riots 
continued throughout the whole night and very quickly, the first deaths and 
injuries were reported (HRW 1999). The next day, the violence had already 
spread to more rural regions. The Christian village of Benteng Karang was 
attacked by residents coming from Hitu, Mamala and some other villages 
from the Leihitu peninsula of the island. They marched to Ambon after (false) 
rumors had spread that the Al Fatah mosque in the city centre of Ambon was 
on fire. The attack caused the death of about 15 Christians (HRW 1999:16). In 
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addition, the minority Christian community living between the border of Hila 
and Kaitetu was chased away but no deaths or injuries occurred there. Yet, 6 
people were killed in Hila who were staying at a bible camp organized by the 
New Covenant Church of Christ (Gereja Kristus Perjanjian Baru, GKPB) 
(HRW 1999: 18). In the next few days, violence spread to different locations 
on Ambon island. By early February 1999, different villages on the 
neighbouring islands of Seram, Haruku and Saparua were affected by heavy 
violence. Large-scale expulsions of Muslim Butonese settlements took place, 
in particular on the Christian dominated Leitimur part of Ambon island. One 
example is the different Butonese settlements in the Christian village of Eerie. 
In addition, many market stalls and tricycle taxis - often belonging to Muslim 
Butonese in majority Christians neighborhoods in Ambon town such as 
Kudamati - were destroyed and/or taken over. Many of these Butonese left the 
province of Maluku once and for all. By the beginning of March 1999, after 
the first intensive round of rioting, a conservative estimate putted the death 
toll at around 160 (HRW 1999:2).  
 
Already from the very early days, one should be careful describing the 
violence in Ambon by terms such as ‘spontaneous outbursts’ or 
‘uncoordinated attacks’. Very quickly, coordination centers were established 
in different places which mobilized people - in particular male youth - to 
attack or defend certain neighborhoods (Van Klinken 2007: 99-100). The 
most important coordination centre for the Christians was the big Maranatha 
church, situated next to the governor’s office in the city centre of Ambon. For 
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Muslims, the Al Fatah mosque was a gathering point for Muslim fighters but 
also served as a hospital for the wounded (including civilians) and a 
temporary refuge to the many Muslim IDPs.6 The Maranatha church and the 
Al Fatah mosque are a 10 to 15 minute walking distance from each other. The 
mobile units that were mobilized by these centers came to be known in 
Ambon as the akar rumput (grassroots).7
 
 
Although it is easy to interpret events in hindsight, many Ambonese explained 
to me that the eruption of the inter-religious violence in the beginning of 1999 
was no real surprise to them. Different people used the image of a ‘bom 
waktu’ (time bomb) to refer to the events of those first weeks. Already during 
the preceding weeks, there were apparent occurrences of fights with a strong 
inter-religious rationale. This sense that something was ‘in the air’ can also be 
derived from placards that appeared at the end of 1998 in Ambon promoting 
inter-religious harmony. These placards were placed throughout Ambon by a 
couple of NGOs following the church burnings in the Ketapang district in 
Jakarta and the violent reactions this provoked in the city of Kupang, West 
                                                          
6 As far as mid 2006, hundreds of Muslim IDPs kept residing adjacent to the Al Fatah 
mosque in the camp of THR. (see chapter 4) 
7 The young Christian fighters were referred to as agas after a small mosquito with a 
nasty bite. Agas also stands for Anak Gereja Allah Sayang (Child Church God Love). 
Schulze (2002: 64) estimates that over the two to three years of violence, there existed 
about 25 Christian militia groups consisting of about 100 to 200 members operating 
all over the island of Ambon. About 60% of these militia fighters consisted of youth 
between 12 and 25 years old. The Ambonese Muslim fighters were known as linggis 
(crowbar). 
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Timor on November 30, 1998. At the end of 1998, at ecumenical meetings in 
the Maranatha Church in Ambon city, measures were openly discussed in case 
unrest would break out (The situation in Ambon/Moluccas, Report No. 41, 
August 20, 2000). Yet, despite the anticipation of unrest, everyone spoken to 
confessed that they never expected events would run out of hand the way they 
did. Both the intensity and the enduring nature of the conflict took everybody 
by surprise. At first, it also appeared that the violence could  be contained 
relatively quickly. At the beginning of March, things appeared to return to 
normal and civil servants started returning to their work (Suara Pembaruan, 
March 3, 1999; Kompas, March 19, 1999). Governor Saleh Latuconsina even 
officially declared that it was safe enough for all IDPs to return home and start 
rebuilding their lives (Suara Maluku, March 13, 1999). This lull in the 
fighting came to define the first phase of the conflict (Tanamal and Trijono 
2004: 238-239).  
 
Although no longer resulting in massive bloodletting, tensions remained 
strained in and around Ambon.8
                                                          
8 This was also the case in the town of Tual on the far-away Kei islands in Southeast 
Maluku where inter-religious violence erupted in April 1999. The violence on the Kei 
island could relatively easy and quickly be contained (Thornburn 2002). 
 As would happen regularly in the coming 
months, sporadic confrontations took place in the borderland between 
Christian Mardika and Muslim Batu Merah. The area around Diponegoro 
street also remained vulnerable to violence between Christians and Muslims 
(Suara Maluku, July 19, 1999). This period of relative calm came to a halt 
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when renewed high-intensity violence erupted from the 23th until the 25th of 
July in Poka, at the opposite end of the bay from where Ambon city is situated 
(see map No. 1). These events in Poka were the start of what came to be 
known as the second round of riots in Ambon which lasted until late 
1999/early 2000 (Van Klinken 2001:4). Throughout August and September, 
the town and the island of Ambon were plagued by major riots such as the 
ones in Hative Kecil at the end of August. In the beginning of October, heavy 
fighting broke out in the neighborhoods of Batu Merah, Benteng and Air 
Salobar. The region of Seram Barat (Western Seram) also became affected by 
inter-religious violence resulting in dozens dead (Suara Maluku, December 6, 
1999). Towards the end of 1999, it looked as if Ambon and the surrounding 
island were descending into total chaos with some of the worst clashes ever 
taking place. The start of this intensive round of rioting was the burning of the 
Silo church in the city of Ambon on the 26th of December 1999. The 
following day, the An Nur mosque was totally destroyed. Three days after the 
burning of the Silo Church, 58 deaths were reported in the city of Ambon 
alone and hundreds more wounded (Suara Pembaruan, December 29 1999). 
Ambonese newspapers referred to this period as ‘natal berdarah’ (bloody 
Christmas), in other cases, the image of a ‘lautan api’ or ‘fire sea’ was used to 
describe the city of Ambon (Suara Maluku, December 28, 1999). On New 
Year’s Eve, a curfew was declared in the city during which people were 
forbidden to go out between 10pm until 6 am in the morning. Other islands 
also witnessed some of the worst violence around this period. On New Year’s 
Eve, there was intense fighting in different villages on the island of Haruku 
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and the town of Masohi on the island of Seram witnessed very serious inter-
religious rioting in the beginning of 2000. The Christian newspaper Suara 
Maluku speaks of 64 deaths due to these riots in the town of Masohi alone 
(Suara Maluku, January 3, 2000). Despite these ferocities, from the middle of 
January onwards, the first reports of a kondisi tenang (cooling condition) can 
be retrieved. This relative stability was firstly evident in Ambon town. In 
many rural regions, violence still erupted frequently. For instance, regular 
border skirmishes took place between Muslim Hitu and Christian Wakal in 
the second half of January. In February and March 2000, violence erupted 
between Christians and Muslims on the island of Buru. Nevertheless, from 
March 2000 onwards, communal tensions started easing in most places in the 
province of Maluku.  
 
 
2.3. The importance of religious framing  
 
In the meantime, the devastating fighting in Maluku had touched a sensitive 
chord in the rest of Indonesia. Already in the first weeks following the 
outbreak of violence in Ambon, demonstrations were staged in many 
Indonesian cities such as Jakarta, Semarang and Pekanbaru (Bertrand 2004: 
127). Yet, as the number of killings rose to unprecedented levels towards the 
end of 1999, voices for concrete engagement in the Moluccas rose 
considerably, in particular among radical and conservative Islamic groupings. 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the period of the natal berdarah in 
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Ambon coincided with massive killings in the province of North Maluku. The 
conflict in North Maluku was already simmering from August 1999 onwards 
but erupted full-scale from November 1999 until early 2000. In particular the 
events on December 27th in which Protestants killed more than 400 
defenseless Muslim civilians in one night was a sad pinnacle (ICG 2002). 
This event boosted the impression among many Muslims in the rest of 
Indonesia that Islam was threatened in the Moluccas and needed protection 
the state could not guarantee (Davis 2002: 15-16). This served as a multiplier 
for the involvement of new armed militias. This religious framing of the 
conflict is central to understanding the dramatic and unforeseen escalation of 
the violence. In Ambon, people translated their everyday experiences into 
broader frameworks they knew from other places in the world. Typical 
examples are identifications with the conflict in the Middle East. For instance, 
the following pictures were taken in deserted houses of Christians in the area 
of Poka/Rumah Tiga. Similar sorts of graffiti can still be retrieved in many 
Muslim places depicting militant organizations such as Hizbullah or 
references to the Intafada.  
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Graffiti on deserted Christian houses in Poka/Rumah Tiga, November 2007 
 
 
 
Apart from Ambonese translating localized events into external frameworks, 
external actors also related to the localized events in Ambon. The religious 
rationale behind the communal violence in Ambon was followed with great 
attention as many Muslims and Christians in the rest of Indonesia felt 
concerned or even sympathetic with their religious brethren (Sidel 2006: 182-
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184). This religious affinity made it possible for certain entrepreneurs to 
mobilize new actors towards violence. This happened both inside and outside 
Ambon. On the island of Lombok, the events in Maluku became a symbolic 
point of reference through which anti-Christian riots were instigated (Avonius 
2004). In the meantime, new patterns of mobilization emerged through which 
non-Moluccan actors would become involved in the Ambonese communal 
violence, thereby giving local conflict a new national and even international 
dimension (Sidel 2006: 196-197).  
 
The most prominent among these armed militias was the Laskar Jihad (the 
Jihad Paramilitary Force) which arrived in the town of Ambon around 
April/May 2000, gracefully cheered by large crowds of Ambonese Muslims 
(Noorhaidi 2006: 204).9
                                                          
9 I do not intend to give a broad overview about the ideological origins of this Laskar 
Jihad as this falls outside the scope of the research. For an elaborate account, see in 
particular the outstanding work by Noorhaidi Hasan (2002, 2005)  
 The Laskar Jihad was set up in the beginning of 
January 2000 as the paramilitary division of the Salafist Forum Komunikasi 
Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jama’ah (FKAWJ, Communication Forum for the 
Congregation of the Followers of the Prophet). In turn, the FKAWJ was 
established in February 1998 in Solo, Java (Hasan 2002: 146-147, 154). On 
April 6, 2000, the enigmatic leader of the Laskar Jihad, Ja’afar Umar Thalib, 
made an open plea in the Senayan stadium in Jakarta to interfere in the 
Moluccas. A couple of weeks later, the first Laskar Jihad fighters set sail for 
Ambon. It is estimated that at its peak, there were about 3000 Laskar Jihad 
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members operating in Ambon. Only a minority of this group was engaged in 
real active fighting. The majority was involved in social services such as 
teaching and nursing. Even after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad, the big 
majority within the Muslim militias still consisted of Ambonese Muslims 
(Noorhaidi 2006: 207). Apart from the Laskar Jihad, some other minor 
Muslim paramilitary groups such as the Front Pembela Islam Maluku (Front 
of the Defenders of Islam in the Moluccas) and the Laskar Mujahidin 
Indonesia (the Indonesian Holy Warrior Paramilitary Force) also left for 
Ambon (Hasan 2002: 148-150). These militias were far outnumbered by the 
Laskar Jihad and only played a marginal role.  
 
The importance of this religious framing also becomes clear if we look at the 
role played by the different security forces. This role cannot be understood 
without making reference to the general Muslim versus Christian divide (ICG 
2002). Although the army versus police tensions that characterized the 
conflict in Ambon were also influenced by national competition (Azca 2003), 
one can generally state that the local police forces and the Brimob (Brigade 
Mobil) took sides with the Christians. Different sections within the TNI 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia, National Army of Indonesia) took sides with the 
Muslims. This siding was largely based on religious affiliation. The majority 
of  the army forces came from outside of Maluku and were generally Muslim. 
The local police forces consisted of 70% Christians (ICG 2002: 4), the 
Brimob counted 75% Christians amongst their rank (Bertrand 2004: 131). 
This stands in sharp contrast to the observations made by Lee Peluso (2001) 
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about the anti-Madurese riots in early 1999 in West Kalimantan. Just like in 
Ambon, a total mismanagement of the security situation by the armed forces 
was noted. In West Kalimantan however, there was hardly any alignment of 
the armed forces with the warring parties. The military represented the 
Indonesian state and the Indonesian state was not a direct target of the armed 
groups. Moreover, these military were considered to be external, neutral and 
having little affinity with the localized battles that were framed through an 
ethnic lens.    
 
 
2.4. The coming of the Laskar Jihad 
 
The arrival of the Laskar Jihad led to a new escalation of the conflict and 
invigorated the military power of the Muslims. Before May 2000, the Muslim 
side was predominantly on the defensive, in particular in the city centre of 
Ambon where they were pushed into a small strip near the harbour. This 
changed after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad who did not just bring fresh 
fighters, superior arms and logistical support (ICG 2000; Goss 2004) but also 
fuelled the spirit of many Ambonese Muslims (Noorhaidi 2006: 205). Shortly 
upon the arrival of the first Laskar Jihad troops, some daring, simultaneous 
attacks were launched on the 17th of May at different strategic points in the 
city centre of Ambon  (Suara Maluku, May 19, 2000). Around the same time, 
the Brimob headquarters in Tantui were attacked through which additional 
professional weaponry was obtained. Due to the fear that the Laskar Jihad 
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would take hold of the whole city, all foreign staff from international NGOs 
such as the Belgian MSF  (Médecins Sans Frontières, Doctors Without 
Borders) and the French ACF (Action Contre la Faim, Action Against 
Hunger) were evacuated. In the succeeding weeks, agonizing fear gripped the 
Christian Ambonese population. It is also around this period that the Catholic 
priest C.J. Böhm started his series of almost daily reports in an attempt to let 
the outside world know what is happening in Ambon. The first report which 
appeared on June 22th, 2000 is illuminating in this regard: ‘The town of 
Ambon is more and more being surrounded by the Jihad Troops, who in this 
way will prevent any Christian to escape the great-scale slaughter they have in 
mind and is apt to be launched any moment now’. Further on, he states: ‘The 
Christians are trying to defend themselves to their last drop of blood, but are 
outnumbered and do not have adequate weapons. They are ready to die, but 
not without the world to know what has been done to them’. The report is 
then concluded by an urgent plea to the United Nations Security Council to 
intervene in the Moluccas. Although the Christians held their positions in 
Ambon town, some considerable defeats were suffered in other parts of the 
region. In May 2000, the arrival of Laskar Jihad troops on the island of Buru 
led to large expulsions of Christian communities who mainly fled to the island 
of Ambon. Beginning the 10th of June, things started to go awry in the villages 
of Poka/Rumah Tiga and Hative Kecil with major fights between Christians 
and Muslims lasting for several days and resulting in dozens of deaths.   
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Due to the seriousness of the situation, a civil emergency (darurat sipil-
militer) was proclaimed on June 23 in which the military gained extra legal 
powers to intervene in case of new emergencies. Foreigners were officially 
prohibited to enter the province (Kompas, June 24, 2000).10
                                                          
10 This civil emergency would remain intact as far as September 2003 (Goss, 2004). 
 A new curfew 
was declared on the 27th of June. The results of these measures were limited. 
The town of Ambon remained paralyzed by open warfare on the borders 
between the Christian and Muslim neighborhoods throughout the month of 
July. Christians and Muslims kept leaving the city of Ambon, to as far as Irian 
Jaya in Indonesian Papua. On the 3rd and 4th of July, a renewed attack was 
launched in Poka/Rumah Tiga which led to the expulsion of all remaining 
Christians and the total destruction of the Universitas Pattimura (Pattimura 
University), an institution that had always been considered an important 
stronghold of Christian elitism. In the meantime, the Christian village of Waai 
came under fierce attack, ultimately resulting in its total destruction at the 
beginning of August 2000. The fall of Waai and the destruction of the 
Pattimura University were important symbolic markers illustrating renewed 
Muslim power resulting from the entrance of the Laskar Jihad, thereby 
fuelling the panic among many Christians that total defeat was imminent. This 
was also stated by Laskar Jihad leader, Ja’afar Umar Thalib, in an interview 
with the Siwalima newspaper (Siwalima August 7, 2000). In the interview, 
Umar Thalib reveals that it is his expectation that the conflict will be finished 
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soon. This would be accomplished by defeating the last three Christian 
strongholds of Kudamati, Passo and Gudang Arang. 
 
This prediction never came true, although battles resulting in vast numbers of 
deaths and wounded continued. In the city of Ambon, the border zone 
between Christian Mardika and Muslim Batu Merah remained insecure. In 
September, heavy fighting started on the island of Saparua (Gatra, September 
16, 2000). A coalition of different Christian villages attacked the small 
Muslim enclave of Iha. After enduring attacks on this village, people were 
literally forced into the sea and many could only reach safety by swimming to 
a nearby navy vessel. In this final attack, 18 people from Iha were killed. Iha 
was the only village ‘lost’ by the Muslims since the arrival of the Laskar 
Jihad. As Christian fighters were gathering to wipe Iha out, some other 
Christian villages on the island of Saparua such as Sirisori Kristen and Pia 
were left behind undefended and came under heavy attack (Siwalima, 
September 25, 2000). Fighting in and around Sirisori Kristen would continue 
to the end of October. Other hotbeds where conflict broke out were the 
villages of Hative Besar and Suli (Suara Maluku, September 27, 2000). As 
late as November, the Christian village of Suli was engulfed by heavy 
violence in which one Brimob member was also killed (Siwalima, October 11, 
2000). Similarly in the Christian village of Hative Kecil, conflict erupted once 
again (Suara Maluku, October 13, 2000). In this last assault on Hative Kecil, 
the attackers were confronted by heavy retaliation from the security forces, 
causing more deaths among the attackers then among the people of Hative 
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Kecil. Three military personnel were also killed in this clash. Due to this 
continuing stream of attacks, large parts of the Ambonese Christian 
population persistently kept asking for outside intervention. Demonstrations 
were staged in Ambon town in which at different times, thousands of 
Christians participated (Siwalima, 28 September 2000).  
 
 
2.5. Regaining control 
 
From December 2000 onwards, open warfare as witnessed in the villages of 
Waai, Iha or Suli started to decrease. At the same time, reports in the 
Ambonese press about sweeps conducted by the security forces with the aim 
of confiscating weapons owned by civilian and/or civilian militias, started to 
appear more regularly. Interventions were also undertaken to eliminate sniper 
hangouts in the town of Ambon. Although these actions had already started in 
late October, from December onwards, their scale and intensity increased 
dramatically. This turning point in the conflict during which serious and 
persistent attempts were made by the security forces to regain control had 
started some time earlier. On 26 June 2000, Colonel I Made Yasa was 
appointed as the new military chief commander of the Pattimura Military 
Command in Ambon. It was hoped that the Hindu religious background of I 
Made Yasa could transcend the Christian versus Muslim divide. In addition, a 
special until called the Yon Gab (Battalyon Gabungan or Joint Battalion) was 
established, destined to be deployed in special emergencies (ICG 2002: 11). 
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This Yon Gab unit was composed of three different military divisions: the 
navy, the army and the special forces Kopassus (Korps Pasukan Khas, Special 
Force Corps). Operations by Yon Gab in Ambon started on August 9, 2000. 
Another important factor foreshadowing the turning point in the conflict was 
the interest foreign governments started to take in the Moluccas. In particular 
the visible involvement of the Laskar Jihad increasingly started to worry some 
foreign governments. Throughout the second half of 2000, a delegation of the 
European Union, ambassadors from Germany, Japan, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and France, a general consul of the USA, the vice 
ambassador from Australia and a delegate of the Vatican all paid a visit to 
Ambon to discuss different issues with the military command, political and 
religious leaders and civil society activists.    
 
In the first months following his appointment, Colonel I Made Yasa still faced 
many difficulties and open warfare continued. Yet, from December 2000 
onwards, the efforts gradually started to pay off. One of the first measures 
undertaken was the arrest of army and police personnel who were aligned 
with the warring parties. Another linchpin of the policy by I Made Yasa was 
the disarmament of armed civil groups.11
                                                          
11 These actions also revealed how many weapons sometimes had infiltrated society in 
the two years of the conflict. For instance, in the far away village of Hatuallang on 
West Seram, 622 ‘bom rakitan’ (self-made bomb) were confiscated (Suara Maluku, 
29 Januari 2001). In many cases, thousands of bullets were confiscated. 
 These actions often provoked 
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renewed fighting between armed militias and the security forces.12 The 
clashes between sections of the Laskar Jihad and the Yon Gab in particular 
sometimes turned violent. This gave the Yon Gab the label of being pro-
Christian and anti-Muslim. One of the most dramatic examples was the siege 
of the Wijaya II hotel between January 20 and 21, 2001, situated at the 
volatile border zone between Batu Merah and Mardika. After snipers were 
signaled there, the hotel was attacked. Since the Muslim militiamen in the 
hotel did not intend to surrender, the situation ran dramatically out of hand. 
Ultimately, the attack on the hotel lasted for about 24 hours, until the navy 
was asked to intervene. The siege led to the death of at least nine civilians and 
one Brimob soldier (ICG 2002: 12).13
                                                          
12 The confiscations of weapons could also stir high emotions in Ambon in which the 
Christians as well as the Muslims accused the Yon Gab of partiality, depending where 
the action was undertaken. For instance, after weapons were confiscated in the 
Muslim village of Waimital on West Seram, a demonstration was staged in Ambon 
city in which Molotov cocktails were thrown at the governor’s office by angry 
civilians (Siwa Lima, December 2, 2000). 
 Remarkably, there were also 14 police 
officers and 1 army officer hiding in the hotel. Although it was never proven 
that these officers were aligned with armed militias, their arrest gave rise to all 
sorts of theories and rumors, not the least in Ambonese newspapers where 
their heavily beaten up faces featured prominently. Another dramatic 
confrontation took place on June 24, 2001 when Yon Gab attacked the 
Medical Clinic of the Laskar Jihad, causing the death of 24 Laskar Jihad 
13 The many reports about this event in Ambonese newspapers provided differing 
numbers of people killed and wounded. All these estimates were considerably higher 
than the data given by the ICG. 
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members and wounding 34 (Noorhaidi 2006: 216). Subsequent to this attack, 
the role of the Laskar Jihad in Ambon was largely diminished. Moreover, the 
grip of the Indonesian government on the Laskar Jihad tightened after the 
09/11 terrorist attacks in the USA (Schulze 2002: 61). The Laskar Jihad was 
officially disbanded on October 12, 2002, five days after the devastating Bali 
bombings.  
 
Adding to the increased efforts to regain control over the situation in the 
Moluccas, was the arrest of some major protagonists in the first half of 2001. 
On the 5th of May 2001, Ja’afar Umar Thalib was arrested at the airport of 
Surabaya and put under house arrest (ICG 2002: 15-16). The arrest of Thalib 
was somewhat balanced by the arrest of FKM (Front Kedalautan Maluku, 
Front for the Sovereignty of the Moluccas) leader Alex Manuputty some days 
before, on the 25th of April, 2001. This FKM made its existence public on the 
18th of December, 2000, but had already been established some time earlier on 
the 15th of July, 2000. The FKM characterized itself as a ‘moral organization’ 
seeking autonomy for Maluku, thereby invoking strong memories of the 
separatist RMS (Republic Maluku Selatan, Republic of the South Moluccas) 
rebellion of 1950. This existence of the FKM proved useful for the Laskar 
Jihad to further legitimate their struggle as defenders of the unity of Indonesia 
versus the assumed separatist tendencies of the Ambonese Christians (Davis 
2002: 17, Schulze 2002: 61, Turner 2003). Overall, the influence of the FKM 
on the conflict in Ambon has been marginal despite the fact they became a 
symbolic rallying point, in particular for the Muslim side of the population. 
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Around the same period, on March 20, 2001, a prominent leader of the 
Christian militias, Agus Wattimena was shot dead under murky 
circumstances. The reasons behind his death are still widely speculated on.14
 
 
Yet, regardless of the circumstances and plausible motives, Wattimena’s role, 
who still enjoys prestige among sections of the Christian population in 
Ambon, was played out.    
Although some pertinent criticisms can be made regarding the sometimes 
crude performance of the Yon Gab (ICG 2002), and some other sections of 
the security forces, large-scale communal violence subsumed substantially 
from December 2000 onwards.15 Despite the fact that communal relations 
remained tense and conflict could be stirred up easily, large-scale, collective 
violence involving large crowds of people resulting in open warfare became 
rare and was replaced by violence of a more hidden nature.16
                                                          
14 Among many Ambonese, there exists a deep held conviction that Agus Wattimena 
knew too much about close collaborations between the Kopassus special forces and 
Christian militias and was therefore shot dead by these same Kopassus units. Other 
rumors have it that he was shot by his wife for adultery.    
 Typical 
15 Due to these criticisms, the Yon Gab was replaced in November 2001 by a 
Kopassus unit. Already in June 2001, I Made Yasa was transferred to a new position. 
16 A remarkable exception in which far-fetched rumors could still provoke major 
upheaval was the visit of the Dutch ambassador to Ambon on the 19th of May 2001. 
In the days preceding his visit, rumor spread that a big RMS conspiracy was being set 
up in the Netherlands and the visit of the ambassador should be understood against 
this background (Timmer 2002:74-77). When the ambassador finally arrived, violence 
broke out in multiple places in Ambon town, resulting in at least 9 deaths on the 
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examples are shoot-outs or bomb attacks on speedboats in and around the bay 
of Ambon throughout 2001 and 2002. As the majority of the people did not 
yet dare to cross the borders separating the Muslim and Christian areas on the 
island by land, people travelled by sea to reach family, friends or places such 
as the airport. As these boats often had to pass through the narrow bay of 
Ambon, these were shot at regularly by snipers. Other examples are hidden 
bomb attacks on public transport facilities such as minibuses.  
 
The efforts to end the hostilities in Ambon ultimately culminated in the 
Malino II agreement. After the Malino I agreement was signed to end the 
communal conflict in Poso in November 2001, 70 delegates from Maluku met 
in the town of Malino to conclude the Malino II agreement on the 13th of 
February, 2002. The most important initiators were Yusuf Kalla, Minister for 
People’s Welfare and Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, also known as SBY, 
Minister for Political and Security Affairs.17 The agreement consists of 11 
articles and essentially states that both parties agree to end hostilities and aim 
to uphold the rule of law.18
                                                                                                                                           
Christian side (Suara Maluku, 22 May 2001). As a result, the ambassador had to be 
evacuated from his hotel by the military and had to abruptly end his visit. 
 Albeit vague, the Malino II agreement seems to 
have injected a sense of optimism and hope among many Ambonese. For 
17 In 2004, SBY and Yusuf Kalla were respectively elected as president and vice-
president of Indonesia.  
18 Probably the most striking and concrete item within the whole declaration is clause 
stating that the system of recruitment for the Pattimura University has to be open and 
impartial.   
II: The events 
 
54 
 
instance, at the end of February 2002, the priest C.J. Böhm, describes a 
remarkable observation he made in the city of Ambon. In his notes, he writes: 
‘Several thousands of young men - both Muslim and Christian - from the 
nearby island of Haruku, specifically from the five villages that together 
constitute the Hatuhala area, came to Ambon yesterday in perfect accordance. 
Their large crowd went loudly singing songs of unity (Satu Nusa Satu 
Bangsa) through the city of Ambon, disregarding any borders that separate 
Christian from Muslim areas. Policemen and military joined them. Even the 
Police Chief  Commander joyfully walked arm in arm with them’ (The 
situation in Ambon/Moluccas, Report No. 243, February 28th, 2002). 
Although this observation might be slightly exaggerated, it illustrates a sense 
of optimism and renewed confidence that the communal conflict in Ambon 
was definitely over.  
 
I do not intend to mention every single bomb blast or shoot out that occurred 
in Ambon as far as 2006. Suffice to say that the overall situation was 
increasingly improving and that from late 2003 onwards, the first people 
started to enter each other’s area. This evolution was shortly but abruptly put a 
halt at the end of April 2004 when suddenly, the city of Ambon descended 
once again into high-intensity violence.19
                                                          
19 The following is largely based on ICG (2004) 
 These riots started on the 25th of 
April, 2004 when FKM supporters commemorated the 54th anniversary of the 
RMS rebellion in the Christian neighborhood of Kudamati. After the raising 
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of an RMS flag, the participants who attended the commemoration were 
arrested. Going to and coming from the police station, the arrestees were 
obliged to pass through Muslim neighborhoods, thereby giving the impression 
that an RMS rally was going on. This caused outrage among parts of the 
Muslim population. Ultimately, upon their return from the police station, 
these FKM supporters became involved in a fight with Muslim youth. 
Quickly, some offices of international NGOs such as MSF, a UN office and - 
important for the following chapters - the whole land registration office 
(kadaster) were burned down. By May 5th, the riots were largely contained, 
yet at a cost of 38 deaths. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the events 
and the involvement of professional snipers made many people in Ambon 
conclude that outside provocateurs were behind the violence and that it was 
closely related to the upcoming presidential elections. Although these events 
in late April 2004 will probably always remain shrouded in secrecy, the most 
important factor is that these riots only were an interruption in a gradual 
process of recovery and Ambon did not descend once again into long-term 
communal violence.   
 
 III  
 
 
Explaining communal conflict.  
Agency, private opportunities and ordinary folk1
 
  
 
After providing a chronological overview of the events that are known as the 
kerusuhan, this chapter aims to elaborate on the explanations why this conflict 
erupted. More in particular, it will be stated how many explanations about the 
recent communal warfare in Ambon tend to downplay the role of Ambonese 
‘ordinary folk’ in the conflict, by emphasizing the manipulative role played by 
elites. In the so-called provocateur theory, which is still popular among broad 
sections of Ambonese society today, Jakarta-based military elites are held 
responsible for instigating the violence. Apart from the fact that conclusive 
evidence for this hypothesis is still lacking, violence is inaccurately 
downplayed as a defensive reaction to the aggressive provocation of a distant, 
almost ghostly, actor. More elaborate accounts of the eruption of communal 
conflict between Christians and Muslims in Ambon point to religiously 
framed struggles to access a patrimonial state and the emergence of specific 
threats and opportunities for regional elites after the fall of Suharto in May 
1998. Whilst this thesis will be upheld, it does not wholly account for why so 
                                                          
1 This outline of this chapter is based on the article ‘How ordinary folk became 
involved in the Ambonese conflict. Understanding private opportunities during 
communal violence’,  Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast 
Asia and Oceania (accepted) 
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many people with little chance of ever accessing the state bureaucracy became 
involved in this communal conflict. In order to better grasp the incentives of 
engaging in communal violence in Ambon, this chapter posits the explanation 
that people had exceptional opportunities to take over land when the first 
Christian-Muslim riots broke out in the town of Ambon. This was particularly 
the case in those instances where institutional arrangements to access land 
were already being contested before 1999. These private opportunities stood 
apart from the reasons which instigated the initial riots in the town of Ambon 
but became a rationale throughout the conflict. In this regard, displacement 
cannot be understood as an unforeseen byproduct of the violence. Rather, 
effecting displacement served as one of the foremost reasons to conduct 
violence against the religious other, or as John Sidel correctly points out: ‘... it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that the violence served a means of 
effecting displacement, rather than displacement coming as a by-product of 
the violence’ (Sidel 2008: 47). 
 
 
3.1. About provocateurs and bandana’s 
 
Amongst broad sections of Ambonese society, there exists a strong belief that 
Jakarta is responsible for inciting the Ambonese into civil warfare. The most 
widely spread variant of this theory is the idea that the military circles close to 
former president Suharto provoked the violence in order to create uproar and 
chaos in the country. This would then be seized as an opportunity to facilitate 
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the return of Suharto and restore the New Order as the ultimate solution to end 
these conflicts. Another variant of this provocation theory circulating in 
Ambon is the belief that the current president Susilo Bambang Yudyhono and 
then vice-president Yusuf Kalla secretly instigated the violence. The conflict 
in Ambon (and Poso) offered them an exceptional opportunity to present 
themselves as determined peace builders and the ultimate saviours of the 
stability of the country. This, according to the theory, formed a part of their 
successful strategy to get themselves elected as president and vice-president 
of Indonesia in 2004. As the ultimate proof of this speculation, people often 
refer to unknown, shadowy figures whom they saw distributing both red 
(Christian) and white (Muslim) bandanas at different times and different 
places. These figures are considered to belong to a special, secret section 
within the TNI that is especially established to create uproar and chaos, when 
called for by the regime. The agency of the Ambonese society within this 
framework is often accounted for through a simple, essentialist explanation in 
which the Ambonese blame their own culture of violence, aggression and red-
handedness for the ease with which these actors could manipulate existing 
religious fault lines. It was therefore not the wickedness of the Ambonese that 
is to blame for the outburst of inter-religious violence in the beginning of 
1999 but rather their naivety or even their stupidity. 
 
This provocation theory also has a written variant. The best-known proponent 
for the Ambonese case is the Indonesian academic George Junus Aditjondro 
who states that: ‘The explanation for the continuing troubles in Maluku has to 
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be found in a more systematic way in the interests of the TNI.’ (Aditjondro 
2001: 119). The famous late human rights activist Munir also figured 
prominently in Ambonese newspapers proving the involvement of the 
Indonesian military behind the violence, amongst others through the selling of 
weapons (Jumat Kliwon, February 19, 1999). In particular in the Christian 
Ambonese media there seemed to exist a tendency to represent Ambon as the 
playground of vicious military elites (Suara Maluku, September 24, 1999; 
Suara Maluku, January 12, 2000).  
 
The popularity of this framework is partly a reflex inherited from the New 
Order era where the perpetrators of violence were indeed often the highly 
nationalist, corrupt and authoritarian army. The main example is East Timor 
where in 1999, sections within the Indonesian military were largely 
responsible for instigating violence (Schulze 2001). The appeal of this 
hypothesis in Ambon was further enforced by the amateurish and corrupt 
actions taken by the security forces to deal with the conflict such as the selling 
of firearms to the warring parties (ICG 2002). This gave the impression that 
sections within these security forces deliberately tried to continue the violence 
for their own objectives. Nonetheless, these observations are not convincing 
evidence that there was a big master plan to instigate a high-intensity conflict 
in Ambon (Azca 2003). Rather, the popularity of this provocateur theory 
among broad parts of the Ambonese population and some sections of 
academia, points to a difficulty of coming to grips with the role of Ambonese 
society in the recent communal conflict. Many people give preference to a 
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detached vision in which the Ambonese are treated as apathetic and naive, not 
being able to make their own decisions. Whilst laying the blame on outside 
forces may have a positive side in terms of overcoming local fault lines, it 
neglects the accountability of local actors in the field by holding unknown and 
elusive perpetrators responsible for the events (Von Benda Beckmann 2004, 
Purdey 2004).  
 
 
3.2. A political economy explanation 
 
The most elaborate and detailed accounts for the sudden eruption of violence 
in Ambon are those utilising a more classical political economy approach. Of 
special importance is the recent book by Van Klinken (2007) but also the 
earlier work by Bertrand (2002, 2004), Goss (2004) and Van Klinken (2001) 
has discerned certain particular characteristics of the Ambonese political 
economy which underpin the explosion of the religiously-inspired violence in 
1999. A well-known Ambonese voice in this debate is the NGO activist and 
Muslim leader, Thamrin Ely (Ummat No. 35, March 15, 1999). Within this 
body of literature, two converging dynamics stand out. First, Ambon is 
characterised by a long-term politicization of religious identities that are 
strongly attached to networks negotiating access to both the colonial and the 
post-colonial state (Bertrand 2002: 62-63, Bertrand 2004: 115-116). As far 
back as the 17th century, Ambon witnessed the build-up of a tiny but visible 
Dutch colonial administration by the VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische 
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Compagnie, Dutch East-India Company), which had a close relationship with 
the Christian part of the population.2
These close relations between the Dutch and the Christian Ambonese 
deepened after the abolition of the world wide monopoly on cloves in 1863 
and the ensuing economic malaise which gripped the whole Ambonese 
region. With the price of cloves plummeting, on the one hand, and the 
expansion of the Dutch East Indies requiring a growing colonial 
administration on the other, the number of surplus workers in the Moluccas 
willing to take up jobs in the colonial administration and the KNIL 
(Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, Royal Army of the Dutch Indies) grew 
(Chauvel 1990: 37).
 For instance, already during the first 
decades of VOC rule, Christians dominated the landraad, the highest body of 
the colonial administration in which Ambonese were allowed to participate 
(Knaap 2004: 53). Muslims, on the other hand, were considered more 
untrustworthy and prone to rebellion and were therefore left out of the 
colonial administration (Knaap 2004: 107, 124).  
3
                                                          
2 There is also a minority Catholic community in Ambon. When throughout this thesis 
reference is made to Christians, this includes both the Catholic and the Protestant 
community in Maluku.  
 With predominantly Protestant Ambonese filling these 
 
3 This special relationship ultimately gave occasion to the RMS rebellion in 1950. 
Within the KNIL, a privileged position was reserved for Moluccans, many of whom 
fought the Indonesian nationalists between 1945-1949, together with the Dutch army. 
When the Dutch surrendered in 1949 and Indonesia became an independent country, 
they continued to struggle for an independent South Maluku. This separatist struggle 
was mainly supported by Christians but also some Muslims joined in. When this 
attempt failed, thousands of Moluccans were shipped to the Netherlands. A small 
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jobs, a system of religious divisions was installed in which a Protestant elite 
increasingly gained privileged access to the colonial bureaucracy and the 
political and economic advantages related to it (Bartels 2000). As historian 
Richard Chauvel notes: ‘Under colonial patronage, they (Christian 
Ambonese) acquired a privileged status above their compatriots (and below 
the Ducth)’ (Chauvel 1980: 47). In effect, this rendered the Muslim 
population second-class citizens in colonial Ambonese society (Chauvel 1980, 
Bartels 2003), and to this day Ambonese Protestants are somewhat bitterly 
referred to as the ‘anak emas’ or the golden child by the Muslim population.4
 
 
This privileged status of the Protestant elite was largely maintained following 
Indonesian independence (Bertrand 2002). Both in the Sukarno era and during 
the New Order, Ambonese Christians preserved close ties to the regime in 
Jakarta through which they kept a strong grip on the local bureaucracy.  
Discussing state access for the Ambon case in independent Indonesia, it is 
important to bear in mind that the province of Maluku has always been 
                                                                                                                                           
minority kept waging armed rebellion against the Indonesian state until the mid 
sixties. For an elaborate account, see: Chauvel 1990.  
 
4 This lower class status of the Muslim population is also illustrated by the Dutch 
doctor E.W.A. Ludeking who wrote in 1868 in his ‘Schets van de Residentie 
Amboina’: ‘The people of the residency of Amboina can properly be divided into 
three classes: firstly, those who because of their Christianity, burger status etc. can be 
given the collective name of Ambonese…; secondly the class of Alifurese who 
constitute the indigenous people of Ceram and Buru, and who are far the most 
numerous; thirdly, the far less significant class of Moslems, together with Arabs and 
other Asiatics’ (cited in Chauvel 1980: 40).  
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characterized by a vast government apparatus, accounting for a huge part of 
all available jobs in the region. For instance, in 1990 there were about 55.000 
civil servants in the province, meaning that government jobs accounted for 
33% of all available jobs outside the primary sector (agriculture, fisheries and 
forestry). Even in absolute terms, this number of 55.000 is higher compared to 
East Java, a province whose population is 17 times as big compared to 
Maluku. (Van Klinken 2007:34-52, 90). Logically, this importance of the 
state in terms of job opportunities dramatically increased competition to 
obtain access to this state in Ambon. In particular from the late eighties 
onwards, high-ranking positions in the administration became increasingly 
contested between the two religious blocks. One of the first, strongly divisive 
figures was Dicky Wattimena, Christian mayor of the city of Ambon between 
1985 and 1991, who was particularly resented among Muslim migrants as he 
attempted to break their strong grip on informal economies such as petty 
trading (Tempo, March 15, 1999). Around the same time, a rival Muslim 
network emerged challenging the traditional Protestant hegemony in the 
region (Bertrand 2002, 2004).5
                                                          
5 Evidently, the establishment of a network of Ambonese Muslim intellectuals did not 
come overnight. Following decolonization, Ambonese Muslims gradually developed 
contacts throughout Indonesia and the outside world, thereby setting in motion a slow 
yet steady process of emancipation of the Ambonese Muslim society (Chauvel 1980). 
 This network was organized around the 
national Muslim organization ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) founded in 1990. This 
organization was chaired by Minister of Research and Technology and later to 
become Indonesia’s first post-New Order president, B.J. Habibie. At its 
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second national congress, held in 1995, almost half of all Indonesian ministers 
were elected to leadership positions within ICMI, making it one of the most 
important ‘state corporatist organizations’ through which the New Order 
aimed to control the army and gain the support of a fast growing group of 
middle class Muslims (Liddle 1996: 613, 618). This sharp rise of ICMI is 
illustrative of the so-called greening of the New Order, in which Suharto was 
turning to modernist Islamic groupings to support his regime from the late 
eighties onwards and was increasingly ‘playing the Muslim card’ (Hefner 
2000: 128). In the meantime, modernist Islamic groupings such as ICMI 
gained a substantial influence in the upper echelons of the Suharto cabinet, 
which increased the fear of many Christian Ambonese of becoming a small 
minority in a Muslim dominated country. An important victory for this 
network at the Moluccan level was the appointment of Akib Latuconsina - a 
prominent and well-known member of the Ambonese ICMI branch at the time 
- in 1992 as the first Muslim Moluccan governor. Among the traditional 
Protestant elite this move was interpreted as proof of an Islamic offensive 
challenging their traditional hegemonic status and thus further polarizing the 
two religious communities. This growing power of the Muslim part of 
Ambonese society was also symbolized by the term ‘OPEK’. This is an 
abbreviation that stands for the villages of Ori, Pelauw and Kaliolo situated on 
the island of Haruku. These villages are home to some well-known Muslim 
families such as Tuasikal, Latuconsina and Marasabessy whom obtained a 
growing influence in the state bureaucracy throughout the nineties.  
 
III: Explaining communal conflict. 
 
66 
 
The second factor explaining communal conflict in the province of Maluku is 
the emergence of specific opportunities to renegotiate access to the state 
arising from the fall of the New Order. This was further enforced through a 
far-reaching decentralization move which transferred different competences 
from the national level to the provinces and districts. Decentralization thus 
made gaining access to the state at these regional levels all the more relevant 
and therefore all the more contested. A creeping polarization that was already 
set in for more than a decade ultimately took a drastic turn once the Suharto-
led centralist state finally imploded in May 1998 and alternative networks 
attempted to seize the chance to use the institutional turmoil to challenge 
existing power structures (Van Klinken 2007). During this process, religion 
became a vehicle for political mobilization in a fast-changing society, with 
people becoming much more involved in political life through the first open 
and direct elections since 1955.  
 
Apart from the emergence of certain opportunities during this period, mutual 
suspicion and the anxiety of losing powerful positions in a new and uncertain 
era further politicized the two religious communities. Among Christians, a 
general phobia existed that post-New Order Indonesia would be transformed 
into an Islamic state, thus putting them into a vulnerable position in Maluku.6
                                                          
6 This general fear among Indonesian Christians of becoming an Islamic state 
somewhat dissipated following the poor results for Islamic parties during the national 
elections 1999. In these elections the two big nationalist parties Golkar and PDI-P 
won 24% and 30,60% of the votes, respectively. The biggest Islamic party, PPP 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party) only won some 11,60% 
of the votes (Singh 2003)  
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Conversely, amongst Muslims there was a suspicion that in the new 
democratic era the PDI-P (Partai Demokrat Indonesia - Perjanguan, 
Democratic Party Indonesia – Struggle) would obtain a majority in the 
Moluccan elections and use it to reinstate Christian control over the state 
bureaucracy. This Christian dominance of the PDI-P in Maluku stems from 
the fact that the PDI-P is a compilation of different parties that were forced to 
merge together in 1973 to form the PDI (Partai Demokrat Indonesian,  
Indonesian Democratic Party).7
 
 In October 1998, the PDI changed its name 
into PDI-P, adding Perjuangan (struggle) to stress the difference with the 
inferior position they held during the New Order.  
Historically, the most important building blocks of the PDI in Ambon have 
been the Parkindo (Partei Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Party) and 
the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, National Indonesian Party). In particular 
the influence of the Parkindo has been central in defining the Christian 
character of the Moluccan PDI-P branch (Van Klinken 2001: 22). 
Traditionally, Parkindo has been the most powerful political party 
representing the interests of the Christians, in particular in the town of 
Ambon, where, for instance, in the elections of 1955 Parkindo obtained 50% 
of the votes, making it the town’s dominant party. Even in the provincial 
                                                          
7 This should be understood as a government plan to curtail opposition and transform 
multiparty politics into corporate group representation. The reason why opposition 
parties were not simply abolished was the fact that these parties still represented 
important elite factions within Indonesian society which could not completely be 
pushed aside. Moreover, the New Order regime wanted to maintain some sort of 
‘democratic appearance’ in order to seek international legitimacy (Eklöf 2003: 54-59). 
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elections of 1971, in which there was substantial intimidation exercised on 
people in Ambon to vote for the government party Golkar, Parkindo managed 
to remain the largest party in Ambon city obtaining 6 seats while Golkar only 
won 5 seats (Van Fraassen 1972: 1-3).8 When the New Order finally 
collapsed, PDI-P saw its chance to shed the subordinate place under Golkar 
and position itself at the forefront of Ambonese political life.9 However, the 
prospect of the PDI-P creating a new Christian stronghold in Maluku made 
many Ambonese Muslims nervous, since they did not have a strong, unified 
party that could equal the PDI-P.10
                                                          
8 One of the best-known Ambonese politicians in the history of Indonesia, Johannes 
Leimena, was also a Parkindo member. Leimena served many years as health minister 
and ultimately became Deputy Prime Minister under Sukarno from 1957 until 1966. 
 This mutual distrust led to a further 
activation of religiously-defined patrimonial networks. The work done by Van 
Klinken (2007: 96-106) demonstrates how local Ambonese elites with 
obvious political party affiliations were instrumental for instigating this 
violence through these networks, which in many cases were church and 
 
9 This expected dominance of the PDI-P has to a certain extent become true. Since 
2003, the PDI-P has taken over the governorship of Maluku through popular figure of 
Karel Albert Ralahalu (Tomsa 2009). In 2002, local PDI-P strongman Jopie Papilaya, 
has been elected as the mayor of Ambon. Only in the provincial legislative elections 
of 2004, the PDI-P (10 seats) was beaten by the Golkar party (11 seats) with a narrow 
margin. 
 
10 Not coincidentally, the victory of the PDI-P in June 1999 for the Ambonese city 
council, gaining 53% of the votes, was one of the triggers which started a second 
round of rioting in July 1999 (Van Klinken 2001). 
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mosque affiliated organizations.11
 
 An example of such an organization is the 
youth wing of the GPM (Gereja Protestan Maluku, Protestant Church of 
Maluku). 
 
3.3. Private opportunities during collective violence:  
theoretical framework 
 
Although this focus on the regional political economy and struggles to access 
a patrimonial state contains strong arguments to explain the outburst of 
violence in Ambon, it also contains some deficiencies. First, it is often noted 
that studies on collective violence tend to overlook the factors that further 
escalate certain riots and contribute to their perpetuation (Brass 1996, 1997). 
This is the case with these political economy accounts that succeed in 
explaining the causal roots of a conflict but have greater difficulty grappling 
with the ongoing logics and dynamics of protracted communal violence. In 
other words, they fail to account for the violence’s protracted nature. Second, 
the agency of the ‘masses’ is largely underestimated in this structuralist 
framework. These masses are portrayed as languid actors simply following 
greedy elites. Yet, as Fearon and Laitin (2000: 854) argue, it is not sufficient 
                                                          
11 It is worthy of note that in the build-up to the violence, colours associated with 
political parties ultimately became symbolic markers of armed militias during the 
conflict. For instance, red has always been the party colour of the PDI-P. However, 
this colour came to be increasingly associated with the whole Christian community. 
Ultimately red became one of the differentiating symbols of the Christian militias 
during the conflict which contrasted the white colour of Muslim militias. 
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to look at elite interests in explaining collective violence, an equal amount of 
attention has to be paid to reasons behind why people decide to engage in 
conflict. 
 
These two deficiencies come together in one simple but essential question 
concerning why so many ‘ordinary folks’, who had little chance of ever 
accessing the state bureaucracy became involved in the violence. Related to 
this question is how one accounts for the huge numbers of internally displaced 
this conflict brought about. In general, international organizations put the 
number of internally displaced in Maluku and Ambon at one third of the total 
population during the high-intensity violence (ICG 2002, Mason 2001). The 
figures that come across the official channels are somewhat lower. The 
UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) puts the 
number of IDPs at the height of the conflict in 2002 at 338,320 out of a total 
Moluccan population of 1,311565 (UNOCHA 2002: 39). A report published 
by the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) declared 
that in the years 2002 and 2003, there were 275,091 IDPs in the province of 
Maluku, or about one fifth of the total population. At that time, Maluku was 
the province with most IDPs in the whole Indonesian archipelago (INCHR 
2005).12
                                                          
12 These data should be treated with care. Internal displacement was often a short-
lived phenomenon depending on waves of  high-intensity warfare or rumors about a 
pending attack. In a couple of days or weeks, the number of internally displaced 
therefore could alter significantly. Moreover, the different organizations counting the 
internally displaced used different criteria. For instance, the data provided by the 
 Despite the fact that no real conclusive data can be given about the 
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exact number of IDPs, even the most conservative estimates illustrate that 
displacement was not a marginal phenomenon but affected large parts of the 
population. An essential question therefore concerns why so many people 
became violently expelled throughout the recent kerusuhan.  
 
To answer this question, this chapter seeks to explain how the violence 
initiated private economic opportunities that led to the involvement of a range 
of new actors in the conflict. It is particularly relevant to refer to the work 
done by Stathis Kalyvas (2003, 2006) in this regard. Through an elaborate 
analysis of a whole range of civil wars, Kalyvas concludes that ‘civil wars are 
not binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous processes that foster an 
apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and actions’ (Kalyvas 
2003: 475). In this mix of identities and actions, Kalyvas states that actions at 
the micro-level of society in situations of protracted civil warfare often have a 
private character and bear little relation to the reasons behind its instigation. 
Civil warfare therefore presents a forum within which actors take the 
                                                                                                                                           
Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights are based on official registrations 
conducted by the provincial government. Overall, the people who were registered as 
IDPs were the ones permanently living in officially designated IDP camps. The 
people who migrated to family or friends and in this sense also were internally 
displaced, were not included in this group. On the other hand, many people 
registering as an IDP were not at all IDPs. For instance, a large group in the camp of 
the IDP camp of THR consisted of university students. Furthermore, in these 
registration procedures, many people living in the nearby neighborhoods to the camp 
also stood in line to register as an IDP in order to receive reconstruction funds (BBR, 
Bantuan Bangunan Rumah). As I observed myself in THR, this could end up in rough 
scuffles between the people from the camp and the people from the surrounding area.  
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opportunity to settle private disputes outside the realm of the master 
configuration of the conflict. Whilst everyday tensions would never result into 
violence under normal circumstances, the conflict opens up possibilities of 
settling old accounts (Kalyvas 2006: 365). These ideas correspond to the 
distinction David Keen makes between bottom-up violence and top down 
violence during civil warfare (Keen 2002, 2008: 73-89). According to Keen, 
top down violence is mobilized by political leaders and entrepreneurs who 
deliberately manipulate ethnic, religious or other fault lines. In the case of 
Ambon, this typology is evident in the political struggles described above 
during which certain elites instigated the conflict through religiously defined 
grassroots organizations. Bottom-up violence on the other hand is actively 
embraced by a variety of ordinary people as a solution to problems of their 
own. Some authors such as Paul Brass even go as far to state that in some 
contexts the search for an objective and unambiguous cause of a riot/conflict 
becomes useless, as all actors participating in the violence do this based on 
personal motives. Based on a study of the New York draft riots that occurred 
in 1863, Brass (1996: 23) concludes that ‘... its course makes clear the futility 
of ascribing ‘cause’ and overall logic to the incidents which occur once a riot 
expands. It is possible to find for many, if not most, individual incidents 
particular reasons, such as local personal enmities or economic rivalries 
settled under the cover of chaos.’  
 
These sorts of enmities and rivalries - in particular in relation to land access - 
are one of the reasons for effecting the displacement of so many people in 
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Ambon. This is not to say that struggles to access land lie at the root of the 
violence. The only small debate on the role of land in the Ambonese conflict 
so far has centred on the question of whether land tensions and demographic 
pressure lie at the root of the conflict (Soselisa 2000: 76, Bartels 2000).13
 
 The 
view defended here is that competition to access land does not explain the 
outburst of violence in the city of Ambon. In the run-up to the initial riots in 
January 1999, no specific organizations mobilizing people around the issue of 
land can be found, contrary to the case of struggles to access the state 
bureaucracy. Moreover, struggles over land and issues of migration and 
population pressure cannot be seen as typically Moluccan or Ambonese as 
these also play in other parts of Indonesia that never turned into an enduring 
communal conflict (see: Clark 2004 on Flores and East Java and Von Benda 
Beckmann F. and K. 2004 on Minangkabau). Nevertheless, land and 
religiously defined competition to access land quickly became an issue during 
the conflict. The subsequent case studies of the villages of Hila, Kaitetu, Waai 
and Liang show how many people had their own incentives for engaging in 
violence and displacing certain religious communities. These are related to the 
settling of private disputes regarding access to economic resources such as 
land. In this regard, land became a point of contention throughout the conflict 
in Ambon rather than a clear-cut motivation for its commencement.  
 
                                                          
13 For a similar debate on the Poso region, see Acciaiolo (2001), Van Klinken (2007: 
72-79).   
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3.4. Case study: the Christians of Hila and Kaitetu 
 
Kaitetu is a village situated in the Muslim dominated Leihitu peninsula on the 
island of Ambon where, before the January 1999 riots, one Christian minority 
of some 120 households lived (see map No. 2). This Christian community 
consists of people who migrated from neighbouring islands to act as guards 
around the VOC Fort Amsterdam during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Over centuries, they developed strong social bonds with the villages 
of Hila and Kaitetu. Although the community administratively belonged to 
Kaitetu, according to adat or customary law, the land the Christians lived on 
was claimed by a clan coming from neighbouring Hila.14
                                                          
14 For a more elaborate explanation on the Ambonese adat system, see chapter 5 
 Therefore, the 
Christians have always characterized themselves as originating from Hila. 
This apparent contradiction only concerned the land they lived on. The 
question of the land the Christians were cultivating is different and more 
complex. Here we can observe how a mix of different property rights allowed 
the majority of Christian households to obtain secure and satisfactory access 
to land. Due to their migrant status, the Christian community was not 
considered a part of the original negeri (village) of Kaitetu or Hila. According 
to strict adat law they could therefore not obtain the ownership rights 
necessary to cultivate perennial crops such as cengkeh (clove), kelapa 
(coconut) or pala (nutmeg). Within the adat system, such as it is commonly 
practised in Hila and Kaitetu, a free cultivation of long-term crops is solely 
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reserved for people who originate from a clan (dati) belonging to an original 
negeri (village). Despite the migrant status of the Christians living in Hila and 
Kaitetu, their overall social standing was higher than that of other non-
Moluccan settlers who are still somewhat derogatorily referred to by terms 
such as ‘penungsi kemarin’ (refugees from yesterday) ‘buruh tanah’ (land 
labourer) or ‘orang pendatang’ (migrants).15 These terms were never applied 
to the Christians. Accordingly, different Christian families received the adat 
rights to freely grow long-term crops on lands that belonged to these 
‘original’ Muslim families, in many cases through inter-marriages with 
indigenous clans.16
 
 Throughout the years, they also managed to buy some 
lands privately on which they cultivated different crops. Other migrants such 
as the Butonese also received the privilege to cultivate these crops but had to 
share the harvest with the people of Hila and Kaitetu (Brouwer 1998). 
The Christian community fled on the 20th January 1999, one day after the 
initial riots buffeted the town of Ambon on the other side of the island. During 
their flight, the community was split up, with one part going to Hatiwe Besar, 
                                                          
15 In Hila and Kaitetu, these non-Moluccan settlers consist of Butonese communities, 
originating from the neighbouring island of Sulawesi. Most of these people already 
settled in Ambon for decades. Their migration to Ambon and surrounding islands is a 
spontaneous one driven by economic incentives.  
 
16 Understanding resource management in the Ambonese context requires 
distinguishing between property rights for land as such and property rights for what is 
on the land such as trees or houses. In this case, many Christians did not own the land 
but nevertheless had rights to grow crops on these lands, see also (Von Benda-
Beckmann and Taale 1996: 41) 
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the other to Laha. After being separated for three years, they finally settled in 
2002 in Tanah Putih in the negeri of Tawiri, nearby the airport, where they 
still live today. In attempting to discern why the Christians had to flee so 
immediately, the story appears somewhat unclear. According to the 
Christians, Muslims from Hila chased them away by destroying their houses 
and other property, something which is vigorously denied by anyone 
interviewed in Hila. According to their version, bands of youth from the 
neighbouring village of Hitu were responsible for driving the Christians away 
in the beginning of 1999. Interestingly, what is acknowledged in Hila is that 
people from Hila were responsible for cutting down the crops and trees the 
Christians were cultivating within the borders of their village and for 
destroying the houses they lived in.   
 
How do we understand this story? First of all, it is important to interpret the 
destruction of property as a deliberate strategy to drive people away. Talking 
with different displaced communities throughout the island, not all of these 
people were directly physically threatened or had to run for their life. For 
instance, many IDPs stated that they decided to leave their place after their 
windows were smashed with stones or their houses were daubed with paint. 
This served as a symbol that they were no longer welcome in the place they 
lived in. This was also the case in Hila, albeit in a more hastily manner. 
People were chased away by bands of youth throwing stones and shouting all 
sorts of provocations. Rumors that Muslims from Hitu were on their way to 
Hila after having eradicated the Christian village of Benteng Kareng, only 
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increased the agony which gripped this community. In their flight however, 
nobody was killed or even wounded. In this regard, there is little utility 
distinguishing between those who chased the people away and those who 
destroyed crops and houses afterwards. In reality, this was a part of the same 
movement and largely occurred in the same time frame. The same day the 
Christians fled to the mountains, people started destroying property belonging 
to this Christian community. In this regard, destruction should not be 
interpreted as the manifestation of some sort of ‘irrational religious fervor’. In 
most cases, it was a deliberate attempt to clear a certain space with the aim of 
assuming control. At the same time, this case study also refines the 
representation of the Ambonese violence as an all Christian against all 
Muslim conflict. Many people - such as the community of Kaitetu - took no 
part in the violence and even attempted to offer protection to people who were 
ejected.   
 
Second, there are clear-cut economic reasons behind the expulsion of the 
Christians. The cutting down of trees is illustrative. As adat law states that 
one loses the informal adat property rights to his land once the long-term 
crops have died or have been eradicated, their cutting indicates a conscious 
attempt by some villagers of Hila to reclaim lands Christians have been 
cultivating for generations. In this regard, the destruction of property not only 
serves to chase a community away but also becomes a deliberate attempt to 
symbolically eradicate its remnants and take over their property. As a result, 
the Christian community has once and for all lost these lands in Hila. In a 
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similar, seemingly contradictory way, the houses belonging to Christians were 
destroyed and burned down by youth who also came from Hila. Rather than 
an act of ‘irrational’ behaviour, this destruction should be understood as a 
strategic move in a simmering border conflict between the villages of Kaitetu 
and Hila. As described above, the land the Christians were living on was 
claimed by a customary clan of Hila, although this belonged within the 
administrative boundary of Kaitetu.17
                                                          
17 Despite the small size of the plot, this land was considered to be of high economic 
value due to the presence of the VOC fort Amsterdam, the Emmanuel church being 
the oldest church in the whole of Indonesia and the well of the famous 17th century 
biologist Rumphius. These assets could potentially lead to some small-scale touristic 
exploitation of the area. 
 This border dispute dates to colonial 
times and has resulted in a strained relationship between the village of Kaitetu 
and this customary clan. This border conflict was given new impetus one year 
before the outbreak of violence when a large number of the Christian 
community attempted to obtain a formal ownership certificate for this land. 
This would have implied that the Christians would become the formal owners 
of the land; the customary clan would lose their customary claim and the 
village of Kaitetu could more securely claim this land as their village land. 
This process has been halted due to the violent removal of the Christian 
community. Through the destruction of their property, any trace suggesting 
that Christians once lived on this land was removed. Since then, this ‘empty’ 
land has been reclaimed by the customary clan from Hila and different signs 
have been put up that state that the land cannot be entered without their 
consent.  
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3.5. Case Study: Waai 
 
A second example where a localized, long-term border dispute re-erupted 
after the urban riots of January 1999, occurred in the villages of Waai and 
Liang. The Christian village of Waai is geographically wedged between the 
Muslim villages of Liang and Tulehu (see map No.2). Starting from the 23rd 
of February 1999, Waai became involved in a fierce battle with these two 
neighboring villages resulting in dozens of dead and wounded on both sides. 
Ultimately, it was not until Waai was attacked simultaneously from the sides 
of Tulehu, Liang and the sea with the help of newly arrived, well equipped 
Laskar Jihad fighters, that this community was forced to flee to Passo in July 
2000 where they stayed until August 2003. This final offensive was divided in 
two major parts. The first attack occurred around the 6th and 7th of July 
resulting in about 22 deaths, 51 heavily wounded and the displacement of the 
majority of the Waai community (Suara Maluku, July 8, 2000). The final 
attack to clear the whole village was then set in on the 30th of July 2000 until 
the 1st of August resulting in at least 23 deaths at the Christian side (Suara 
Maluku, August 5, 2000). Data on the Muslim side could not be obtained.18
 
  
                                                          
18 Remarkably, in the same newspaper reports it was stated that on the Christian side 
there were about 17 deaths and 10 wounded while at the Muslim side there were 5 
deaths and 41 wounded. These data therefore seem to buttress the argument that 
heavier and more professional weaponry was found on the Muslim side because of the 
involvement of the Laskar Jihad. The Christians on the other hand had to stick to 
amateurish weapons such as spears, stones, self made guns… making a lot of 
wounded but less deaths. 
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Although this story can easily be interpreted as an ‘all against all’ religious 
war, a more complex picture emerges when reconstructing the story in detail. 
It is apparent how people from Waai interpret the violence with Liang, on the 
one hand, and Tulehu, on the other hand, in two different frameworks. The 
harsh fighting with Liang is explained by a narrative that originates in colonial 
times and in which the recent fighting is perceived as the last chapter in a long 
history of violence. In this regard, a clear distinction is made between the 
recent kerusuhan and this historically strained relationship with Liang, 
although it is admitted that both became closely intertwined. Trying to 
reconstruct the history of this border dispute, one is confronted with a variety 
of differing interpretations, not only between but also within the two villages. 
Yet, the overall rationale behind the competing land claims is a dispute over 
who arrived and cultivated the land first, guaranteeing the customary 
ownership rights over that land. In Waai, the people of Liang are perceived as 
invaders of their historical territory which was originally considered to be 
much larger. According to people living in Liang, these claims by Waai are 
baseless. These conflicting interpretations gave rise to a simmering border 
dispute between the two villages, with occasional outbursts of violence 
occurring before 1999. On both sides, the detailed knowledge with which 
these violent stories are told and retold is remarkable, even amongst teenagers 
who give accurate accounts of legal battles and killings during Dutch times. 
Also apparent is the ferocity and scale of these skirmishes. During certain 
periods, all children and women of the village had to flee to the mountains for 
a couple of days where crossing each other’s borders would result in certain 
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death. As the riots in Ambon commenced, these simmering tensions were 
given new impetus as the two parties were provided with opportunities to 
settle this long-standing dispute. On the border between Waai and Liang, all 
trees and crops growing there were destroyed with the aim to take over these 
contested lands. Eventually, the people from Waai were forced to flee. This 
gave Liang the chance to fell all the trees on the border and also to erect a 
marker to delineate a new boundary between the two villages, thereby 
usurping large tracts of land owned by people from Waai before the conflict.  
The violence between the villages of Waai and Tulehu is understood in a 
different framework since historical tensions are not considered to be at the 
root of  it. In fact, Waai and Tulehu have a traditionally close relationship and 
they consider themselves to be from the same ancestors, despite their different 
religious background. Proof of this is found in the similar family names in the 
two villages. For instance, while Salomi is a common family name in Waai, 
many people in Tulehu have Tuasalomi as a family name. Neither has the 
border between the villages ever been contested. This does not mean that 
relations between both communities remained totally peaceful throughout the 
kerusuhan. Regular violent skirmishes were noted but the level of violence 
never reached the same intensity as that of Liang. Although data on the 
number of people wounded and dead are lacking, all parties agreed that - until 
the arrival of the Laskar Jihad in May 2000 - most heavy fighting was in fact 
conducted on the border between Waai and Liang, resulting in most of the 
dead and wounded. Due to good relations between Waai and Tulehu, 
traditional leaders from Tulehu kept in contact with leaders from Waai and 
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also made several attempts to keep hot tempered youth under control in their 
village. People from Waai and Tulehu also often visited each other before 
May/June 2000 in order to buy food or just socialize. This was unimaginable 
in the case of Waai/Liang where crossing the border was considered 
extremely perilous. Also illustrative is the fact that the land on the border 
between Waai and Tulehu never suffered the same fate as those on the border 
with Liang. On the Tulehu border no crops or trees were destroyed. In fact, 
many people of Tulehu took care of the trees owned by the people from Waai 
during the flight of the Waai community in Passo. In a similar vein, no 
borders have been removed or other attempts made to take over land.  
 
So what then explains the fact that the final attack on Waai in July 2000 also 
came from Tulehu? According to people from Waai and Tulehu, the primary 
reason for the attack is linked to the considerable Laskar Jihad presence in 
Tulehu from May 2000 onwards. This Laskar Jihad set up an important posko 
(coordination centre) in the village of Tulehu, more particular in the dusun 
(sub-village) of Gurnala. It is only following the entry of the Laskar Jihad - 
constantly referred to as an alien, Javanese phenomenon - that a fierce attack 
was executed. In this regard, the violence that occurred between Tulehu and 
Waai is not understood within the framework of a long-term, historical enmity 
between the two villages but instead is considered a product of the recent 
kerusuhan and more particularly a product of the pressure and intimidation 
the Laskar Jihad fighters exercised among the villagers of Tulehu. This also 
indicates how the entrance of the Laskar Jihad gave a new turn to the conflict 
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and became an important additional factor to conduct violence, apart from 
localized struggles to access resources such as land. Although it is always 
hard to distinguish between fact and myth in reconstructing these types of 
stories, it is remarkable that the interpretation of events is largely similar 
between the people of Waai and Tulehu. Through numerous details, people in 
both Waai and Tulehu try to demonstrate how the recent riots were nothing 
more than an ‘accident de parcours’ within a normally peaceful relation. For 
instance, it was often noted that the people of Tulehu came to warn the people 
of Waai just before the last big attacks in July 2000 so that older people and 
children could take refuge in the woods and many lives could be saved. As 
one older Waai women told me: ‘people from Tulehu came to warn us and 
risked their lives while the Liang people just wanted us all dead.’ 
 
 
3.6. Contested spaces in urban areas 
 
These two examples illustrate how the general Muslim against Christian 
dichotomy through which communal conflict in Ambon was organized found 
fertile ground since competition for access to land was partly organized 
through these same religious lines. While in the case of Hila and Kaitetu, this 
made a radical difference between engaging or not engaging in violence, in 
the Waai case this explains considerable variations in the intensity of the 
violence. Too often this observation has been neglected in analysis of the 
Ambon conflict which focus on national and regional dynamics tends to 
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overlook the way violence is conducted at the micro-levels of society. These 
sorts of historical, local tensions nevertheless serve as one of the primary 
explanations why the violence escalated so quickly and dramatically and 
cannot be overlooked if one wants to fully understand the complexities and 
different genealogies of the violence (von Benda Beckmann 2004: 292).  
 
These kinds of private opportunities surfaced not just through seeking to gain 
access to land in rural areas. Local political elites were instrumental in 
instigating riots in the town of Ambon with the primary objective of obtaining 
access to the state in a new and uncertain era (Van Klinken 2007). Yet, this 
observation does not fully account for the incentives people - in particular 
male youth - in this urban context had to start engaging in communal conflict. 
Similarly in the town Ambon, cleansing whole neighborhoods of a religious 
minority often followed a particular economic rationale. A typical example is 
the fact that young Christian males have taken over major parts of the 
informal transport sector from which Muslims have been violently expelled. 
The near monopolization of this transport sector by Muslim migrants before 
the start of the kerusuhan was already a source of enduring frustration among 
many unemployed male Ambonese youth, occasionally resulting in low 
intensity skirmishes between the two groups (von Benda Beckmann 2004). 
The conflict presented a unique chance to settle these disputes for previously 
marginalized groups such as unemployed young Christian men. For instance, 
all the becaks (tricycle taxis) left behind by minority Muslim communities 
were immediately possessed by Christians. Importantly, in addition, the 
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spaces where the becak business was performed by Muslims have been 
‘cleared’. Bearing this in mind, the logic behind violent evictions in rural and 
urban areas have striking resemblances. In both cases, access to space became 
one of the central incentives to drive people out. Whilst in rural areas this 
space is mainly used for agricultural purposes, in urban areas this space has 
been occupied to engage in informal economic activities such as transport.   
Various sources stated that competition for access to the informal economy 
are at the root of the conflict in Ambon. This is particularly the case for 
reports written shortly after the start of the first riots by fact-finding teams of 
the local Unpatti University (Tim Pengkajian 1999) and the Jakarta based 
Universitas Indonesia (Tim Peneliti Universitas Indonesia 1999). In these 
reports, the existence of sharp communal tensions for access to the informal 
economy in the town of Ambon are considered pivotal to the start of the 
conflict. In the Universitas Indonesia report, these tensions are named as the 
most prominent factor explaining the outburst of violence. This competition is 
also understood to be ethnically defined by the division between the Muslim 
migrant community of the so-called BMM (Butonese, Bugis and 
Makkasarese) who largely dominated the informal economy prior to the start 
of the bloodshed, and the autochthonous Ambonese. It is then further claimed 
that this ethnic violence was gradually transformed into a religious conflict 
(Tim Peneliti Universitas Indonesia 1999: 118-124). Contrary to this view, I 
believe that competition for access to the informal economy was not the cause 
of the violence but should be understood as part of the ongoing rationale 
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within the violence. Similar to the question of land access, no specific 
organizations mobilizing people around the issue of the informal economy 
could be found in the lead up to the conflict. Moreover, one could query the 
timing of the violence, given that tensions surrounding access to the informal 
economy were already present throughout the nineties. Viewed from this 
perspective, a classic political economy approach explains much better the 
specific temporal and spatial dimensions behind the violence. At the same 
time, existing frustrations and tensions arising from these issues constituted a 
rationale to sustain the violence and settle disputes for economic gains.   
 
In the Universitas Indonesia and the Unpatti reports, it is also stated that the 
initial urban riots in Ambon were framed trough an ethnic perspective and 
only later evolved into a religious conflict. This view is shared by many 
Ambonese, in particular Christian Ambonese. For instance, some Christian 
Ambonese stated that felt deceived by their Muslim Ambonese brethren 
because they made a deliberate decision to side with the Muslim migrants 
after the first weeks of rioting in the town. These sorts of statements are 
overdone as communal violence in Ambon was religiously framed from the 
start. Yet, what is true is that ethnic and religious fault lines have always been 
closely linked to each other from the beginning of the unrest, although the 
religious framing of the conflict dominated. Competition for access to space 
in urban and rural areas always contained a strong ethnic dimension that plays 
out between autochthonous Ambonese, including both Christians and 
Muslims, and migrant communities essentially consisting of Muslims. 
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Studying the issue of land access in Ambon, one quickly discerns ethnic 
tensions that are essentially concentrated between Muslim Butonese migrants 
and ‘autochthonous’ Ambonese who are both Christian and Muslim. For 
instance, many Butonese settlements are found in Hila at the border with Hitu. 
Communal relations between these migrant Muslim communities and the 
autochthonous Muslim community of Hila have always been quite tense, as 
evidenced by different instances of verbal and physical aggression from the 
past (Von Benda Beckmann 1990: 250-252). Until now, this type of ethnically 
framed low-intensity violence occurs once in a while in Hila, as in many other 
places on the island. In most cases, these incidents are caused by conflicting 
interpretations of institutional arrangements for the management of resources. 
Yet, while these tensions exist throughout the region, the recent violence did 
not present an opportunity to settle these types of disputes, since they are 
ethnically defined and occur among Muslims. Within the religious logic 
through which the conflict was fought, settling these sorts of ethnic disputes 
would not be acceptable. On the other hand, where minority Butonese 
communities lived in Christian areas, they were chased away and in most 
instances their land was deliberately taken over by Christians. Put somewhat 
cynically, the religious fault line laid down the ‘rules of the game’ which 
guided the settlement of private disputes. Therefore, Ambon did not descend 
into a situation of total chaos in which all economic tensions were at play. The 
general Muslim versus Christian opposition still mattered in Ambon as it 
prescribed the lines along which these disputes could be settled.  
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3.7. Conclusion: the need for empirically grounded,  
integrative approaches 
 
In most accounts seeking to explain the recent communal warfare in Ambon, 
strong attention is paid to political transformations occurring on the national 
level following the implosion of the New Order in May 1998. This also 
largely applies to other cases of communal violence that occurred around that 
time in Indonesia. In addition, the agency of ‘ordinary folk’ engaging (or not 
engaging) in communal conflict tends to be overlooked. As Jemma Purdey 
(2004: 201), in summarizing the existing literature on violence in Indonesia 
after the New Order, puts it: ‘More needs to be done, however, to explore the 
emotions and compulsions that exist among members of the crowds who 
participate in violence’. A similar critique has been made by Patrick Barron 
et.al., stating that analysis of conflicts in Indonesia often lack primary 
empirical data, thereby: ‘… overlooking possible connections between 
smaller scale (everyday) forms of violence and large incidents’ (Barron et.al. 
2004: 8). The same applies to Ambon, where, despite a wide array of 
literature about the origins of the violence, elaborate empirical accounts of the 
way violence was conducted at the micro-levels of society remain scarce. As a 
consequence, ‘ordinary folk’ (Brass 1997) are too easily viewed as an 
amorphous mass following the politics of greedy elites. The case studies 
presented here refute this image. People had specific, private interests in 
engaging in communal violence and were much more proactive than generally 
believed. This view is probably best summed up by a Muslim friend who, 
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throughout an informal evening dinner, made the following remark: ‘Of 
course there were provocateurs in the conflict. We were all constantly 
provoking each other’. This sorts of remarks ascribing agency to Ambonese 
society in the kerusuhan have been rather rare throughout my fieldwork. 
When the first Christian-Muslim riots broke out in the town of Ambon, people 
had exceptional opportunities to take over land, particularly in those cases 
where the institutional arrangements to access land have traditionally been 
contested. In most instances, these disputes took root during colonial times 
and have since occasionally resulted in recurrent outbursts of violence prior to 
1999. Thus displacement and the subsequent ‘clearing’ of space have to be 
understood as an important factor behind the violence itself rather than as an 
unforeseen byproduct.19
 
 This does not only apply to rural areas. A similar 
dynamic appeared in urban areas where the clearing of space became the 
essential means for taking over certain activities in the informal economy.  
Importantly, this observation does not serve as the ultimate explanation 
behind the recent violence in Ambon; many other factors need to be 
accounted for in order to obtain a balanced understanding of why people 
decided (or not) to fight. Stressing the importance of private opportunities 
during communal violence does not mean that the recent episode of civil 
warfare in Ambon can be simply viewed as a situation in which ‘rational’ 
                                                          
19 Similar observations have also been made for cases of separatist collective violence 
in post-Suharto Indonesia, see Robinson (2008) on East Timor and Aspinall (2008) on 
Aceh. 
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people solely sought ‘rational’ economic self-interest. Studying conflict at the 
micro-levels of society, one is inevitably confronted with a diversity of 
actions, making it impossible to point to the one true motive on the ground 
(Brass 1997, Kalyvas 2003). In other words, there exists no golden bullet 
theory for understanding communal conflict. A full understanding of the 
conflict that engulfed Ambon therefore demands an integrative and 
multidisciplinary approach that takes into account the many overlapping 
dimensions that characterized the violence (Pannell 2003, von Benda 
Beckmann 2004). Apart from the settling of private disputes, there is a 
multiplicity of other reasons why people engaged in communal violence. For 
instance, Dieter Bartels notes with regard to the violence in the Moluccas: 
‘religious righteousness was not only the means to gain political and 
economic power but also an end in itself, proving the superiority of the 
religion of the victors’ (Bartels 2003: 20). In informal discussions, people 
regularly cite religion as the most important reason to engage in violence. For 
instance, one older Christian women who had been active in the production of 
guns and bombs openly stated  ‘… foreign researchers such as you too easily 
downplay the central role played by religion in the conflict. I know it is 
maybe hard for western people to understand but for me it was all about the 
preservation of my religion.’ A similar argument is put forward by Goss 
(2004), who in relation to the conflict in Ambon warns not to simply dismiss 
religious justifications for violence as some sort of false consciousness, hiding 
the ‘real’ economic, territorial and economic grievances.  
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It is also apparent how often one is confronted with individualized, apparently 
banal reasons to engage in violence that have little connection with the bigger 
economic and political picture. For instance, revenge is often mentioned as 
the reason to kill people from the other religion. Similarly, their involvement 
in the violence gave many young people - in particular unemployed young 
men - a new social standing. Becoming the protector of the community gave 
them local heroes status and - at least in their own eyes - sharply increased 
their popularity amongst girls. Important markers of this newly acquired 
standing was the free provision of meals and the fact that they could ask for 
free cigarettes to ‘whoever we wanted’.20
                                                          
20 One can question if this self-proclaimed societal status was shared among broader 
parts of the population. In the town of Ambon, these ‘akar rumput’ (grassroots) were 
definitely popular among some sections of society as they were considered to be the 
defenders of the neighborhood in case conventional security forces failed in this task. 
On the other hand, these organizations were also referred to as ‘geng-geng’ and many 
people noted that, as the conflict progressed, the aggression by which these gangs 
claimed free food or constantly asked for ‘uang rokok’ (cigarette money, tips) 
dramatically increased. In some cases, businesses were extorted in exchange for 
protection.   
 Considering this multitude of 
factors to start engaging in communal violence, stressing the importance of 
private opportunities to access space can only form a part of a much more 
complex and multilayered picture. A number of extra empirically grounded 
studies trying to analyze how and why violence was conducted at the micro-
levels of society could therefore increase our understanding about the reasons 
and ongoing logic behind the recent communal conflict in Ambon. Obviously, 
this also counts for many other cases of communal conflict in post-Suharto 
Indonesia. 
 
  
 
IV  
 
 
City in war. 
Displacement, income generation and food distribution during 
urban communal conflict1
 
 
 
This chapter aims to offer some answers to the question of how internally 
displaced people generated income in an urban context characterized by high-
intensity violence. This will be done through a case study on the IDP camps 
of THR and Wisma Atlit. The foremost conclusions that can be drawn from 
these two case studies is that a disproportionate large part of the male 
population lost their jobs in the private economy shortly after the outburst of 
the first violence. Among the women, one noticed an increase in their 
engagement in the informal petty trading, although this increase was unevenly 
spread between Christian Wisma Atlit and Muslim THR. Further elaborating 
on these findings, in the second part of this chapter, it will be illustrated how 
insecurity restructured food trade networks in Ambon. In a somewhat 
contradictory way, this posed an opportunity and a threat for the internally 
displaced being cut off from these food trade network and markets. On the 
one hand, vulnerability towards food insecurity increased as alternatives in 
urban agriculture in these overcrowded camps were nonexistent. On the other 
                                                          
1 The outline of the first part of this article is based on: Adam, J. and Peilouw, L. 
(2007) ‘Internal Displacement and Income Generation Strategies: A Case Study in 
Ambon’, Social Development Issues, 30 (2): 78-90.  
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hand, there emerged some particular incentives for people that traditionally 
had been excluded from informal petty trading to take up a function in food 
retailing and generate an income through these activities. 
 
 
4.1. Urban violence in Ambon 
 
The recent communal conflict in Maluku has always had a strong urban 
character. It was in the inner town of Ambon that the symbolic ‘green light’ 
for the start of the violence was given after a fight ran out of hand on the 19th 
of January 1999. Until 2001, the town of Ambon remained a warzone as the 
religious fault lines and subsequent battle lines ran straight through the city. It 
was also in the inner city centre of Ambon that the last big riots of April/May 
2004 took place. The communal violence in the city of Ambon thus had a 
longer endurance compared to most of the rural parts of the Moluccas. One of 
the explanations for this has to be sought in demographics. Many rural regions 
in Maluku were characterized by demographic imbalances between Christians 
and Muslims. After the respective religious minority was expelled, stability 
quickly returned. An obvious example is the Leihitu peninsula on Ambon 
island. This peninsula has always been Muslim dominated and after some 
small Christian enclaves were chased away in early 1999, this part of Ambon 
island remained relatively peaceful throughout the whole kerusuhan. The 
most notable exception on the Leihitu peninsula was the village of Waai 
where violence persisted for about one and a half year until the Waai 
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community was expelled. The same happened in the city of Ambon where 
neither of the two religious groups had the capacity to chase the other one out. 
This observation confirms the remark made by John Sidel (2008: 53) that: ‘… 
displacement played a crucial role in the transformation, de-escalation, and 
effective termination of large-scale inter-religious violence’.  
 
This urban character of the violence in Ambon is rather exceptional. In many 
conflict regions in the world, cities play a pivotal role but rarely as a 
battlefield where different factions fight each other for multiple years. In the 
majority of cases, cities are controlled by one of the warring parties or an 
international security force and the real battle lines are situated in more rural, 
far-away areas. As a consequence, cities become attraction poles for people 
living in these volatile rural areas.2  In contrast, the town of Ambon witnessed 
a dramatic mass exodus due to the high levels of insecurity. I did not manage 
to obtain exact data about the exact number of killings or wounded in the city 
compared to more rural regions. However, the underlying population figures 
illustrate poignantly the urban character of the violence.3
 
  
 
 
                                                          
2 For instance, in the period of protracted warfare in eastern DRC, the town of Goma 
witnessed an average growth of 14% (Verhoeve 2004: 112).  
 
3 These data are derived from different Maluku Dalam Angka (Maluku in Figures) 
books (1988, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2007). These statistical yearbooks are 
distributed by the Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Maluku.     
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Absolute  numbers Population density 
1961 99142 267/km² 
1971 139704 389/km² 
1980 208898 582/km² 
1985 223823 623/km² 
1990 276955 734/km² 
1995 311974 827/km² 
2000 206210 547/km² 
2005 234421 622/km² 
2007 256222 680/km² 
 
    Table 1: Population figures Ambon city 
Studying these data, in particular the steep decline between 1995 and 2000 is 
remarkable. While in 1995, there still were 827 inhabitants per km² in the 
town of Ambon, in 2000, this had decreased to 547 inhabitants per km². It is 
clear that this decline is due to the eruption of violence in Ambon in the 
beginning of 1999, which caused a dramatic mass exodus out of the city. By 
2007, population density was still lower compared to 1990, despite the fact 
that high-intensity violence was already over for about 5 to 6 years at that 
time. When we take a look at the population figures for the same period in the 
largely rural district of Maluku Tengah, a different picture emerges.4
 
  
                                                          
4 Maluku Tengah is considered here as the old district including the districts of  Buru, 
Seram Bagian Barat and Seram Bagian Timur which were recently divided from the 
old Maluku Tengah district. This means that for the years 2005 and 2007, the 
population figures for the current district of Maluku Tengah are somewhat lower than 
these data suggest.   
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 Absolute numbers  Population density 
1961 252928 9/km² 
1971 352460 12/km² 
1980 444006 15/km² 
1985 520735 18/km 
1990 592675 20/km² 
1995 666870 23/km² 
2000 651114 23/km² 
2005 667784 23/km² 
2007 682788 24/km² 
 
                  Table 2: Population figures Maluku Tengah district 
 
For this district, we notice how a small demographic decline can be noted 
between 1995 and 2000. Yet, this never reached the same level as was the 
case for the city of Ambon. This difference between urban Ambon and rural 
Maluku Tengah can also be derived from the subsequent diagram.  
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Diagram 1: Population figures Ambon city and Maluku Tengah 
 
 
4.2. Methodologies for data collection 
 
How did civil populations attempt to economically survive in this specific 
context of enduring and high-intensity urban warfare? As a concrete entry 
point to answer this broad question, research has been conducted in two IDP 
camps situated in the city of Ambon. More in particular, a comparative study 
was undertaken in the first three months of 2006 in order to see why and how 
income generation changed once the kerusuhan burst out in the beginning of 
1999. The first camp of Wisma Atlit (Athlete’s Home Stay) consisted of a 
Protestant community of around 200 households which before the conflict 
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lived in the predominantly Muslim neighborhood of Batu Merah. For reasons 
of insecurity, this community was forced to flee to the Christian 
neighbourhood of Karpan (Karan Panjang) on the 23rd of February 1999, 
where they took refuge in an abandoned sports centre. This site was situated 
about two kilometres away from their original place of living. Of the 700 
households that fled from Batu Merah, only some 200 families could settle in 
Karpan. Others arriving once the place was already packed, became dispersed 
all over the island. For the first two years, people simply lived in the 
government building and slept on the ground. From the end of 2001 onwards, 
people began to build small wooden cabins. Yet, living conditions remained 
uncomfortable. For instance, due to the small sizes of the cabins, there was 
not enough sleeping place for the whole household (in many cases also 
including grandparents). Therefore, there existed ‘sleeping shifts’ and in many 
of the cabins, there were constantly people sleeping, also in the daytime. 
Another problem encountered was the lack of privacy for a satisfying sexual 
life. In particular people who became married throughout the time of 
displacement could not claim their own personal cabin to live and were forced 
to stay in their parents place. Some of these newlyweds confirmed that this 
had a negative influence for their love life. In the end, this community lived in 
this camp for seven years until they were permanently relocated in April-May 
2006 to a new place. 
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Small living cabins in the IDP camp of Wisma Atlit (February 2006) 
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The second camp that has been researched is the Muslim IDP camp of THR, 
situated near the harbour. The IDPs of this camp came from different parts of 
the city and the Moluccan archipelago. This resulted in an ethnically 
diversified IDP-community. This ethnic diversification was illustrated in the 
architectural development of the camp. Here also, people originally slept on 
the floor of a government building but when they finally began to build their 
cabins, they did this among ethnic lines. This resulted in a camp where ‘ethnic 
enclaves’ could be distinguished as the Bugis, Butonese, Ambonese Muslims 
and other ethnic groups all occupied their own quarter. The number of IDPs 
was at its peak between 1999 until 2002 and throughout the riots of April 
2004. During these periods, THR accommodated approximately 600 
households. From April 2006 onwards, the IDPs were moved to different 
relocation camps scattered all over the island. At the time of research, THR 
gave shelter to some 250 households as some of the IDPs were already 
relocated in a new and permanent place. 
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Women and children passing their time in THR (February 2006) 
 
The methodology used to investigate how and why income generation 
changed in these two settings once the kerusuhan started was twofold. In a 
first stage, interviews that fell in two categories were conducted: (1) 
introductory interviews with people who were closely involved in the 
organization of the camps, such as community leaders, religious leaders and 
NGO activists, and (2) general focus group discussions with the IDPs of both 
camps on diverse aspects of their internal displacement. These two kinds of 
interviews helped us get insight into the history of the camps and the most 
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important problems and opportunities that arose throughout their 
displacement.  
Household interviews were conducted in the second phase. A questionnaire 
was used to gather personal data and investigate two things: (1) how was 
income obtained by the household before and during the conflict, and (2) how 
large respondents’ income was before and during the kerusuhan.5
                                                          
5 See the annex for an example of this questionnaire. One will notice how questions 
about the aftermath of the conflict have also been included in the questionnaire. 
However, when processing the data, it was decided to leave this part out due to 
contrasting interpretations when the conflict ended.  
 When 
looking at the questionnaire, one will notice that the word pekerjaan (job) 
figures quite prominently. However, already after the first household 
interviews, it became clear that some people considered working in informal 
economies not as a job while this obviously is an important and relevant 
manner to generate income. Therefore, interviews were conducted as open as 
possible and started from the general question how many was obtained (dapat 
uang) in order to fulfil the household needs and the word pekerjaan has been 
left out as much as possible. The interviews were conducted with the wife and 
husband together. Despite the fact that the data were collected separately for 
men and women, preference was given not to ask people to leave the place as 
this would damage an atmosphere of informality and thrust. When other 
friends and family were present, they were as much as possible involved in 
the interview. In the end, the discussions people sometimes had with each 
other proofed to be an added value for the research.  
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The respondents were selected at random with two important restrictions.6
 
 I 
only interviewed people who already supported themselves before the 
conflict, and the interviews were only conducted in the evening time when 
most of the people were taking a rest. In total, 70 in-depth household 
interviews were conducted in the two IDP camps. The same household was 
sometimes interviewed two times to get additional information or double 
check the data. When people had difficulties indicating how much money they 
made with certain activities, the question just remained unanswered. 
Considering the rather limited sample that has been interviewed, the 
underlying data should be interpreted as figures that reflect some tendencies, 
rather than exact numbers. Although the questionnaires were focussed on 
collecting quantitative data, many time was spent to elaborate on more 
qualitative explanations. For instance, when men indicated they had no source 
of income whatsoever, additional questions were asked how they fell about 
this, how they spent their time when they had nothing to do... All this 
additional information was also noted down.  
 
                                                          
6 In the initial phase of the research, contacts were made with community leaders in 
the camp. These community leaders helped us to find our first respondents and also 
facilitated our focus group discussions. However, once people were used to see 
myself and my Ambonese colleague wandering around in the camp, households were 
selected at random. In this way, it was assured that the interviewees did not all belong 
to one and the same network but as many different voices as possible were heard in 
the camp (see also Jacobsen and Landau 2003 on the dangers of using snowball 
sampling approaches in refugee camps). 
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4.3. Impoverishment and a crisis of masculinity 
 
As a starting point of the analysis, the strategies men and women used to 
obtain money have been classified into socio-professional categories. These 
categories were grouped along the following lines: Pegawai Negeri (Civil 
Servant): Public Sector; Pegawai Swasta (Private Servant), Buruh Bangunan 
(Construction Worker) and Buruh Pelabuhan (Dock Worker): Formal Private 
Sector; Wiraswasta/Usaha Sendiri (Self-Employed), Pedagang di Pasar 
(Trader at the Market): Petty Trade;7 Petani (Farmer) and Nelayan 
(Fisherman): Farmer-Fisherman, Pembantu Rumah Tangga: Housemaid, 
Sopir (driver: public bus, motorcycle and tricycle): Transport, and finally the 
category of No Income. Each of these categories was identified separately for 
men and women.8
 
  
 
                                                          
7 Throughout the interviews, I noticed how the terms pedagang di pasar and 
wiraswasta/usaha sendiri were often closely interrelated. In case of uncertainties, the 
data have been double checked through additional questions. 
 
8 To overcome the problem of diversification (one person having different sources of  
income generation at the same time), I identified the strategy that people indicated to 
be their most important source of income and placed this under one of the socio-
professional groups. This method can be justified by the limited diversification people 
had. When we count the people who declared they had two or more different income-
generation strategies, we cannot detect a great difference between the situations 
before and during the conflict. Before the violence broke out, 7 percent of our 
interviewees used two or more strategies, during the conflict this number was 6 
percent.  
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                                                       Men                           Women 
            Before        During         Before      During 
 
          Table 3: Income generation before and during communal conflict 
 
Table 3 thus shows the development of income generation for the IDPs of 
THR and Wisma Atlit, before and during the kerusuhan. As I already said, 
considering the limited sample of interviewees, it is important to only focus 
on those categories where sharp differences can be noticed. A first remarkable 
trend is a steep rise for the men in the category of ‘No Income’. While only 
3% of the men declared they did not have any source of financial income 
before the conflict, this figure rose to 29%, or almost one-third of the whole 
male population, during the conflict. This picture is different for the women. 
Here we see a decline from 44% to 35% of the women having no source of 
income generation during the conflict.  
The same tendency is reflected in the underlying table regarding household 
income. In the household interviews, it was asked to indicate how much 
Public Sector 7% 10% 2% 2% 
Formal private sector 48% 27% 6% 2% 
Petty Trade 15% 18% 36% 47% 
Farmer-Fisherman 8% 2% 4% 0% 
Housemaid 0% 0% 8% 14% 
Transport 19% 14% 0% 0% 
No Income 3% 29% 44% 35% 
IV: City in war 
 
107 
 
money was made in one month. This was then grouped into four income 
categories.9
 
  
                                                                   Men                          Women 
                                                         Before       During        Before      During 
 
No Income 2% 28% 45% 36% 
< Rp. 500,000 (US$55) 49% 45% 40% 58% 
Rp. 500,000–1,000,000 (US$110) 34% 25% 11% 6% 
> Rp. 1,000,000 15% 2% 4% 0% 
 
Table 4: Household Income 
 
During the conflict, the women’s relative contributions to the total household 
income rose considerably. However, among the two IDP communities, we 
notice an overall decline in the household income during the conflict. This can 
be deduced from this table 4, where the two highest income categories 
decrease sharply during the conflict among both men and women.10
                                                          
9 The minimal variation in the no-income data between table 3 and 4 can be explained 
by the fact that some people had no idea what they were earning. These people were 
not included in the sample.  
 The first 
significant conclusion, however, that emerges from these tables is that men 
were more vulnerable compared to women to losing their income once the 
 
10 It is important to bear in mind that after the fall of the New Order in 1998, the 
whole of Indonesia was confronted with a devaluation that resulted in a loss of 
purchasing power. This suggests that the impoverishment the IDPs were confronted 
with is even more problematic than these data suggest.  
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kerusuhan started. Apart from the economic impacts, this had some import 
emotional consequences. Parts of the male population expressed feelings that 
can be defined as a real ‘crisis of masculinity’. This term indicates that 
traditional bases of power and identity of men in family units are being 
undermined by changes in the labour market (Chant 2004). This was clearly 
the case in both IDP camps as many men lost their classic role as the wage 
earner of the household. Different men stated they considered it as a stigma 
they could not longer fulfil the needs of their family. Other men declared they 
felt terribly bored as they had very little to do. This was tellingly summed up 
by one man who openly stated that ‘... all day long, I was only laying on the 
sacks of rice provided by the aid agencies’. Illustrative is also the fact that a 
football competition was set up in the camp of Wisma Atlit for the men, in 
order ‘to kill the time’. Yet, one should be careful not to make a simple 
stereotype of this crisis of masculinity. When interviewing NGO activists and 
community and religious leaders who were closely involved in the daily 
workings of the camps, a rather one-sided picture was often portrayed. In 
general, the conclusion put forward was that the women were the ones taking 
on responsibility and the men were the lazy ones. Throughout the interviews 
and discussions conducted, a much more complex and refined picture 
emerged. I had for instance some discussions in which women praised their 
husbands for taking up different activities within the household upon losing 
their employment and even declared that their relationship had drastically 
improved. None of the men interviewed considered the loss of income as a 
comfortable situation and many of them stressed the shame (rasa malu) they 
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felt because of this. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that many women 
still did not have their own means of generating an income and were staying 
all day long in the camp. It appears however that this ‘empty time’ could be 
filled up easier with traditional household activities such as taking care of the 
children or cooking and cleaning.  
 
An essential question that needs to be posed is why in particular men were 
vulnerable to losing their income once the conflict started. In order to answer 
this question, it is interesting to review table 3. In this table, we see that 
before the conflict, 48% of the men interviewed gained an income through the 
formal private economy. In contrast, only 6% of the women were employed in 
this sector. Once the conflict started, this number dropped from 48% to 27%. 
It thus looks as if in particular the formal private economy contracted due to 
the eruption of the violence. Because the majority of men were engaged in 
this sector, it was in particular the men who lost their primary source of 
income. Since women were traditionally less engaged in this sector, they were 
less affected by this economic downturn. This observation is confirmed 
through different, more general economic data. Apart from the number of 
direct killings and the high level of displacement, it is often forgotten that the 
communal violence in Ambon induced a steep economic decline. This was 
further aggravated by the overall financial crisis that raged throughout 
Indonesia at the time and caused a negative economic growth of 15,3% and an 
inflation rate of 45,4% in the years 1998 to 1999 (Booth 1999). Although the 
direct consequences were most gravely felt in urban Java and Sumatra, the 
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combination of the conflict coupled with the financial crisis resulted in an 
economic recession that was sharper and more prolonged in the Moluccan 
province compared to other Indonesian provinces.11
                                                          
11 The following economic data are based on Mawdsley et.al. (2005) 
 In most Indonesian 
provinces, real GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product) started to grow 
from the years 2000 – 2001 onwards and had already in the year 2000 resulted 
in a 4,8% overall economic growth in Indonesia (Dick, 2001). In Maluku on 
the other hand, the GRDP per capita fell by 20 % for the total period of 1998 
– 2002. As a consequence, in 2002 one in three people were living below the 
poverty line and in terms of per capita GRDP, the province ranked 26th out of 
30 Indonesian provinces. One of the reasons for this economic downfall was a 
sharp decline in industrial, manufacturing and construction activities, in 
particular those economic sectors a lot of men were engaged in. Between 
1998 and 2002, the output of the manufacturing and industrial sector 
experienced a decline of 62% while construction decreased with 81%. 
Agriculture on the other hand declined only by 8%. Consequently, 40% of the 
entire workforce employed in the industrial and manufacturing sectors lost 
their job. This sharp economic downturn can also be evidenced by some of the 
economic data that were collected through own research in the statistical 
yearbooks of the province of Maluku (BPS Maluku 1997, 1999, 2000). For 
instance, the total amount of industrial production in the province of Maluku 
decreased from 619 422 tons in 1999 to 285 422 tons in 2000. The total 
number of people employed in mechanical, metal and chemical industries 
decreased from 5878 in 1997 to 3647 in 2000. For agricultural and forest 
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industries, a similar picture emerges. While in 1997, 12960 people were 
employed in this sector, by 2000, this number had fallen to 6516. Within this 
last sector, in particular the shutting down of the big plywood factories in and 
around the city of Ambon was dramatic. Also many of the men in THR and 
Wisma Atlit had a job in these plywood factories. As these economic sectors 
were particularly affected by the recession, the municipality of Ambon - 
which has a more urbanized and industrialized character compared to the 
other peripheral, rural islands in Maluku - was amongst the hardest hit within 
the province of Maluku, experiencing a contraction of 33 per cent in real 
GRDP terms between 1998 and 2002. This economic downfall in Ambon is 
also evidenced by the economic performance of the harbour. Whilst in 1987 
this harbour exported goods worth US$ 315 million (totaling 87 % of all 
exports in the Moluccan province), in 2000 this number had reverted to 
US$24 million or 27 % of all exports in the province.  
 
 
4.4. Women and the informal economy 
 
Studying how women adapted their income generation after the start of the 
conflict, a different picture emerges. Apart from a decrease in the number of 
women having no source of income after the start of the kerusuhan, a second 
important observation that needs to be made is that the share of women 
engaging in informal economies increased throughout the violence. Looking 
again at table 3, we see how before the conflict, 36% of the women engaged 
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in petty trading activities. Throughout the violence, this number rose to 47%. 
The same counts for women working as housemaid. While before the conflict, 
8% of the women did some housemaid activities, during the conflict, this 
number rose to 14%.  
 
Considering the small sample of households that were studied, this increase is 
not that obvious and did not confirm the widely held perception that women 
started engaging ‘en masse’ in the informal economy. Throughout preliminary 
discussions with civil society activists and journalists, a story that regularly 
featured concerned the economically proactive role women played during the 
conflict. In particular the fact that many women started engaging in the 
informal economy was constantly stressed. In addition, research conducted 
among women in informal fish selling on the island of Ambon throughout the 
kerusuhan tended to confirm this idea (Ongen s.d.). Yet, when compiling the 
data that came out of the questionnaires, it quickly appeared that this idea 
needed to be refined. Although it was confirmed that women increasingly 
engaged in the informal economy, this increase was not as spectacular as 
expected. Yet, when I decided to split up the data between the two different 
IDP camps, a much clearer picture emerged. In the Protestant camp of Wisma 
Atlit, only 19% of the women were involved in petty trade before the conflict, 
but this figure rose to 42% during the conflict. In the case of THR, some 45% 
of the women were involved in petty trade before the outbreak of violence, 
rising to 55% during the conflict. In other words, the rise in female petty 
traders is much more significant among the Christians of Wisma Atlit 
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compared to Muslim THR. This difference corresponded with the observation 
that many more new petty markets were established in the Christian part of 
town compared to the Muslim part. As can be derived from the map below, 
the majority of the so-called pasar kaget - ‘accidental’ markets which came 
into being throughout the conflict - were situated in the Christian part of town.  
 
 
 Map: Petty markets in Ambon city (1999-2002) 
 
Before the conflict, there were no petty markets in the Christian part of town 
and the markets at Citra, Batu Gantung, Batu Meja and Belakang Soja are all 
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examples of markets that sprang up throughout the kerusuhan.  In the Muslim 
part of town, only in Amplaz (Ambon Plaza), new marketing activities were 
established because the walls of this shopping mall provided extra security. 
Apart from this one example, no extra markets were established in the Muslim 
part of town as the Mardika market already existed before the start of the 
conflict. In other words, insecurity brought about a fundamental 
reorganization of the marketing system in the town of Ambon and the 
incentives to engage in these marketing activities appeared higher in the 
Christian part of town.  
 
 
4.5. Food insecurity in the town of Ambon 
 
Arriving at these preliminary insights, I concluded my first fieldtrip to Ambon 
in 2006. It was then decided to elaborate further on this issue starting in early 
2007. Additional research was conducted about the way food trade networks 
and food markets in the town of Ambon were reconfigured throughout the 
high-intensity violence and how IDPs were integrated in these networks. In 
particular, attention has focused on the distribution and selling of locally 
produced vegetables. As an entry point, further research was conducted 
among the women traders of Wisma Atlit, who by then were relocated to a 
new site. Using this group as a starting point, a more classic 
ethnographic/qualitative approach was employed in which other traders, 
consumers, transporters and food producers were interviewed.  
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In order to reconstruct the alternative food trade networks that came into 
being throughout the kerusuhan, one should take the Mardika market as a 
starting point. Before the outbreak of the violence, this market served as the 
focal point for the distribution of fresh foods such as fish, meat and vegetables 
in the city of Ambon. These foods were imported as well as locally produced. 
The imported crops mainly came from the islands of Sulawesi and Java, were 
brought by ship to the harbour of Ambon and were then further distributed by 
middlemen to urban street merchants. The local vegetables were produced and 
sold, mainly by the ethnic Muslim Butonese community living on the island 
of Ambon and some of the surrounding islands. Their focus on the cultivation 
of vegetables instead of perennial, long-term crops goes back to the fact that 
the migrant Butonese community in Ambonese customary law, holds a 
secondary position (Benda Beckmann 1990). As a consequence, Butonese can 
only obtain insecure users’ rights and therefore cultivate short-term crops such 
as vegetables and cassava that do not require a strong financial investment and 
are less risk-prone in case ownership over the land becomes contested. There 
existed two manners in which these vegetables were distributed at local 
markets. In the first way, middlemen bought the vegetables in bulk in the 
villages and further distributed the produce to local markets. This practice of 
middlemen is known in Ambon as papelele. For the farmers, this had the 
advantage that there was no need to invest in transport and they did not have 
to care in case part of the produce was not sold at the market. The 
disadvantage was that the price paid by the middlemen was considerably 
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lower than the market price. These vegetables were then sold at local markets, 
often by urban Muslim residents of Butonese descent whom bought these 
products from the middlemen. In the second manner, farmers sold their 
produce directly at the market in Ambon.12
 
  
In the beginning of 1999, traditional modes of transport to the market of 
Mardika needed to be reorganized for reasons of insecurity. For instance, 
before the start of the conflict, much of the vegetables produced by the many 
Muslim Butonese settlements on the Leihitu part of the island were 
traditionally brought to the Mardika market over land. However, once the 
violence unfolded, the city of Ambon was no longer reachable by car from the 
Leihitu peninsula as the large Christian enclave of Passo needed to be passed. 
Therefore, new distribution networks were set up. One example is the way 
vegetables were brought over the mountains from the Leihitu peninsula to the 
village of Rumah Tiga, situated at the bay opposite from Ambon city. From 
Rumah Tiga, these vegetables were then transported by speedboat to Mardika. 
The biggest problem in terms of access however arose for the Christian 
population living in the city centre of Ambon. As can be seen on the map, 
very quickly after the outbursts of the first riots in the beginning of 1999, the 
                                                          
12 This does not mean that the whole Mardika market was dominated by Muslim 
Butonese. There were also Christian and Muslim Ambonese involved in the 
production and selling of locally produced vegetables. This however was a minority 
compared to the large Butonese community. Although this is not a general rule, it 
looks as if the Muslim Bugis, who are also economic migrants from the neighbouring 
island of Sulawesi, were/are more involved in the selling of textiles, toys, CDs, 
DVDs, tools…  and played a marginal function in food distribution.    
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area where the Mardika market and the harbour was situated became a mono-
religious Muslim zone that was no longer reachable for Christians. There were 
attempts to import food crops to Ambon through alternative harbours situated 
in Christian parts of the island. One example was in Gudang Arang. The 
problem however was that this harbour did not have any real infrastructure 
and could only be reached by small boats. Moreover, transportation between 
this harbour and the Christian part of town was dangerous and expensive. 
Another entry point where goods could be imported was at the harbour in 
Halong. The problem here was that his harbor was controlled by the TNI and 
the TNI had to be paid money if goods for civilians were imported.  As a 
consequence, Christians - consisting of half of the urban population - became 
almost totally deprived of their traditional access to the producers and the 
distribution networks retailing food crops in town. Therefore, food insecurity 
in the Christian part of town increased dramatically.  
 
In the camp of Wisma Atlit, this emerging food security took a particular 
form. Research conducted in 2006 had already indicated that throughout the 
conflict, there was an abundance of foods in this camp, in particular of rice, 
dried noodles and dried fish. This was also the case in THR. In this regard, the 
quote about the man laying all day long on sacks of rice is not only illustrative 
of an emerging crisis of masculinity but also demonstrates the abundance of 
staple food that was available in the camps. The primary reason for this 
profusion is that the people living in Wisma Atlit were assembled in a camp 
that possessed an official IDP status granted by the local government. Hence, 
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these populations were considered primary target groups for the food aid 
agencies and their organization in a camp made them easily reachable and 
manageable.13
 
 Yet, despite this abundance of what people refer to as 
‘makanan kering’ or dried foods, the IDPs pointed out that their immediate 
worry concerned their access to what they call fresh foods or ‘makanan 
segar’. Food insecurity was thus primarily about the access to fresh foods of 
high quality. Although not perfectly applicable in this context as cassava - 
which is considered as a staple food in Ambon - was not provided by the aid 
agencies, many IDPs referred to this need for fresh, high-quality foods with 
the expression ‘makan casbi, sakit perut’; eating cassava gives you a painful 
stomach.  
Because research focused on the Wisma Atlit IDPs, I cannot give any 
definitive conclusions how this affected food security among the total 
Christian population in Ambon town. However, some tentative data seem to 
indicate that for the majority of Christian residents living in Ambon city 
throughout the kerusuhan, mere hunger was not considered the primary 
solicitude. Just like in the case of Wisma Atlit, people were primarily 
concerned about their access to fresh food. For instance, discussing issues of 
food access among urban Christian citizens, many people referred to their 
                                                          
13 This somewhat privileged treatment of camp IDPs in terms of food aid is also 
apparent in the tensions that arose between the IDPs and the surrounding host 
community. The surplus food aid was often sold below-cost prices at the local 
markets by the IDP camp population, thereby driving the local host population out of 
the market or taking away the incentives to start engaging in petty marketing 
activities. 
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very one-sided diet of indomie (dried noodles), which was distributed by aid 
agencies. Some of them have never wanted to eat indomie again since that 
period.  
 
4.7. Alternative food trade networks 
 
Food insecurity in the camp of Wisma Atlit thus concerned the access to fresh 
foods. Going through the literature on how people deal with rising food 
insecurity in an urban context, a first strategy urban residents in different parts 
of the world have employed is urban agriculture (see Maxwell 1999 on 
Kampala, Tinsley 2003 on Kenyan cities and Ashebir, Pasquini and Bihon 
2007 on Mekelle-Ethiopia). This urban agriculture can both be used for means 
of subsistence or for selling food crops at local markets to increase income. 
Yet, as can be derived from the pictures above, space to start farming in the 
camp of Wisma Atlit was nonexistent. Therefore, these IDPs remained 
dependent on trade networks to obtain access to fresh foods. As a 
consequence, people were forced to set up alternative trade networks with the 
Muslim part of the population in the city centre at fixed transaction points, 
situated at the borderland between Muslim and Christian areas. These 
transactions came to be known as ‘tangan ketiga’ or ‘third hand transactions’.  
 
A case in point were the women traders from Wisma Atlit. After their forced 
displacement late February 1999 to Karpan, among many of these women, the 
idea started to grow to engage in petty marketing activities in order to gain 
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some additional financial income. Interestingly, throughout some informal 
meetings and discussions, these women decided to set up their own, 
independent food trade network. The (correct) analysis made by the women of 
Wisma Atlit was that food prices in the Christian part of town were extremely 
high because there were too many ‘in-betweens’ involved in the distribution 
of food. Therefore, the women traders of Wisma Atlit wanted to set up their 
own, independent trade network, hereby bypassing all sorts of middlemen 
(perantara) who were in control of these networks. Their ultimate aim was to 
sell at a cheaper price and make more profit for themselves at the same time. 
Central to this strategy were their contacts with Muslim friends in Batu 
Merah, in particular with Muslim traders who had traditionally always been 
involved in petty marketing activities in Mardika. In order to set up the trade 
network, contacts were made with friends and neighbors who were still living 
in Batu Merah. The transactions were then made under the auspices of the 
Indonesian military on the border between the Muslim and Christian parts of 
town, at a transaction point close to the market of Mardika (see map: Petty 
markets in Ambon city). This transaction point came to be known as Amans, 
due to the nearby hotel with the same name.14
                                                          
14 As can be seen on the same map, a similar transaction point emerged near the Silo 
Church. In particular imported goods coming from the harbour were sold at this point. 
Women traders from Wisma Atlit were not involved in these transactions.   
 Once the transactions were 
concluded between the Muslims of Batu Merah and the Protestants of Wisma 
Atlit, these fresh products were then immediately sold by the Protestant 
women at the nearby, newly established petty market near the Citra 
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warehouse. In a later stage, activities were shifted to a market in Belakang 
Soya.    
 
Yet, within a few weeks, this independent trade network was prohibited by 
what was referred to as koordinator (coordinator) who started to intimidate 
the women traders. For instance, some of them were threatened to be beaten 
up if they would continue with their activities. Ultimately, the women traders 
were forced to buy the products from these coordinators. Much to my 
frustration, I have never succeeded to establish contacts with any of these 
coordinators and therefore, data remain patchy. Asking the women traders 
who these people were, it was told they were strong, young men, ‘who looked 
like the TNI, had a special relationship with the TNI, but definitely were no 
TNI’. They were Christians and according to some, they had links with 
Christian armed groups operating in town, the so-called akar rumput. Yet, the 
only definitive conclusion that can be made from the women’s accounts is that 
they had no idea who these people were and where they came from. They 
were however much detested for their actions. Apart from the fact that these 
coordinators extorted market activities for their own profit, another complaint 
was that they could no longer have any personal contact with their Muslim 
friends at the other side of the border.15
                                                          
15 The existence of these networks was also confirmed by other informants, but none 
of them could give me convincing data or contacts. 
 Yet, what is sure is that throughout 
the kerusuhan, there definitely existed networks whom obtained an almost 
total control over all the economic transactions that were made near the 
IV: City in war 
 
122 
 
Amans hotel and this allowed them to arbitrarily set prices. For instance, 
many of the women traders from Wisma Atlit indicated that the price of one 
iklat (bundle) of vegetables or fish could easily rise by 300 to 400% once 
these coordinators were in control of these distribution networks. Thus, 
through the establishment of a monopoly, these coordinators could ask for 
extremely high prices, hereby reaping the profits and pushing up the prices of 
food crops in the Christian areas. This example perfectly illustrates how in 
cases where people have no own means of production in situations of 
increasing food insecurity, people remain depending on trade networks 
distributing the necessary food. This dependence puts them in an extremely 
vulnerable position towards the people controlling these networks. 
 
Apart from periods of extremely brutal violence as was the case at the end of 
1999 during the so-called natal berdarah, these sorts of tangan ketiga systems 
could go on relatively easy. More difficulties however arose after the entrance 
of the Laskar Jihad in May 2000 who forbade any commercial transactions 
between Christian and Muslim. For instance, through the Laskar Jihad radio 
SPMM (Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku - Voice of the Moluccan Muslim 
Struggle), it was regularly broadcasted that economic transaction had to stop. 
Muslim businessmen who ignored this ban were in some cases beaten up or 
killed. Therefore, the distribution of products from the Muslim area to the 
Christian area had to happen in secrecy. One of the ways to cope with this 
insecurity was to use the protection of the Indonesian military and a lot of the 
transactions happened in the army barracks in and around the town of Ambon. 
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Evidently, the army was paid good money to provide this protection. Another 
way to cope with this insecurity was the switching of small trucks or minivans 
with fresh foods or other sellable goods. This was particularly the case at the 
transaction point near the Silo church. A Muslim driver parked this truck as 
far as possible near the Christian border and a Christian driver then quickly 
took over the truck and drove to Christian territory. Arrangements about the 
price, quantity and quality of the products were already made beforehand 
through the phone. Obviously, this was fraught danger. Another way to cope 
with this problem for the Christian population was the buying of food and 
other items in Christian Passo. To reach Passo from Ambon city takes about a 
20 minute drive in normal circumstances. However, throughout the conflict, it 
was impossible to cross Muslim Batu Merah and the Christians were forced to 
make an enormous detour through the mountains in order to arrive in Passo. 
Some of the people who made this trip, declared there was a high risk to be 
shot by snipers as they had to pass closely at the Muslim border. On the other 
hand, they also declared that the profits they made with these trips were high. 
As a consequence, the price of the products they brought from Passo was 
extremely expensive. 
 
Throughout this period which lasted for about a year, commercial activities at 
the transaction point at Amans nearly came to a standstill and the majority of 
women traders in Wisma Atlit lost their primary source of financial income. 
Many remembered this period as extremely hard and insecure and their 
consumption of high-quality foods was limited. From the middle of 2001 
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onwards, when the role of the Laskar Jihad was played out, commercial 
activities were gradually restored at the borderlands between Christian and 
Muslim areas. At the end of 2001, the Dutch priest C.J. Böhm made the 
following interesting remark in his daily notes (The situation in 
Ambon/Moluccas, Report No. 219, December 30, 2001): ‘A few days ago we 
happened to stroll about near the Amans Hotel at the border of the Muslim 
neighborhood of Batumerah and the Christian neighborhood of Mardika, 
Ambon. We could see several hundreds of people merchandising, 
disregarding to be either Christian or Muslim.’ Although the number of 
‘several hundred’ is probably exaggerated, this quote illustrates how 
commercial activities at the Amans transaction point were largely restored 
after the Laskar Jihad left the city. This does not mean that the situation had 
returned to some sort of pre-conflict normality. By the end of 2001, people 
still did not dare to enter into each other’s area and the system of alternative 
food distribution networks as it came into being in 1999, remained intact. 
Also, many of the women of Wisma Atlit reengaged in these petty trading 
activities. This engagement lasted until 2003. From that year on, people 
gradually started reentering each other’s area hereby once again transforming 
food distribution networks and the incentives to engage in these networks. 
This issue will be the focus of chapter 7.  
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4.8. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I attempted to illustrate how displaced populations adapted 
their income generation in an urban context characterized by protracted, high-
intensity communal warfare. Based on research conducted in one Christian 
and one Muslim IDP camp, situated in the inner city centre of Ambon, two 
obvious conclusion can be put forward. First, due to their traditional affinity 
with the private formal economy, men proved extremely vulnerable for losing 
their income once the high-intensity violence erupted as this private economy 
went through a deep contraction after the start of the conflict in 1999. Second, 
women increasingly engaged in informal economic activities after the start of 
the conflict, albeit this engagement was remarkably higher in the Christian 
camp of Wisma Atlit, compared to the Muslim camp of THR. This points to a 
remarkable contradiction. On the one hand, the Christian urban population 
became cut off from their traditional access to food due to insecurity. This 
dramatically increased food insecurity as there were no opportunities to 
switch to urban agriculture in the overpopulated camp of Wisma Atlit. This 
also largely applied to the urban Christian population as a whole in the inner 
city of Ambon. Christian urban residents in Ambon therefore remained 
dependent on trade networks for their food provision. Although food trade 
networks were reorganized to satisfy the needs of these isolated populations, 
opportunities emerged to monopolize and extort market transactions. On the 
other hand, due to this spatial reorganization of food trade networks, there 
emerged some particular economic incentives for people, such as the women 
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from Wisma Atlit, who traditionally had been excluded from these activities 
in petty marketing to take up a function in food retailing and attempt to 
increase their income through these activities.  
 V 
 
 
I am more indigenous than you are 
Recognizing customary tenure in Ambon1
 
 
 
In chapter 3, it was demonstrated how displacement stood central in a strategy 
to settle private disputes and access space in order to perform economic 
activities and can therefore not be understood as an accidental side product of 
the recent communal violence. Elaborating further on these findings, this 
chapter aims to touch upon one of the reasons why a large part of these 
forcibly migrated have been restrained to return home once this high-intensity 
conflict ended. The hypothesis put forward in this chapter is that an 
exclusivist interpretation of customary land tenure is one of the primary 
reasons why many IDPs could not return to the place they were living before 
the start of the kerusuhan. The exclusivist deployment of customary tenure - 
also called adat in the case of Ambon - to exclude non-indigenous 
communities from secure access to resources was already a feature that was 
apparent throughout the New Order. Since an adat law community is based on 
kinship and historical ties to a particular territory, populations considered as 
non-indigenous due to geographical mobility could only access land through 
insecure, informal users rights or formal property rights. Adat therefore has 
                                                          
1 The outline of this chapter is based on the article ‘I am more indigenous than you 
are. Recognizing customary tenure in post-conflict Ambon’, Development and 
Change (under review) 
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always constituted an arena of power in which populations considered as non-
indigenous to a fixed historical territory are pushed into an inferior legal 
position. In the meantime, the recent period of communal violence and the 
ensuing population movements have given some particular opportunities for 
the indigenous adat community to settle long-standing disputes with migrant 
communities. Central to this process is a move to start registering customary 
systems of land tenure in which all land in the province is considered 
traditional adat land where indigenous adat law communities are 
acknowledged as the legitimate owners. This recognition should therefore be 
interpreted as an attempt by parts of the indigenous, Ambonese community to 
legally confirm some of the forced expulsions that were brought about during 
the recent communal warfare.  
 
 
5.1. Customary tenure and indigenousness in Indonesia and Ambon 
 
Discussions about customary tenure in Indonesia are inextricably linked to 
adat. This concept embodies the many variations of the idea of the ‘local’ in 
the diverse Indonesian archipelago (Warren and McCarthy 2002) and can 
therefore be deployed for multiple purposes (Li 2000, 2007). On a macro 
level, adat can be characterized as a set of social expectations defining how an 
ideal society should look like (Biezeveld 2004, 2007; Davidson and Henley 
2007; Li 2007; see also chapter 8). In a narrow sense, adat can be defined as 
customary land tenure or as Davidson and Henley (2007: 3) state, ‘a complex 
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of rights and obligations which ties together three things - history, land, and 
law - in a way that appears rather specific to Indonesia.’ Already throughout 
the nineties, adat was increasingly deployed in Indonesia within emancipatory 
struggles defending the rights of indigenous populations against massive, 
state-led, capitalist development projects such as dam constructions or forest 
conversions. The end of the New Order and the subsequent democratization of 
Indonesian society have further opened up the political space for all sorts of 
adat based NGOs. Illustrative was the establishment of the national 
organization AMAN (Alliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusatara, Alliance of 
Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago) in 1999. The overall objective of this 
organization is probably best summed up in the motto they used for their 
second national congress held in 2003: ‘To strengthen the position and role of 
indigenous peoples in order to realize justice and popular democracy in the 
era of regional autonomy’ (Acciaiolo 2007: 295). Central in this struggle 
stands the issue of land rights and more in particular customary land rights of 
populations considered as indigenous to a particular territory.   
 
These objectives put forward by an organization like AMAN reflect a broader 
discourse in which customary land tenure is increasingly gaining popularity 
among several donors, NGOs and governments in the South to meet the needs 
of the rural poor and mediate conflicts between land users (Toulmin and Quan 
2000, Peters 2004). Examples of countries that have witnessed a gradual 
recognition of customary land tenure in their recent history include Malawi 
(Peters and Kambewa 2007), Zimbabwe (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008), 
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South Africa (Mathis 2007), Venezuela, Bolivia and parts of the Philippines 
(Hirtz 2003). This increasing popularity of the customary finds its origins in 
several development paradigms which all imply a move away from state led 
programs of formal, individual land titling. The first paradigm is centered 
around promoting and defending the ‘culture-specific’, ‘indigenous rights’ or 
the ‘traditional customs’. This cultural turn in development started to take root 
in the seventies when universal concepts such as class and state became 
increasingly criticized by parts of the traditional progressive left in the West 
and as a reaction, culture was put forward as an alternative development 
objective (Nederveen Pieterse 1995, Davidson and Henley 2007). Within this 
discourse, customary systems of land tenure are attributed collective and 
community-based solidarity mechanisms that operate according to non-market 
principles and come to serve as strongholds against predatory free-market 
systems based on individual titling. This view is particularly in vogue among 
many NGOs situated at the left-leaning side of the development continuum 
(Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). A second incentive for this growing popularity 
is the perception that customary tenure is culturally and ecologically 
embedded. Customary systems are deemed stable and secure because they are 
accepted among a majority of the population and are adapted to location-
specific conditions (Deininger 2003). Therefore, customary tenure is 
considered an institution of resource management that provides high tenure 
security at a relatively low cost (Toulmin and Quan 2000, Platteau 2000, 
Fitzpatrick 2005).  
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Many of these characteristics ascribed to customary tenure such as the 
existence of multiple social security mechanisms are also present within 
Ambonese adat. A concrete, well-documented example is the cultivation of 
sagu. Sagu is a staple food derived from the sagu tree which on Ambon and 
some of the surrounding islands has traditionally always been used as an ex 
ante food security provision in times of crisis (makanan krisis, crisis food) 
(Brouwer 1998, Von Benda Beckmann 1990b). In general, this cultivation of 
sagu as a subsistence resource happened according to non-marketing 
principles and its exploitation as a marketable commodity has always been 
marginal (Brouwer 1998: 355). Ambonese adat is also considered a durable 
and ecologically embedded system of resource management due to the central 
role played by sasi. Sasi is commonly understood as a ritual protection of 
resources in which there are fixed periods in which it is forbidden to catch or 
harvest certain natural resources. The observance of these rules is done by the 
tuan sasi (sasi master). A closer and critical reading of this sasi reveals that 
these durable features are somewhat exaggerated (Von Benda Beckmann K. 
and F. and Brouwer 1995), despite this still being a commonly held 
assumption in Ambon today. This belief in the potential of local customary 
tenure to tackle rural poverty and ecological degradation is also shared by 
international and national NGOs in Ambon. A case in point is the Baileo 
network, funded by the Dutch NGO Oxfam Novib. This is a network of 
indigenous Moluccan community based organizations which already 
throughout the nineties aimed to preserve customary systems of resource 
management in the region.  
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Specific for the Ambon case is that this belief in adat has been linked up with 
the idea to revitalize adat as a set of social norms to reconcile a religiously 
fractured society (Bräuchler 2007). Throughout and after the recent inter-
religious turmoil, multiple initiatives, debates and organizations have sprung 
that aimed to deploy adat as a tool for reconciliation and conflict prevention. 
Here we see how different meanings of adat have mutually enforced and 
influenced each other. In different instances, opinions about ‘adat as 
reconciliation’ have been linked to beliefs in adat as a durable, equitable and 
embedded institution of resource management. For instance, in the case of the 
Baileo network, since the beginning of the conflict in 1999, their ‘traditional’ 
support for adat has been linked up with a reconciliation discourse that 
considers local culture conditional to stop and prevent communal violence. 
Another example are those organizations which attempt to start registering 
local cultural practices, including customary land law, as this ‘local wisdom’ 
is considered helpful to prevent future conflicts. A typical example are the so-
called ‘socio-anthropological codification’ exercises set up by the local 
UNDP office and the Pattimura University in which oral culture is registered 
with the aim to prevent further communal violence (Universitas Pattimura and 
Peace through Development, 2007).  
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5.2. Adat as an arena of power and struggle 
 
Despite this belief in adat as the magic cure for the many ills that characterize 
Ambonese society, adat should also be seen as an arena of power and struggle 
which contains some exclusivist features. Due to interventions dating back to 
colonial times, adat has obtained a very territorial interpretation (Holleman 
1923: 62-75). Utilising a strategy of territorialization in which people were 
forced to settle along the coast, the Dutch set up structures of indirect rule 
through the creation of the so-called negeri or ‘traditional’ law community 
consisting of ‘original’ settler clans.2
                                                          
2 This observation warns not to perceive adat as a fixed set of pre-colonial legal 
arrangements that are the opposite of modern, statutory land law. What is currently 
understood as adat in Ambon is the outcome of interactions between local practices 
and colonial and post-colonial state interventions dating back to the 17th century. As a 
consequence, many of the socio-political concepts that are considered as traditional 
were shaped by the Dutch colonial regulation and have become ‘adatised’ (Von 
Benda Beckmann and Taale 1996: 42) throughout the centuries.  
 This created a system in which the land 
within the borders of the adat village (negeri) land is controlled by the 
indigenous adat community. One can distinguish different socio-political 
control rights over property. First, the indigenous adat law community is 
composed of different indigenous land holding clan segments or dati. These 
clans have a non-written property right (hak milik) for their respective clan 
land (tanah dati). The Dutch legal anthropologist Holleman (1923:66) 
therefore describes this dati system (stelsel) as the ‘… linking up of fixed 
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territories to certain groups of people…’.3
 
 Apart from these clan lands, there 
also exist undifferentiated empty, wild land, located in the mountains (tanah 
ewang), yet still within the borders of the adat village. In many cases, this 
land is considered as some sort of backup for future generations. Apart from 
these two categories, there is also tanah negeri (village land) which is 
managed by the bapak raja (customary leader) but is under the control of the 
whole adat law community. When a dati has become extinct, the dati land 
converts into this collective village land. This can then be redistributed to the 
remaining clans.    
It is thus one of the essential features within Ambonese adat that the village 
organization is based upon kinship ties and one has to belong to the 
indigenous adat law community to obtain ownership rights to land based on 
customary law (von Benda Beckmann 1990). Both the access to village land, 
clan land and undifferentiated land are reserved for the indigenous adat law 
community having a historical relationship with that particular negeri. People 
not possessing this genealogical relationship cannot claim these customary 
ties and are pushed into an inferior legal position. Entering a clan for people 
that do not belong to the indigenous community can only be done through 
marriage based on a patrilineal system or, only in very rare cases, through 
adoption. At best, migrants can receive a hak pakai (user right) after a 
sharecropping agreement with the owner of the land or have to buy land 
                                                          
3 Translation: ‘Het datistelsel, dat de vastkoppeling is van vaste gronden aan 
bepaalde groepen van personen, …’  
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privately. What is considered as a migrant is thus contextual and depends on 
the territory where one is living. Generally speaking, one can say that this 
category consists of all people not cultivating or inhabiting land in the 
territory attributed to their own adat law community. A first large group are 
those people not native to Ambon such as the large Muslim Butonese 
communities that originate from the neighbouring island of Sulawesi, even 
though these communities already settled in Ambon for decades and the 
majority are born in Ambon. Also autochthonous Ambonese can only claim 
these customary ownership rights in their own negeri. Once they decide to 
live in another village, they are legally reduced to the status of a migrant. Yet, 
instances in which Ambonese decide to start farming in another village than 
their own is unusual and most of the intra-island migration only occurs to the 
city of Ambon where systems of formal, individual ownership are dominant. 
Therefore, the most important ethnic divide is the one between the 
autochthonous Ambonese and the large migrant communities. The category of 
indigenous Ambonese consists of Christians and Muslims. Technically 
speaking, also migrants can be of any religion. In reality however, the 
majority of these settler communities are Muslim migrants. In Christian 
negeri, an ethnic fault line therefore corresponds with a religious fault line. 
 
 
5.3. Legal transformations at the national level 
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Since the end of the New Order, more space has been created at the national, 
Indonesian level to legally enforce customary land tenure. Traditionally, local 
cultural manifestations remained subordinate to ideals of unification, 
centralization and modernization in the post-colonial Indonesian state. This is 
particularly clear studying the first landmark national land legislation, the 
Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) from 1960. Although formally acknowledged in 
the Explanatory Memorandum of the BAL, adat always remained subordinate 
to centralized state interests (Fitzpatrick 2006, 2007). Of particular relevance 
was Article 3 which stated that all land in Indonesia was under the control of 
the state. This statement was taken to its extremes during the New Order when 
in 1967 the Basic Forestry Law placed some 65% of the total Indonesian 
landmass under the direct control of the state. Meanwhile, the BAL opened 
the door to arbitrary political decisions in which state supported development 
projects could take over land whenever they wanted, thereby neglecting the 
rights of local populations (Thornburn 2004, Warren and McCarthy 2002). 
 
This explicit objective of a national legal unification has changed since the 
fall of Suharto in May 1998 and the ensuing reformasi has provided for more 
recognition of customary rights to land management. For instance, Law No. 
5/1999 regarding the Guidelines for the Settlement of Communal Land Rights 
Issues stated the following with regards to customary tenure (Sakai 2002):  
• communal land rights are recognized by customary law and are 
owned by a certain customary community over a certain territory 
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• certain territories constitute the environment of community members 
to obtain the benefits of natural resources, including land 
• there are still uninterrupted hereditary physical and spiritual 
relationships between the customary community and the relevant 
territory 
 
Similarly, several features in Law No. 22/1999 regarding Regional Autonomy 
legally enforced customary rights to claim access to economic assets (Sakai 
2002) and the 1999 Human Rights Act (Law No. 39/1999, art.6) noted that 
traditional rights to communal land deserve recognition and protection 
(Fitzpatrick 2007:131). The new draft Agrarian Resources Act of 2004 
stipulates that customary law provides the basis for natural resource 
management in Indonesia (arts. 5,8) (Fitzpatrick 2007: 130). Also, Law 
32/2004 on Regional Administration confirmed through art. 2003(3) that 
customary law communities and local traditional rights are only valid if they 
are confirmed in a Regional Regulation (Slaats e.a. 2009). 
 
Discussing issues of land access with customary authorities in Ambon, it was 
apparent how well all these provisions were known and had given these 
authorities a renewed self-confidence to claim what they consider as their 
legitimate title. Therefore, these legal changes at the national level serve as 
important symbolic markers and an overall feeling - rightly or wrongly - 
exists that Jakarta is no longer opposing local cultural manifestations as was 
the case during the New Order. At a second level, these new provisions also 
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provided a legal space to start formalising customary resource management. 
According to the head of the legal team currently writing up the new land 
laws in Maluku, these changes at the national level force them to adapt land 
legislation at the provincial, district and municipal level to be in accordance 
with these new provisions. Furthermore, through Law No. 22 on Regional 
Government and Law No. 25 on the Fiscal Balance between the Centre and 
the Regions (Thornburn 2004) and Presidential Decision 34/2003 (Fitzpatrick 
2007), part of the authority over land affairs has been transferred to the district 
and municipal level. As Daniel Fitzpatrick (2007 : 140) states : ‘… these new 
provisions have been seized upon by provinces and/or districts to assert 
control over land and resources within their territories.’ In many cases, local 
customary forms of land tenure gained increasing prominence in this process. 
 
In contrast to the rosy picture of adat being about defending the rights of 
marginalized, indigenous populations and the promotion of local level 
democracy through customary systems of village governance, multiple case 
studies illustrate how adat has been deployed in a complex and extremely 
politicized manner in post-Suharto Indonesia. In many cases, this has not 
served the interests of suppressed, poor communities. Illustrative is the 
research conducted by John McCarthy (2004) in the forests of Central 
Kalimantan. In this case study, McCarthy describes how due to some of the 
legal transformations described above, traditional village leaders found 
themselves in a ‘profitable gate keeping role’ and colluded with large 
companies in order to grant concessions for timber exploitation (McCarthy, 
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2004:1211). In most cases, these actions by customary elites were 
diametrically opposed to the interest of the villagers, even if these villagers 
were part of the indigenous adat law community. In other regions in 
Indonesia, ethnic divisions between communities considered as indigenous 
versus communities considered as outsiders have sharpened considerably. 
Based on a case study in Central Sulawesi, Tania Murray Li (2007: 356) puts 
forward the conclusion that in struggles to access resources, there is an 
increasing tendency in which: ‘communities that have an ancestral association 
with their current territory sometimes deploy the concept of adat when 
attempting to assert territorial sovereignty vis-à-vis migrants they classify as 
outsiders’. A similar conclusion is made by Keebet and Franz von Benda 
Beckmann (2004) in the case of Minangkabau, Sumatra. In this region, there 
are attempts to reinstate the ‘nagari’ as a traditional adat law community, 
thereby fundamentally reshuffling the organization of the village government 
and the borders of the villages as they were formed throughout the New 
Order. Also these struggles provoked numerous tensions with populations that 
are classified as newcomers. In some extreme cases such as in West 
Kalimantan, discourses about indigenism and adat have invoked violent, 
ethnicized socio-political struggles in which ‘… indigenous peoples in the 
name of indigenism inflict violence on other civilians’ (Davidson 2007: 225). 
These different examples illustrate how decentralization and the increasing 
importance of customary systems of resource management, in contrast to the 
common international discourse, led to fragmentation, intense competition 
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and profound legal uncertainty in which local elites often manipulate existing 
legislation for their own benefit.  
 
This ethnicized deployment of adat, enforcing divisions between the 
indigenous adat law communities and communities labelled as newcomers or 
migrants, is also visible in Ambon and therefore reflects tendencies found in 
other regions in Indonesia. Yet, in the Ambon case, an important, extra factor 
are the massive population movements wrought about by the recent 
kerusuhan. This has created extraordinary opportunities for indigenous adat 
law communities to take over deserted lands, thereby blocking a process of 
return. A central feature in this process is the drawing up of new land 
legislations since 2005.  
 
 
5.4. New land legislations in Ambon 
 
A well educated, largely Protestant elite network has been pivotal in lobbying 
for and writing down these new legislations. This network is organized 
through the Lembaga Kebudayaan Daerah Maluku (LKDM, Organization for 
Moluccan Culture). The LKDM, established in the eighties, wishes to portray 
itself as a non-political organization with two overall objectives. A first aim is 
to promote Moluccan adat in a general way. For instance, already during the 
New Order, numerous booklets were published about local cultural 
manifestations such as styles of housing, clothing… in the different cultural 
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regions Maluku consists of. A second aim is to promote eco-tourism in 
Maluku and related features of Moluccan culture such as traditional dance, 
traditional food… (not coincidentally, the secretary of the LKDM is the head 
of the tourism department of Ambon city). At first sight, discussing adat with 
members of the LKDM, the interpretation of adat put forward seems rather 
innocent and harmless. Most members put this in an open and progressive 
discourse and start the interview by stressing the importance of adat in issues 
such as reconciliation, ecological preservation or tenure security. However, 
when asking some critical, more concrete questions about ethnic fault lines, 
resource management and population pressure, the tone of the interviews 
often (not always) changed radically. In many cases, it was stated that migrant 
communities needed to honour/respect (menghormati) the indigenous law 
communities. When asking what this vague concept of ‘menghormati’ 
concretely meant, very quickly, some exclusivist, rather crude opinions could 
be heard. For instance, one prominent member literally stated that ‘the 
Butonese have to adapt to Ambonese adat or leave the Moluccas’, another 
one stated that ‘the place is full and there is no more place for migrants’.  
 
Importantly, many of the members of this organization are actively involved 
in a consultancy firm that is hired by the provincial government to write down 
new legislations regarding land access. This consultancy firm is named 
‘Lokollo & Partners’ after retired Unpatti professor and indigenous law 
expert, John Lokollo, who is also the president of the LKDM. Both this 
consultancy firm and the LKDM have strong links with the local Pattimura 
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university as the majority of the consultants are Unpatti professors. There also 
exist strong links with the powerful Ambonese branch of the PDI-P, in 
particular with the incumbent PDI-P governor Karel Albert Ralahalu. For 
instance, John Lokollo, is one of the closest advisers of governor Ralahalu. 
The secretary of the LKDM is the interpreter of Ralahalu in meetings with 
foreign dignitaries. For many of the recent publications of the LKDM, 
Ralahalu has written the preface. Not coincidentally, when the PDI-P took 
hold of the provincial governor’s office in 2003 through the election of Karel 
Albert Ralahalu, the LKDM started a second life. Throughout the kerusuhan, 
the activities of the LKDM came to a halt. However, from 2004, they were 
reinstated as a formal organization based on the Surat Keputusan Gubernur 
Maluku, Nomor 1478, Tahun 2004 ( Decision letter of the Governor of the 
Moluccas, Number 1478, Year 2004). In the same year, the consultancy firm 
‘Lokollo & Partners’ was established. In 2005, the first legislations 
recognizing adat and adat law communities were implemented. Despite their 
positive stance towards adat, NGOs and other international organizations 
such as the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) remain largely 
excluded from this law making process. As some of the staff of the 
consultancy firm stated, they prefer to make the legislation on their own 
because the NGOs too often have an incorrect interpretation of adat. In one 
case, UNDP staff had already made a draft legislation for a couple of villages 
within the district of Seram Barat in which customary law was converted into 
formal state law. However, as there was not yet a general legislative 
framework for this district, the exercise was rather useless and the draft 
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legislation could not be implemented. Moreover, in private discussions it was 
stated by people of the consultancy firm, that the UNDP people did not have 
the capacity to draw up these sorts of legislations because they were no real 
experts in Moluccan adat. Although these sorts of quarrels may seem banal at 
first sight, they revealed a fundamentally contrasting interpretation regarding 
adat. The consultancy firm has a strict understanding of this process, openly 
stating that the main aim is to instate the adat community as the legitimate 
owners of all land in Maluku through the reconstruction of an adat that is as 
historically correct as possible (adat yang benar). The UNDP people on the 
other hand use a much more flexible - yet also very hazy - terminology such 
as ‘aspirasi dulu’ (aspiration from the past). Organizations such as UNDP and 
the Baileo network also state that attempts should be made to attribute more 
secure ownership rights to migrants by lumping them together in a newly 
established land holding clan segment. For instance, this was a proposal the 
UNDP people made in their draft legislations for Seram Barat. Obviously, this 
‘incorrect’ interpretation is vehemently opposed by the consultancy firm.  
 
This exclusivist interpretation can already be encountered in the first 
Provincial Regulation (No.14/2005) about the reinstatement of the negeri as a 
unified adat law community in which the concept of the indigenous negeri is 
advocated to replace the desa as the foremost institution of village 
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governance.4
In the district of Maluku Tengah, this Provincial Regulation is followed by a 
range of new legal frameworks (No.1 until No. 16) that were implemented in 
2006. Legal frameworks for the other districts in the province of Maluku are 
expected soon but are already running considerably behind schedule due to 
the creation of multiple new districts in the last years.
 This legislation signifies a move away from the much contested 
Law No. 5 on Village Administration of 1979 in which a uniform system of 
local governance through the system of the Javanese desa was propagated. 
This Provincial Regulation remains rather vague and essentially states what 
sorts of requirements one has to fulfill to be entitled as an indigenous adat law 
community or to claim indigenous rights (hak asal usul). One requirement is 
having a historical relationship with a delineated territory (Pasal 5). 
Communities not fulfilling these requirements are lumped together in a so-
called negeri administratif which falls under the village administration of the 
negeri.  
5
                                                          
4 Transcription: Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Maluku No. 14 (2005) ‘Penetapan kembali 
negeri sebagai kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat dalam wilayah pemerintahan 
provinsi Maluku’ 
 These laws for the 
district of Maluku Tengah entail more details about the particular systems of 
 
5 This delay is a source of constant frustration for the people writing up the 
legislations as the objective was to implement the legislative frameworks for all 
districts in the province by 2010. Obviously, this initial target will not be made. 
Therefore, in 2008, the LKDM published a manifest entitled: ‘Persiapan dan 
sosialisasi lomba cepat kembali ke negeri hukum adat’ (Preparation and socialization 
for a quick return to the adat law community)   
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local governance. Among the many new stipulations, it is of particular 
relevance to note that the different functions in the administration of the 
negeri have to be fulfilled by people that meet to the requirements of 
indigenousness (Peraturan tentang cara pemilihan pengangkatan dan 
pemberhentian perangkat Negeri). In the first chapter (Pasal 1), article g until 
j, it is already stated that members of the village government can solely 
consist of people having a genealogical lineage in their respective negeri. This 
implies that although the majority of the population in one negeri consists of 
migrants - as is sometimes the case - people are forced to elect the village 
leaders among the minority indigenous population. In a similar vein, the 
legislation explicitly states that all land and waterside shores of the negeri are 
owned by the indigenous adat community (peraturan tentang negeri, Bab I, 
pasal 1/26). This implies that people belonging to the negeri administratif 
cannot claim ownership rights based on adat law. For instance, in the same 
legal framework (Bab II, pasal 4/1), it is stated that the administrative negeri 
constitutes a law community that falls outside the genealogical law 
community which owns the borders of the land.6
 
 A little further, it is stated 
that those territories that were traditionally known as dusun (sub-village) will 
obtain the status of a negeri administratif (Bab II, pasal 9).  
Within this range of legislations, discussions over what should be delineated 
as customary land is absent as all land is considered customary adat land and 
                                                          
6 Transcription: ‘Negeri administratif merupakan kesatuan masyarakat hukum diluar 
masyarakat hukum geneologis yang memiliki batas-batas wilayah’ 
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customary rights are linked to these fixed, historical territories. In cases where 
formal property rights are available, these are deemed a higher status 
compared to informal customary rights. Yet, in most rural areas, these formal 
property rights are hardly available as there has never been a serious attempt 
to start a process of formal, individual titling in the region.7
 
 Another 
important aspect is the setting up of a team, ‘Tim Penegasan Batas Wilayah 
Petuanan Negeri’, (Team to Define the Borders of the Village Land), to 
determine the borders between the different villages. This team will remain 
independent from the negeri itself (peraturan tentang negeri, Bab XIII, pasal 
62) and will consist of historians and legal experts attempting to reconstruct 
the historical borders between the different villages through the consultation 
of archives. This ambitious and sensitive exercise is scheduled when legal 
frameworks will be implemented in the near future at the level of the negeri.  
 
5.5. Population pressure, violence and the exclusivist tendencies 
within adat 
 
How should we understand this registration of customary adat law in Ambon? 
First of all, it is important not to represent this as a radical break away from 
                                                          
7 This is one of the reasons why the implementation of a legal framework for the city 
district of Ambon is put to a halt at the moment. This team of legal experts finds it 
very hard to reconcile adat law with the dominance of individual statutory law in the 
city. They also admit that the features that can be encountered in the framework that 
has been implemented for the rural district of Maluku Tengah, cannot be blindly 
transferred to the city district of Ambon.   
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the New Order era. Already in the beginning of the seventies, it was noted 
how population pressure raised the value of land and led to increasing border 
disputes (Van Fraassen 1972: 82). This was, among other things, due to an 
explosion in the price of cloves in the seventies and a subsequent rise in the 
influx of Butonese migrant workers. As a consequence, competition for access 
to resources rose, regularly resulting in disputes which often took an ethnic 
turn due to the vague and non written agreements between the indigenous 
Ambonese and this growing migrant community. Already throughout the New 
Order, many of these disputes were concluded using customary adat law. 
Consequentially, non-indigenous communities were often excluded from 
secure access to natural resources or oral sharecropping agreements simply 
were broken, making adat into a ‘jurisprudence of insurgency and oppression’ 
(Von Benda Beckmann 1990). In this regard, the indigenous adat community 
already was powerful throughout the New Order, despite the fact that many 
heads of land holding clans (kepala dati) like to portray themselves as being 
oppressed by a ruthless, centralized, Java dominated state.  
 
As I demonstrated in chapter 3, the quick escalation of the violence after the 
first riots in the town of Ambon in January 1999 was closely related to these 
simmering land conflicts and many of the violence conducted was intended to 
settle these disputes. This was particularly the case where religious and ethnic 
fault lines coincided such as in the eviction of the Muslim Butonese 
communities on the many Christian negeri on the Leitimur part of the island 
of Ambon. Cases in which Muslim Butonese settlements in Muslim villages 
V: I am more indigenous than you are 
 
148 
 
have been destroyed have not been noted, despite the often strained relations 
between these two communities. Once these migrant communities were 
forcibly displaced, the indigenous adat law communities - not necessarily 
involved in the violence itself - were granted exceptional opportunities to 
reinstate themselves as the traditional and legitimate owners of these 
abandoned lands. In this regard, the observation made in the beginning of the 
nineties by Franz von Benda Beckmann that ‘… the increasing land scarcity 
leads one to expect that the Ambonese will increasingly try to regain control 
over that land’ (Benda Beckmann, 1990: 249) has partly become true with the 
recent conflict, despite the overall religious logic of the violence.  
 
These attempts to regain control over land have continued since the end of the 
conflict and adat was pivotal in this process. It is thus important to note the 
continuities that exist between the New Order, the period of the kerusuhan 
and the current phase. Increasing population pressure and conflict over land 
access were determining factors in the escalation of the communal conflict 
that lasted from 1999 until 2001. Many of the violent expulsions that were 
brought about by the conflict have been enforced through an active 
deployment of adat. In other words, the conflict presented opportunities to 
settle private disputes regarding resource management. Since the ending of 
the high-intensity violence, different opportunities were presented to legally 
enforce some of the populations movements brought about by the conflict. 
Although most displaced, non-indigenous communities already were 
restrained to return before 2005, the current registration of adat should be 
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interpreted against this background. It is apparent that little is mentioned 
about the many subtleties and different access rights that exist within 
Ambonese adat. For instance, nothing is said about pusaka (inheritance) 
rights or the difference between access rights to land and access rights to 
resources on the land. Although no legislations are yet implemented at the 
village land, the legal experts of the Consultancy firm drawing up the 
legislations confirmed they do not intend to define the borders of the different 
dati, ewang (empty) or collective negeri lands within the village.  
 
At least at this stage, the majority of the legislations are about the ethnic 
distinction between the adat law communities and migrants communities and 
it looks as if there is little enthusiasm to touch upon divisions and distinctions 
within the adat law community. This was also confirmed by the head of the 
legal team making up these legal frameworks. It was literally stated that the 
primary aim of these legislations is to confirm the adat law communities as 
the legitimate owners of the land in Maluku, in particular as these adat law 
communities are threatened by a growing migrant community. On the other 
hand, there also exists an awareness that adat knows many variations among 
the different villages. Therefore, this legal team wanted to make sure not to 
impose a particular and very detailed interpretation of adat which is different 
to what people are accustomed. As a consequence, these legislations are still 
characterized by a high level of vagueness and it remains to be seen whether 
the different legislations at the village level will entail more details about 
different types of access rights within Ambonese adat.    
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On the other hand, although many of these legal frameworks are still ‘in the 
making’, there are already some tangible results due to these legal changes. 
The next paragraphs will demonstrate that the registration of customary tenure 
has further enforced the already powerful position of indigenous adat law 
communities as these written laws are actively utilized in formal courts and 
strategies of legal bluffing. As a consequence, indigenous adat law 
communities gain greater legal powers and displaced non-indigenous 
communities are restrained to return or reclaim property. This observation 
also challenges the often heard complaint that the short-term politics of the 
government are responsible for the permanent relocation of the many 
displaced, thereby enforcing the establishment of mono-religious zones in 
Ambon. This is only partly true. In the case of displaced, indigenous adat law 
communities such as in the villages of Waai, Poka or Rumah Tiga, the 
government managed to facilitate a program of return.8
 
 This was not the case 
for displaced, non-indigenous communities.  
 
5.6. The importance of written legislation 
 
A first case in point is a large Protestant community that before 1999 lived in 
the area of Batu Merah, situated in the inner city of Ambon (see chapter 3 for 
more details). In this urban neighbourhood, the flight of this Protestant 
                                                          
8 An exception to this rule is the relocated, indigenous adat law community of Iha. I 
will discuss this case in chapter 6.  
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community in January 1999 enabled land holding clans to claim whole tracts 
of land that were considered ownership of the GPM and on which the 
majority of these Protestants lived. This provoked a legal battle between the 
GPM and these customary land holding clans from Batu Merah. The 
Moluccan Protestant Church tries to justify their ownership over the land 
based on colonial legislation that never became formalized in post-colonial 
Indonesia. Moreover, these documents proving the ownership rights of the 
GPM have all been lost, apparently because of the bombing of Ambon city in 
the second World War. The land holding clans on the other hand state that, 
historically, this has always been their land and was unlawfully taken away by 
the Dutch as they used the area to build a military camp for the KNIL. After 
the Dutch left, this land was then given to the GPM.9 At the time of research 
in 2007, the legal case was still pending. In the meantime, most of the houses 
that once belonged to the Protestants, were inhabited by new Muslim families 
who pay rent to these customary clans.10
 
 As a consequence, the Protestant 
community is unable to return and cannot claim ownership over land and 
houses with the aim of selling this property. This is also the case for people 
who possess a formal certificate for their house and/or land.  
                                                          
9 This can be seen as a perfect example of what Daniel Fitzpatrick calls (2006: 100) 
‘semi-formal legal arrangements’ in which these arrangements ‘derive from local 
sources of State power and yet lack formal validity in the eyes of national law’ 
 
10 In February 2007, leaflets were handed out by a team of the GPM to these people 
with a request to not longer pay rent to the customary clans as the GPM is the 
legitimate owner of the land they are living on.  
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Discussing these issues with land holding clans in Batu Merah and the 
lawyers defending these clans, some remarkable observations can be made. 
First of all, already before the implementation of the first provincial legal 
framework about the reinstatement of the adat law community in 2005, adat 
was deployed as a tool of ethno-territorialization. From late 2002 onwards, 
there have been attempts by the displaced Protestant community to reclaim 
lost property. These attempts were immediately blocked by land holding clans 
from Batu Merah. Also the legal case against the GPM already began earlier 
than 2005. Yet, the new legislations in the province of Maluku are more than 
a change in policy rhetoric as they are actively deployed in formal legal 
battles through strategies of legal bluffing. The lawyers defending the 
customary clans from Batu Merah assured that the new provincial legal 
framework has tremendously enhanced their claims and they were self-
confident that the legal dispute would now be settled in their advantage.11
                                                          
11 Formal documents which are used in this legal battle could not be obtained because 
the GPM and the land holding customary clans from Batu Merah considered the issue 
too ‘sensitive’ too share with a foreign researcher. All information therefore has been 
gathered by interviewing the different stakeholders in this conflict.  
 
While before 2005, only references were made to national legislations that 
ascribe increasing importance to customary rights, now, this provincial 
legislative framework was constantly cited in their arguments to enhance the 
validity of the adat claims of the land holding clans. They also stated the wish 
that the legal framework for the city district of Ambon would be implemented 
soon as this would further enforce the already powerful position of customary 
land holding clans in this particular legal case. Remarkably, similar issues 
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play for many Muslims who decided to leave the area throughout the period 
of high-intensity violence. Once these families and individuals decided to 
return, many were prohibited to do this by members of the Batu Merah 
customary clans, stating that this land was now their property and they were 
forced to pay rent for the land if they wanted to re-enter their house. In those 
cases where people were not in the possession of a formal certificate, some 
people decided to settle elsewhere or started to pay rent to these customary 
clans. In some other cases, people have started a legal case against some of 
these customary clans. Those Muslims that were in the possession of a formal 
certificate and threatened to start a legal case, could relatively easy return. 
This clearly indicates how formal ownership certificates still hold a greater 
legal power compared to customary adat rights. Yet, all over the island, many 
people lost formal ownership certificates throughout the violence due to 
sudden forced expulsions and massive destruction. In the meantime, the 
whole land register in the city of Ambon has been burned down in late April 
2004.12
 
 This has dramatically increased the validity of customary 
arrangements as these came to replace these formal ownership awards. In 
particular in urban areas in the city of Ambon, such as Batu Merah, this is 
very clear.  
These cases are a classic example of land access conflicts which arise due to 
far-reaching legal pluralism. Legal pluralism is understood here as ‘the 
                                                          
12 This burning down of the kadaster, situated in Mardika not far from the border with 
Batu Merah where all sorts of legal issues regarding land access were pending, has 
given emergence many rumors and theories who was behind this destruction.  
V: I am more indigenous than you are 
 
154 
 
coexistence of two or more legal systems in the same social field or setting’ 
(Griffiths, 1986:1). This case study on Batu Merah is an illustration of this 
legal pluralism as there exist different legal systems, in this case: adat versus 
semi-formal state legislation, through which different actors make their 
claims. In the end this has led to a situation of utmost legal complexity in 
which different parties try to claim access to land based on different legal 
systems. It should however also be noted that these attempts by customary 
land holding clans to take over land have further enforced divisions and 
conflicts at different levels between and within adat law communities. A first 
example is a new border conflict between the negeri of Batu Merah and the 
negeri of Christian Soya, situated north of Batu Merah. Throughout the 
kerusuhan, Christians who lived at this dangerous borderland have fled the 
area and since then, this land is claimed by a Batu Merah land holding clan as 
their dati land. This claim is vigorously denied by the village of Soya. 
Numerous stories could also be noted how since the ending of the kerusuhan, 
new conflicts have emerged between different Batu Merah clans about the 
respective borders of their dati land. For instance, different adat clans 
attempting to reclaim parts of the GPM land are having fierce discussions 
about the borders of their respective clan land. Moreover, numerous conflicts 
have erupted among different clan members within one and the same dati 
about the division of the respective clan among themselves. This second type 
of conflicts, which are currently omnipresent in urban Batu Merah, can be 
labeled as ‘system-internal pluralism’ (Von Benda-Beckmann 2002) in which 
different interpretations within one normative system are the reasons for 
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competing and conflicting claims.  
 
Within legal battles which are fought outside formal state courts, these new 
legislations have also enforced the position of the indigenous adat law 
communities as they are applied in a strategy of legal bluffing. This could be 
observed in the Muslim villages of Hila and Kaitetu, situated in the district of 
Maluku Tengah on Ambon island. As I already explained in chapter 3, at the 
borderland between Hila and Kaitetu, a Protestant community that lived there 
for centuries was chased away by Muslim youth shortly after the outbreak of 
the first riots in the city of Ambon. Similar to the GPM issue in Batu Merah, 
the Protestants based their access to this land on semi-formal legislation based 
in colonial legal arrangements which never became formalized in post-
colonial Indonesia. More specific, in 1948 the Dutch colonial authorities 
issued a ‘Letter of Agreement between Hila Islam and Kaitetu about the 
boundary of the state land between these two negeri.’13
                                                          
13 Transcription: ‘Soerat perdjandjian antara Hila Islam dan Kaitetoo tentang sifat 
tanah goebernamen jang terdepat ditangah-tangah kadoea negeri itoe.’   
 The letter states that 
the government land on which the Protestants lived is formally given to the 
Protestant community. When the Dutch left in 1949-1950, this Letter of 
Agreement was never transformed into formal legislation and the status by 
which the Protestants of Hila lived on their lands remained legally insecure. 
Therefore, this Protestant community tried to obtain a formal ownership 
certificate for this land one year before the outbreak of the violence. This 
attempt has been put a halt due to the expulsion of this Protestant community. 
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Since then, a customary land holding clan from Hila has claimed this land as 
their traditional adat land. Part of the complexity of the problem is that a clan 
of Hila is now claiming land that formally belongs within the administrative 
boundaries of the neighbouring Muslim village of Tawiri. Consequently, not 
only the Protestants but also the village of Tawiri was strongly in favour of a 
return of the Protestant community as this would help them to retake the land 
that was now claimed by a clan from the neighbouring village. The placard 
underneath is one of the many which have been put on this deserted land. 
 
 
Transcription: ‘Strong Prohibition to perform any sort of activity on the dati 
land of Lating Nustapy’ (Hila/Kaitetu, March 2007) 
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Written legislation at the national and regional levels which ascribes 
increasing importance to customary tenure has been actively studied and 
applied by this clan from Hila to prove their legitimate customary ownership 
over the land. As in many other cases on the island of Ambon, their 
knowledge of certain passages and regulations is remarkably elaborated. In 
this particular case however, the issue has never been brought to a formal 
court. According to this land holding clan, this is because the village of Tawiri 
and the Protestant community realize they will never be able to win the case 
as the power of adat is now omnipresent. In this process, these new legal 
frameworks are thus deployed in a strategy of legal bluffing not to bring the 
case to court. This is not only done to hinder return but also to prohibit the 
village of Tawiri and the Protestant community to reclaim any access rights 
on this piece of land. This could be observed in late 2007 when a delegation 
of the Protestant community paid a visit to this customary clan from Hila after 
rumors started to spread that their historical 18th century church would be 
rebuild after it was demolished in early 1999. As the church was being 
reconstructed with the aim of attracting tourists, they requested to share part 
of the expected income tourism would bring to their former place. As a 
response to their request, the customary leader to whom the visit was paid, 
stated that the Protestants are not entitled to claim a share of the profits as this 
was the traditional land of his clan to which the Christians had no rights. 
While the discussion dragged on for a while, this leader suddenly pulled out 
the new legislations on the district of Maluku Tengah that were implemented 
in 2006 and started citing different passages, in particular where it is stated 
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that all the land of the negeri is owned by the indigenous adat community. 
The Protestant delegation, somewhat bedazzled by this move and impressed 
by the legal knowledge the customary leader displayed, left the house without 
an agreement.  
 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
Among many donors and NGOs, customary tenure is increasingly being 
perceived as an institution of resource management that is socially and 
ecologically embedded, thereby providing high levels of tenure security for 
large parts of the population and protecting the rights of marginalized 
populations. While this may be partly true, it is often neglected that land 
relations around customary holding are also embedded in unequal social 
relationships leading to processes of social competition and exclusion (Peters 
2004). In particular, this is potentially the case in environments that are 
characterized by large-scale migration and increasing levels of legal 
pluralism. In these sorts of contexts, communities that are considered 
indigenous to a certain territory face particular opportunities to block 
processes of return and/or reclaiming of lost property by displaced 
communities not considered indigenous to those territories. As a consequence, 
some of the populations movements that are brought about by protracted 
violence are further sustained.  
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There have always been exclusivist tendencies within Ambonese adat, in 
particular as population pressure increased from the seventies onwards on the 
island. At the same time, adat always remained powerful in Ambon despite 
the centralist tendencies of the New Order as registrations of agricultural land 
under the BAL were hardly known and the majority of land transactions were 
regulated through customary land law (Benda Beckmann 1990b). As a 
consequence, adat often turned into a tool of oppression against a growing 
migrant community by denying them a secure access to resources. The current 
deployment of adat as a tool of ethno-territorialisation should therefore be 
understood as the continuation of processes that already were playing during 
the New Order. At the same time, due to the recent kerusuhan, some very 
particular opportunities were presented to the indigenous adat law 
communities to regain access to land and other resources. Despite the 
increasing popularity of adat as a means to reconcile a religiously fractured 
society, adat has also been deployed to block the return or the reclaiming of 
lost property of displaced, non-indigenous communities. Pivotal in this 
process is the conversion of customary law into formal law. At this moment 
only the province of Maluku and the district of Maluku Tengah have an 
official legal framework but others are expected to follow soon. In these 
legislations, it is required to have a historical relationship with a delineated 
territory in order to be entitled as an adat law community. These adat law 
communities own all land and waterside shores of their respective village or 
negeri. Communities not fulfilling the requirements to be entitled as an adat 
law community are lumped together in a so-called negeri administratif which 
V: I am more indigenous than you are 
 
160 
 
falls under the village administration of the negeri. Quite worryingly, the 
whole province of Maluku is considered as adat land that is genealogically 
linked with a certain adat law community.  
 
Although still in its initial phase, the first signs indicate that these new laws 
have enforced the already powerful position of the indigenous Ambonese. 
Written documents of all sorts have always been used as evidence (bukti) in 
land disputes in Ambon and are therefore of uttermost importance (Von 
Benda Beckmann F. and K.,1994, Von Benda Beckmann 2005). This is also 
the case with these new legislations which are actively studied and applied as 
tangible proof in everyday land disputes following a protracted communal 
conflict, both in formal legal battles and informal strategies of legal bluffing. 
As a result, recognizing customary tenure proofs to be a disputable 
mechanism of solving problems of land insecurity in contexts marked by 
massive population movements and increasing land scarcity.  
 VI 
 
 
Relocation and access to land  
 
 
Hujan batu di tanah orang tidak sama dengan hujan batu di tanah sendiri 
 
Having trouble on another man’s land is not the same as having trouble on 
your own land (Ambonese saying) 
 
 
Because many communities were restrained from returning home after the 
ending of the kerusuhan, they have been relocated to new sites dispersed all 
over the island of Ambon. An essential question concerns how access to land 
is obtained in these new relocation sites. It is generally agreed upon that land 
constitutes a major issue to be tackled in any sustainable strategy of 
reconstruction and reconciliation after a period of high-intensity conflict 
(Lewis 2004, Zevenbergen and Van der Molen 2004). Often, land lies at the 
root of protracted violence as certain groups are excluded from sustainable 
and equitable land access (Unruh 2004). In other cases, such as Ambon, land 
becomes the subject of dispute during ongoing warfare. Moreover, due to 
population movements, changes in the institutional arrangements controlling 
access to resources, and the destruction of property, many regions recovering 
from warfare are characterized by fierce tensions over land access (Du Plessis 
2003). Secure access to land is also of major economic importance for a 
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majority of the population in many places in the South, in particular in 
environments characterized by long-term conflict and subsequent economic 
decline.  
 
Despite all these different reasons pointing to the importance of equitable and 
secure land access in any durable peace building strategy, land access for 
relocated communities in Ambon is characterized by high levels of legal 
insecurity. These relocated communities are by definition not entitled to 
access land based on customary ownership rights as they do not possess a 
historical relationship with the territory they have been relocated to. 
Moreover, these populations do not have the financial means to buy formal 
ownership certificates and the government provided no support whatsoever to 
them gaining access to arable land. Therefore, these relocated communities 
are forced to access land based on insecure users’ rights. Although this counts 
for all the relocation sites discussed in this chapter, the impact this has on 
aspects of social vulnerability is diverse due to two factors: i) the legal status 
of these communities prior to their forced expulsion, ii) the self-settled or 
forced nature of their relocation. The overall conclusion however is that 
relocation and subsequent tenure insecurity have a negative economic impact 
and these communities are pushed into waged labour or informal economies 
outside agriculture.  
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6.1. Access to land for housing purposes 
 
In order to better understand how access to land is negotiated after relocation 
in Ambon, it is necessary to distinguish between arable land and land for 
housing purposes. In all of the four relocation sites studied, Kayu Tiga, Kate- 
Kate, Hila-Tanah Putih and Iha-Liang, access to land for housing purposes 
has been provided by the government.1
 
 Every relocated household also had 
the right to one house. These houses were of low quality and sometimes 
already had cracks in the walls and the floor before people started living there. 
General facilities such as a kitchen or a toilet were not provided. Communal 
buildings such as a community centre or a church/mosque had to be built and 
paid by the community. There were no open spaces provided for people to 
play sports or hang out. This is illustrated by the picture below, which was 
taken in February 2006, a couple of months before the people living in Wisma 
Altlit were forced to move to Kayu Tiga.  
                                                          
1 As I will explain later in this chapter, only in the case of Iha-Liang, are people still 
waiting for the formal certificates for this land. 
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The relocation site of Kayu Tiga (February 2006) 
 
As can be derived from this picture, what is essentially provided by the 
government are four walls, a roof, a floor and some land for housing purposes. 
In all the relocation sites I visited, people expressed deep discontent about the 
quality of the houses and the fact they needed to invest their own financial 
means to build extra facilities such as a washbasin, a kitchen, a toilet, or a 
shelter. A widely shared belief existed that corruption, due to which large 
amounts of the reconstruction funds coming from Jakarta ended up in the 
pockets of politicians and real estate agents, was to be blamed for the low 
quality of the houses.2
                                                          
2 This issue of corruption regarding reconstruction funds aimed at displaced and 
relocated populations has also been noted for North Maluku (Duncan 2008: 212-215), 
Poso (Aragon 2004, 2008) and West Kalimantan (Davidson 2008b: 79-80). Although 
these allegations were also omnipresent for the Ambon case, I never managed to 
obtain concrete, material evidence proving the misappropriations of refugee funds. 
 In this case of Kayu Tiga, people also feared mud 
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slides due to the location of the camp along a steep hill. For some people, this 
was even an incentive to try to sell their house and live at another place. 
 
The picture underneath was taken two and a half years later, standing at the 
other side of the hill. As can be derived from this picture, all sorts of extra 
facilities have been added to the houses such as a small front yard and a 
shelter. In many cases, people also built an extra, adjacent room at the back. 
The streets have been asphalted (by the government) and new buildings have 
been added. For instance, the larger buildings with the red roofs are 
community centres which serve all sorts of purposes. The picture itself was 
taken from the scaffolding of a church people were building at that time.    
 
 
The relocation site of Kayu Tiga (July 2008) 
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6.2. Tenure insecurity  
 
Despite the fact that money had to be spent in order to make the houses 
provided by the government liveable, the biggest worry for these relocated 
communities concerned their access to arable land. This land had to be 
obtained without any outside help or financial assistance from the 
government. For a camp such as Kayu Tiga, which is situated in the close 
vicinity of the town of Ambon, this posed no immediate problem. Before, 
during and after their displacement, their economic life has been entirely 
focused on the city of Ambon and access to arable land has always been of 
minor importance. The only cultivation of crops occurred on so-called ‘tanah 
kintal’ (garden land around the house). As can be derived from the picture 
above, the size of these gardens was extremely small and the crops were 
solely destined for own consumption. For relocation sites in rural or semi-
rural areas such as Kate-Kate, Hila-Tanah Putih and Iha-Liang, access to 
arable land was a pressing concern. For this reason, I will only focus on these 
three cases in this chapter.  
 
By definition, relocated populations in Ambon are not entitled to access land, 
based on customary ownership rights as they do not possess a genealogical 
relationship with the territory they have migrated to. Moreover, the 
purchasing of formal state certificates was too expensive for the majority of 
people. As a consequence, arable land could only be accessed through users’ 
rights. Considering these rights are based on oral agreements, the nature of 
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these rights is insecure. For the Muslim Butonese community of Eerie which 
relocated to the camp of Kate-Kate, the insecure nature of the arrangements to 
access arable land was nothing new as their legal status prior to their flight 
was already inferior. This community traditionally made a living through oral 
sharecropping arrangements on land that belonged to the Christian adat 
community of Eerie. This village hosted five Butonese settlements that have 
all been wiped out during the conflict. Due to their non-Moluccan migrant 
status, they were not allowed to access land based on ownership rights and no 
arable land was bought with state certificates. In 1999 they were expelled 
from Eerie like so many other Butonese settlements on the Christian-
dominated Leitimur part of Ambon island. They spent 7 years in the IDP 
camp of THR after which they were relocated to Kate-Kate in 2006. This 
camp, consisting of some 240 households, is a collection of diverse Muslim 
communities that all ended up on this one relocation site. About 75% of them 
are ethnic Butonese.  
 
This story differs for those communities that before 1999 could access land 
through more secure rights. A clear case in point are the Protestants whom 
lived in Hila/Kaitetu. In 2002, after living three years in an IDP camp, a 
decision was made by this Protestant community to relocate to Tawiri after an 
agreement was reached with a clan head in Tawiri, named Lesinus Tuhulero. 
After a request by the Protestants of Hila/Kaitetu, this clan head decided to 
rent out some lots of his land for free. The only condition was that no 
perennial crops would be cultivated as this would be considered an attempt to 
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permanently take over the land.3
 
 Although this land was full of stones and 
situated on far away, hilly terrain; this community decided to take up this 
opportunity. Land for housing and houses were bought by the government just 
next to a place where a Butonese community was settled. The certificates 
were obtained on the 31st of January, 2006.  
 
Ceremony celebrating the handing over of the land certificates, January 31st 
2006, Hila-Tanah Putih 
                                                          
3 When asking for the reasons behind doing this, this person answered that he felt pity 
for this expelled community and he considered it his religious duty to help his 
Christian saudara (brothers) in times of need. Out of gratitude for the free cultivation 
of this land, a small part of the harvest is always handed over to the Tuhulero clan. 
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Ceremony celebrating the handing over of the land certificates, January 31st 
2006, Hila-Tanah Putih 
 
The biggest problem this community faced was that the land provided by the 
Tuhulero clan was not sufficient for the whole community to make a living 
through farming. As a consequence, many households went searching for 
sharecropping agreements with other clans in Tawiri and villages further 
away. Examples are rife where these oral agreements have been broken and in 
which the indigenous host community claimed the whole harvest once the 
crops were ripe and ready to sell. In other cases, these sharecropping 
agreements have been broken after one or two years when the land was 
cleared of wild plants. The Tanah Putih community finds itself with no legal 
means with which to fight these sorts of arbitrary and opportunistic decisions. 
In many interviews, it was stressed that this far-reaching tenure insecurity is a 
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new factor in their life since their relocation and added to an overall feeling of 
uncertainty and stress which did not exist in Hila/Kaitetu.  
 
Another example of the legal uncertainty these relocated populations were 
confronted with is faced by the community of Iha-Liang. This Muslim 
community lived on the neighbouring island of Saparua in the village of Iha. 
After multiple attacks by surrounding Christian villages, this community was 
evacuated by the Indonesian army in September 2000. In 2002, this 
community split up with one part consisting of some 115 households deciding 
to relocate in 2002 in Liang, on the island of Ambon, after an agreement was 
reached to cultivate land through a 50/50 sharecropping agreement.4
                                                          
4 The other part followed their customary leader to the village of Sepa in Seram where 
land could be accessed through a genealogical relationship between this bapak raja 
and the community of Sepa. 
 This 
arable land both concerned tanah negeri from Liang and tanah dati. Just like 
in the case of Tanah Putih, the government was responsible for the provision 
of the houses and the land for the houses. At the time of my last visits to this 
community at the end of 2007, the formal ownership awards for this land were 
not yet delivered, causing anger and anxiety. The reason for this delay was a 
conflict between one dati, named Lesi, from Liang claiming this was their 
clan land and the bapak raja from Liang claiming this was tanah negeri, 
which is by definition managed by the bapak raja. While this tension was 
already slumbering for a long time, this conflict has intensified since the 
relocation of the Iha community as both parties want to receive the money 
from the government for this piece of land. At the time when the research was 
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done, the Iha community had a surat hiba (letter of donation) from the bapak 
raja, thereby implicitly recognizing this land as tanah negeri.  
 
Interestingly, this site is populated by an indigenous adat community, 
meaning that these people possessed a genealogical relationship with the 
territory they were living on, prior to them fleeing. At first sight, this seems 
contradictory to the hypothesis explored in chapter 5 about the exclusive 
deployment of customary tenure, which restrained non-indigenous 
communities to return home, in contrast to indigenous communities. 
However, this community from Iha is able to go home but made a decision to 
settle in Liang, at least for the moment being (see chapter 8). Visiting their 
village in Iha, it is remarkable that despite the total destruction of all 
buildings, their land is left untouched and no signs have been put up trying to 
claim this vacant land. The neighbouring villages of Ihamahu and Nollot still 
consider this land as the property of the people of Iha and have so far made no 
attempts to take over the land (Pattinasarany and Vermeulen 2009).   
 
VI: Relocation, access to land and social vulnerability 
 
172 
 
 
The deserted lands and houses of Iha on Saparua (November 2007) 
 
The reasons this community does not wish to return to Iha are twofold. First, 
traumas about the violent clashes with neighbouring Christian villages are still 
alive and many people expressed a deep anxiety about visiting their village in 
Saparua. Adding to this fear is the fact that they are a small Muslim village in 
a majority Christian area. Second, access to arable land in Iha was extremely 
limited and their relocation to Liang has enabled them to access more arable 
land. In this sense, the number of people engaging in agricultural activities has 
increased. Although I have no conclusive quantitative data on this issue, many 
men I interviewed declared that in Iha on Saparua, they worked full-time as 
‘tukang’ (artisan), in particular as ironsmiths. Since their relocation to Iha-
Liang, many of these people have partly become engaged in agricultural 
activities. Access to other facilities such as education and markets are also 
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considered to be better, compared with their life on Saparua. In the 
meanwhile, there is a cynical twist to their relocation. As has been described 
in chapter 3, the border between Liang and Waai has always been contested 
between these two villages and heavy fighting occurred in this border zone 
between 1999 and 2001. Due to the contested nature of this border land, Liang 
villagers prefer not to cultivate own crops in this contested area. This is 
definitely the case for perennial crops which require a serious financial 
investment and take years before they bear fruit. Moreover, it is feared that 
the planting of perennial crops would result in renewed tensions as this could 
be considered by the Waai people as an attempt to permanently occupy this 
area. Therefore, preference is given to allowing settler communities to 
cultivate these lands through sharecropping agreements. This is not only an 
easy way to gain some income from these lands but is also an indirect attempt 
to occupy and claim these borderlands. Although nobody I spoke to in Liang 
or Iha-Liang ever stated it in this way, this was definitely felt like this among 
the people of Waai. Interestingly, the bapak secretaris of Iha-Liang confided 
me that they were approached a couple of times by people from Waai who 
proposed that they could cultivate their crops for free if they acknowledged a 
dati from Waai as the legitimate owners over the land. This proposal has been 
refused. Interestingly, this case is comparable with the fate of the community 
of Hila-Tanah Putih, albeit in a contrary way. In the case of Hila-Tahah Putih, 
return became a strategic aspect in a border dispute between the villages of 
Hila and Kaitetu, while for Iha-Liang, it was their relocation which became 
part of the border dispute between Liang and Waai.  
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The people from Iha/Liang are aware of the insecure nature of their lands for 
housing and agriculture. The tensions within the village of Liang over their 
land for housing purposes creates sorrow and stress although they are not 
concerned by imminent expulsion since they already have a surat hiba for this 
land. Regarding their access to arable land, they are confronted with different 
layers of tenure insecurity which are more far-reaching. The overall 
ownership over these lands is contested by two rivaling villages and the 
access rights they have on this land take the form of insecure, oral 
sharecropping agreements. This legal insecurity creates deep concern. Many 
people stated that they felt as if working and living on somebody else’s land 
inevitably tends to provoke conflict between and within communities. As a 
consequence, some people in Iha/Liang decided not to invest in the land as 
they were afraid they could be kicked off it any time. Although the cultivation 
of short-term crops does not require a strong financial investment, it requires a 
lot of labour to make the land ready for agriculture as all the wild plants need 
to be cut and the land needs to be cleared of stones. Overall, this enforced the 
opinion that one day, it would be better for them to return to Iha on Saparua 
where ownership is more secure. 
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6.3. Self-settled versus forced relocation 
 
How did insecure access rights to arable land affect social vulnerability 
among these three relocated communities?5
                                                          
5 In order to answer this question, a combination of in-depth qualitative household 
interviews and focus group discussions has been used. Over the three sites, about 40 
household interviews and 8 focus group discussions were conducted. Unfortunately, 
these focus group discussions could not be conducted in Iha-Liang as I could not 
obtain the permission of the bapak sekretaris for doing this. I will therefore focus my 
analysis on a comparison between the sites of Hila-Tanah Putih and Kate-Kate.  
 Despite the similar legal status 
among the different relocation sites, socio-economic differences between 
these sites were huge. These differences can be traced back to two important 
factors. The first factor that needs to be reckoned with in explaining the 
remarkable contrasts in terms of social vulnerability is the difference between 
self-settled and forced relocation. Normally, self-settlement is used for urban 
migrants not living in delineated camps and being devoid of humanitarian aid 
(Jacobsen 2005). The interpretation of this term for the Ambon case is slightly 
different. I use this term to make a distinction between those communities 
who went looking on their own for a relocation site and those communities 
whose relocation was completely stipulated by a government plan. The 
communities from Iha and Hila/Kaitetu had already early in their 
displacement taken the initiative to search for land on their own. In both 
communities, it was acknowledged that they could not continue living in 
temporary IDP camps, and a return to their former village was considered 
impossible in the near future. Therefore, delegations were sent out in search of 
VI: Relocation, access to land and social vulnerability 
 
176 
 
land. Although the access rights for these lands are insecure, at least there is 
some land which can be cultivated. These initiatives were never taken among 
the Eerie Butonese in Kate-Kate. This community stayed as long as possible 
in the IDP camp of THR until they were forced to relocate to the camp of 
Kate-Kate in 2006. As the government did not care about access to arable land 
and the camp happened to be situated in an overpopulated area along the 
important road linking the airport with the town of Ambon, access to land is 
almost non-existent in this camp. In the whole of the camp, there were a 
couple of households which rented land owned by the TNI. Some other 
households managed to access land through a Butonese settlement (Air 
Tinggalam) that was situated higher up in the mountains. People working as 
ad-hoc agricultural labourers during the clove harvest were noted, albeit a 
small number. Among the community of Eerie at least, there was nobody 
working as an agricultural labourer. What is however specific to this 
community is that due to their location at the side of the camp, they illegally 
squatted land owned by a private company. This land was a small and hilly 
part, left over from the original land that was not sold to the government with 
the aim of building the relocation camp of Kate-Kate because it was not 
suitable for housing. Out of a total of 35 households, 7 households cultivated 
this land in the first half of 2007. The nature of their access rights was, 
through any normative framework, illegal and the people could only hope that 
this company would not notice they were farming cassava on parts of their 
land. When I visited the community once again in October and November 
2007, only one household was cultivating on this land as representatives of 
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the company had warned these people to stop their activities. Apart from this 
illegal squatting, no other arable land was accessed.  
 
This restrained land access increased the social vulnerability of this Butonese 
community. Before their forced eviction, all households made a living 
through farming. Since their relocation, everybody has been forced to look for 
alternative income generation outside agriculture. However, as will be 
illustrated in the next chapter, the informal economy in urban and peri-urban 
regions on the island of Ambon is already overcrowded. Moreover, the 
majority of the private companies which left Ambon at the start of the 
kerusuhan have not yet returned. It is therefore extremely hard to find a job 
outside of agriculture for these people. This was already painfully illustrated 
in one of my first visits to the camp. Waiting on an appointment, I started 
talking to a man who was carrying out all sorts of reconstruction works on his 
house. When asked why he wanted to improve his house, the man responded 
that the prime reason for doing all this work was mere boredom as he had 
nothing to do and could not find a job. This problem of boredom was 
regularly mentioned in discussions in this camp and was remarkably different 
with all of the other relocation camps I visited. Conducting focus group 
discussions with women on their daily activities; household activities such as 
cooking, cleaning and taking care of the children ranked as the top three. 
Among the few productive economic activities noted were the selling of dried 
food, soft drinks and flowers or door to door selling of pottery within the 
camp. The majority of the women, however, were not involved in income 
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generation whatsoever. As one women stated: ‘Because there is no land to 
cultivate, we have nothing to sell’. The picture for the men was slightly 
different. The biggest sources of income were the many public and private 
reconstruction projects that have blossomed since the end of the conflict. 
These jobs are temporary and it could happen that men would go without a 
job for months. Moreover, it can be expected that this boom in reconstruction 
projects will someday come to an end. Nevertheless, these sorts of jobs 
increased the mobility of many men. Whilst before 1999, the majority of men 
were involved in farming activities within the borders of the village territory 
on a daily basis, this is no longer the case since their relocation. In most of the 
cases, these new jobs are ad hoc, insecure and situated outside the borders of 
the village land. Apart from these jobs, some men attempted to gain an 
income as motorcycle taxi drivers at the entrance of the camp. However, as 
could be easily observed, there were hardly any customers and essentially, 
these men were hanging out all day long to pass the time, as they admitted 
themselves.  
 
Some similar dynamics were noted in the camp of Hila-Tanah Putih, albeit in 
a less radical way. Although there was more arable land compared to Kate-
Kate, people were also forced to increasingly look for jobs outside agriculture. 
Just like in Kate-Kate, many men were engaged in private and public 
infrastructure reconstruction projects. In the case of public works, men were 
often away for many weeks of road construction work on peripheral islands. 
A simple count on a random weekday in November 2007 revealed that in 
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Hila-Tanah Putih, 35 adult men were away for jobs in construction, for at 
least one week or more. This was about one third of the whole active male 
population. When men were away for a long time, farming activities were 
taken over by women. As one older farmer remarked, the fact that women 
now also have to conduct the hard work on the field and not only the 
complementary work such as weeding (cuci rumput), could be seen as the 
ultimate proof of their impoverishment and different socio-economic 
organization. This proactive role played by the women contrasts with the 
findings in Kate-Kate. This does not only relate to labour activities on the 
field, but in particular to trading. To paraphrase the woman from Kate-Kate, 
as there was some land to cultivate in Hila-Tanah Putih, the women at least 
had something to sell. Although it was confirmed in all discussions that the 
level of selling activities among women had declined since their relocation as 
there was less arable land available, there was still a considerable number of 
women engaged in the selling of agricultural produce. This could happen 
inside the camp but in some cases, women attempted to go further and some 
of them went to the market of Mardika on a daily basis.  
 
Although additional research needs to be undertaken to confirm or refute this 
hypothesis, these data tend to indicate that the mobility of men in rural areas 
increases in the case of insufficient arable land, in particular for those 
communities cultivating labour-intensive, short-term crops.6
                                                          
6 This is not the case for the cultivation of perennial crops that are only harvested 
once or twice a year, mainly destined for external markets and require a different 
 The reverse is 
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true for the women, although the picture here is slightly more complicated. As 
I already explained in chapter 4, there are, by and large, two systems of food 
distribution in Ambon. In the first system, the total produce is sold to 
middlemen who then further distribute these food crops to petty traders. In 
this system, the farmer is not involved in the selling and therefore spends 
most of his time within the border of the village. It looks as if this system is 
popular in case of abundant land access. For instance, in some Butonese 
settlements in Rumah Tiga, farmers admitted that they had access to many 
land and that women were actively involved in all types of labour on the field. 
Therefore, they did not consider it necessary to sell their own produce as they 
already were busy all day long. When land access is more limited, it looks as 
if households prefer to bring their own produce to the market. Within this 
second system, there is a rather strict gender labour division between men and 
women, in a sense that the daily activities of men are spent on the field while 
the local distribution of the food crops is almost entirely organized by women. 
However, when land is hardly available, this mobility of women through petty 
trading activities once again drastically declines. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
labour division. Therefore, the cultivation of perennial crops, in general controlled by 
the indigenous Ambonese adat community, can be easily combined with other jobs. 
For those engaged in the labour-intensive cultivation and marketing of short-term 
crops, this is more difficult. Although there are many reasons for the high level of 
civil servants among the indigenous Ambonese, this is one possible explanation that is 
never accounted for.   
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6.4. The tenacity of customary ownership rights 
 
A second factor explaining the differences in terms of social vulnerability is 
the observation that secure access rights to land are not lost, despite 
geographical migration. For instance, concerning the community of Iha-
Liang, I already mentioned that this community can potentially claim their 
former village land on Saparua. In the meantime, despite their migration to 
Liang, this community has about 500 acres of land where they still cultivate 
cloves through a traditional pela relationship with a village on West Seram, 
named Samasuru.7
 
 Although their land in Saparua remains untouched and 
therefore unproductive, the clove harvest in West Seram is an important 
source of financial income for the village.   
The same counts for the Protestants of Hila/Kaitetu. Although they never 
belonged to the indigenous adat community, there existed secure institutional 
agreements through which they grew perennial crops. An example was their 
access to sagu, a staple food derived from the sagu tree, which provided them 
with a high level of food security (von Benda Beckmann, 1990b; Brouwer, 
1998). For the Protestants, these sagu trees were traditionally accessed in 
Kaitetu. Interestingly, despite their relocation, they did not lose their access 
rights to these sagu trees in Kaitetu. In this regard, sagu trees as a source of 
subsistence food provision in times of crisis are still available and it was 
acknowledged that when necessary, people would definitely make use of 
                                                          
7 For an elaboration on these pela relationships, see chapter 8 
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these trees. This is also the case for their clove and nutmeg trees in Kaitetu 
which are still cultivated and harvested. So, although in their new relocation 
site, the Protestants of Hila/Kaitetu have the same status as non-Moluccan 
settler communities, they could safeguard many of the more secure access 
rights they had before 1999. Only in those cases in which perennial crops 
have been cut down, has this relocated community lost the property rights to 
this land (see chapter 3). This cultivation of clove and nutmeg provided 
important sources of cash for the community in Hila-Tanah Putih. In contrast, 
the Butonese in Kate-Kate did not have these sorts of customary ownership 
rights prior to their expulsion and therefore could not take advantage of them 
since their relocation. As a consequence, food insecurity was particularly 
higher in this site. 
 
This tenacity of customary ownership rights is remarkable, especially when 
compared to formal ownership rights. For instance, the majority of the 
Butonese in Kate-Kate possessed formal ownership awards for their housing 
land and their houses in Eerie. Since their expulsion, this formal ownership 
status has been lost and they have never been properly compensated for this. 
The same goes for many people currently living in Hila-Tanah Putih and 
Kayu Tiga. When asking what sort of legal means will be applied in order to 
reclaim this lost property, many people are rather desperate and consider 
bringing the case to court too costly and time-consuming. In contrast, 
customary ownership rights are not lost after forced expulsion, at least in 
those cases where the perennial crops on these customary lands have not been 
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deliberately cut down with the aim of taking over the land. These data thus 
tend to indicate that ownership rights based on adat customary law are 
stronger than those based on formal state law, in particular in relation of 
migration.   
 
 
6.5. Conclusion: New arenas of contestation 
 
Because relocated communities are by definition non-indigenous to the 
territory they migrated to, the government did not provide arable land and the 
purchasing of land through formal certificates was considered too expensive, 
these people could only access arable land through insecure sharecropping 
agreements on these new sites. There are many examples where these 
agreements have been broken to the advantage of the host community. It is 
also important to note how forced migration sometimes reinvigorated existing 
tensions regarding land access among the host community as the value of the 
land increased when migrants came to be settled there. However, despite the 
fact that access to arable land is insecure in all relocation sites studied, the 
relationship with social vulnerability is complex. Although I did not gather 
quantitative data on income generation, it was obvious that vulnerability was 
higher in Kate-Kate compared to the camp of Hila-Tanah Putih. Two factors 
proved to be decisive in this matter. The first one is the status of these 
communities prior to their forced expulsion. Communities having an 
indigenous status could maintain some of their customary ownership status, 
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despite their geographical migration, resulting in a higher level of food 
security and extra sources of cash. Interestingly, these customary ownership 
awards tend be more secure than formal ownership awards which were often 
lost due to forced migration. This observation also refines the idea that all 
relocated communities by definition start from scratch. Secondly, although 
access to arable land was characterized by high levels of tenure insecurity, 
remarkable differences were encountered in the amount of land that could be 
accessed. In general, one can say that those communities who went searching 
for land on their own were better off than those communities which were 
relocated through government plans.  
 
It is important to note that the sharp impoverishment the Butonese of Kate-
Kate were confronted with, was a source of profound frustration. As I 
demonstrated, due to lack of access to land, some Butonese living in Kate-
Kate have decided to illegally squat land. This has given emergence to 
tensions, not only with the private community owning this piece of land, but 
also with the host community which fears that these Butonese will attempt 
occupying pieces of their land. This situation in Kate-Kate is illustrative of the 
fate of many Butonese communities. It is generally estimated that 160,000 
Butonese were forced to flee Maluku province, after the outbreak of violence 
in the beginning of 1999 (Palmer 2004). Many of these people went back to 
Sulawesi but a considerable part has remained in Ambon. For the majority of 
these Butonese, access to arable land is limited or simply nonexistent, as all 
the Muslim Butonese were forced to flee to Muslim areas which became 
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overpopulated. Therefore, in many places on Ambon island, the squatting of 
arable land by displaced Butonese communities poses a problem. Examples 
can be noted in Waiheru and Ahuru where Butonese are farming on land 
formally owned by the Catholic church. These lands were occupied during the 
kerusuhan when the Catholics living there had to flee. Similar problems were 
noted in Poka/Rumah Tiga, Batu Kuning and Tantui. This has further 
increased the resentment against these Butonese communities among many 
Ambonese, both Christian and Muslim, which consider the Butonese as 
becoming ‘very aggressive’ in their economic strategies.  
 
On the other hand, the large-scale evictions of the Butonese, the impossibility 
to return and the extremely dire economic circumstances many of these 
relocated migrant communities find themselves in, has increased awareness 
among many Butonese, both relocated and non-relocated. This could be 
encountered in ethnically confined organizations (paguyuban) of the Butonese 
in Ambon. A clear case in point is the BKMM-Sultra (Badan Keturunan 
Masyarakat Maluku - Sulawesi Tenggara, Committee of the Descendants of 
Moluccan Society – Southeast Sulawesi). It is already interesting studying this 
name which was changed in 2005. Before, this organization was named BKM-
Sultra (Badan Keturunan Masyarakat – Sulawesi Tengara, Committee of the 
Descendants of Southeast Sulawesi Society). While before 2005, they thus 
characterized themselves of descendants of Southeast Sulawesi, the homeland 
of the Butonese, since 2005, they wish to characterize themselves as 
Moluccan people which are from Southeast Sulawesi descent. This is a 
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fundamental change. As the ketua (leader) of the BKMM-Sultra explains, the 
time has come that the Butonese are recognized as real Moluccans with the 
same rights. Central to their struggle is a stronger political representation in 
which they take advantage of the strong numerical presence of the Butonese 
in the Moluccas in the new democratic era since 1998. Resource management 
is one of the prime fields in which they intend to gain an increasing say and 
the exclusivist new land laws that have been described in chapter 5, 
confirming migrants in a secondary legal position, are explicitly mentioned as 
a central struggle for this BKMM-Sultra. For instance, they aim to transform 
the many Butonese dusun (sub-villages) into formal desa (village), that have a 
same legal status as the negeri and sharply resent the idea of the negeri 
administratif. They also disagree with the fact that, according to these new 
laws, the village head has to belong to the indigenous adat law community. It 
is still too early to see how these struggles between ethnic paguyuban and 
certain forces - in particular within the Protestant dominated, powerful PDI-P 
- defending the legal rights of the indigenous Ambonese population will 
evolve in the future. Moreover, it is clear that the power of a paguyuban such 
as the BKMM-Sultra is still limited despite the fact that some rich Butonese 
businessmen joined the organization in 2006. Nevertheless, it is an undeniable 
fact that resentment among many ethnic Butonese has sharply increased since 
the conflict, and will be a factor to be reckoned with in the future. 
  
 
VII 
 
 
Downward social mobility, prestige and the informal economy1
 
 
 
‘The conflict was a learning process that made us all equal’ 
 
Jeffrey, Ambonese tricycle taxi driver 
 
This chapter illustrates how competition at the lower class bazaar level of the 
economy has vigorously intensified since the ending of the recent communal 
conflict in Ambon. As has been demonstrated in chapter 4, due to a decline of 
the formal economy, many people - in particular women - attempted to 
generate income in the informal economy for everyday survival. This was 
further encouraged by spatial transformations during which Muslim migrant 
communities became locked up in Muslim areas and Christian Ambonese 
took over these businesses in the Christian parts of the city. This increasing 
importance of the informal economy for household survival has continued 
since the ending of the kerusuhan with many men engaging in informal 
transport activities. This brought about the downward social mobility of many 
autochthonous Ambonese as they started engaging in economic activities 
                                                          
1 The outline of this chapter is based on the article: ‘Downward Social Mobility, 
Prestige and the Informal Economy in Post-Conflict Ambon’, South East Asia 
Research, 16 (3): 293-311.  
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which before the conflict were dominated by lower class Muslim migrant 
communities. Simply stated, many autochthonous Ambonese took up ‘dirty 
men’s jobs’, which affected their traditional elite status in Ambonese society. 
This particularly played for the Ambonese Protestant community.  
 
 
7.1. Socio-economic change and ethnic competition 
 
Due to the strong and visible religious underpinnings of the recent communal 
conflict, it is often forgotten that ethnic cleavages between a migrant and an 
autochthonous community have always been a hallmark of Ambonese society. 
As I illustrated in chapter 5, this ethnic cleavage is particularly strong in 
issues of land access. Also in urban and peri-urban areas, competition 
between a growing group of migrants and the autochthonous Ambonese 
(including Christians and Muslims) has always been pertinent. This group of 
ethnic migrants is commonly referred to as BBM, which is an abbreviation 
that stands for Bugis, Butonese and Makkasarese. These are three ethnic 
groups originating from the neighbouring island of Sulawesi. Increasingly, the 
term is also used to refer to other and smaller migrant communities such as 
the Madurese coming from Java or people coming from the city of Padang. As 
far as I could see, this term is applied for Muslim groups that are ethnically 
non-Moluccan and are engaged in informal, lower class economic activities. 
For instance, in the city of Ambon, there are a lot of small eating places 
(warung makan) that are run by Muslims from Padang. Quite some Madurese 
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are engaged in the becak (tricycle) business. This term however is not 
applicable for migrant communities originating from within the Moluccas, 
even if they are Muslim. For instance, there are quite some poor Muslim IDPs 
from North Maluku who fled to Ambon during the conflict. These people 
were never referred to as BBM. This label also contains a strong Muslim 
connotation as this, for instance, does not include Catholic migrant 
communities originating from Flores. Although the BBM are considered to be 
ethnic migrants or masyarakat pendatang, most of these people are born in 
the Moluccas and have never seen their homeland. The history of migration of 
the BBM to Ambon is largely a voluntary and long-term migration of poor 
people searching for a sustainable livelihood that had its origins during Dutch 
colonial times. Their migration is related to certain economic dynamics in the 
regional centre of Ambon and the search for vacant lands on the many 
Moluccan islands, including Ambon (Bartels 2002, Palmer 2004).  
 
Generally speaking one can state that before 1999, economic roles were quite 
fixed. In urban and peri-urban environments, the BMM were essentially 
involved in poorly paid, day-to-day survival type of jobs in the informal 
economy such as petty trade and private transport (Mearns 1996). Therefore, 
both in terms of prestige and income, the majority of this group of BBM could 
be labeled as lower class. Importantly, for both Christian and Muslim 
Ambonese, the category of BBM has always carried a negative connotation as 
they are considered ad dirty, dumb and at times even aggressive. This was 
illustrated through some encounters in the early stages of my fieldwork. For 
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instance, walking in the bustling market of Mardika, I witnessed a discussion 
between two men. As these sorts of lively discussions in Mardika are 
common, I did not pay much attention to the men until suddenly the argument 
turned nastier and the men became more physical. The customer angrily 
denounced the seller as a “BBM” who did not sell his goods at fair prices to 
locals like himself. This quarrel immediately reminded me of another incident 
a couple of days earlier when I took an angkot (minibus) around the island of 
Ambon. During the ride, the minibus filled up with teenagers who had just 
finished school. When they noticed to their amazement that this foreigner was 
able to speak their language, an ordinary chit-chat developed about my 
opinions on Ambon and their school and daily life. Suddenly, the cheerful 
discussion took a more aggressive turn when one student pointed to another 
one and warned me to be cautious with her because she was a Bugis and all 
Bugis conceal knifes behind their backs. The student added that a lot of these 
people have a nasty smell. The rest of the teenagers in the bus all thought it 
very amusing, except for the girl. Due to this stigmatizing connotation, which 
also stands for Bahah Bahan Minyak or fuel, this migrant community will 
never refer to themselves as BBM. BBM thus is considered as a term of abuse 
and it would be inappropriate to address people from non-Moluccan descent 
as BBM. Related to these negative stereotypes were the nature of typical 
‘BBM jobs’ such as driving a becak which are insecure, tough, poorly paid 
and therefore considered as low in social status. 
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In opposition to the BBM stand the autochthonous Ambonese or the so-called 
masyarakat adat, a term that can be translated by the community of traditional 
laws and practices of Ambon which contrasts the secondary status of the 
migrant community. This superior status is even more pronounced in the case 
of the Christian Ambonese who are considered to be elite because of their 
historical involvement in the state bureaucracy as civil servants (Chauvel 
1990). The elite status of this Protestant community is therefore strongly 
related to the word ‘ambtenaar’. This Dutch word, which is commonly used 
in Ambon, is the literal translation for civil servant. This word already implies 
a high level of economic security, but in the Ambonese context also reflects 
the high social standing, prestige and educational opportunities of the 
Protestant community which stems from their privileged treatment during 
colonial times. As I explained in chapter 3, this ‘golden boy status’ of a 
Protestant elite already was threatened from the nineties onwards due to a 
stronger involvement of (autochthonous) Muslim intellectuals in the state 
bureaucracy. In terms of prestige and standing however, divisions between 
autochthonous Ambonese and migrant communities remained very much 
alive.  
 
These divisions also led to a particular sort of stereotyping towards the 
autochthonous Ambonese as being lazy.2
                                                          
2 This is somewhat related to the typical ‘Ambon Manise’ (Sweet Ambon) clichés. 
This Ambon Manise theme can be retrieved in many songs by local Ambonese bands 
and refers to a self-proclaimed image of Ambon as a remote, quiet and supposedly 
harmonious region where people enjoy the good life far away from the money 
 Here one sees how the image of the 
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ambtenaar also contains a reverse side. Apart from the ambtenaar as being 
elite and highly educated, there exists a deeply held conviction that civil 
servants are lazy, corrupted people who are sleeping all day long on their 
desk. While the BBM are considered to make money through honest, hard 
work, large parts of the autochthonous community are considered to make 
‘easy’ money through ‘easy’ jobs in the state bureaucracy. This image of the 
lazy Ambonese also plays in the field of agricultural labour. While many 
Butonese in the countryside are involved in the cultivation of labour-
intensive, short-term crops, the Ambonese can just sit back and let their 
perennial crops grow. In many cases, Butonese are then paid as day labourers 
or hired through sharecropping agreements to pluck the fruits from these trees. 
Interestingly, this sort of stereotyping not only lived among BBM 
communities but was also something which large parts of the autochthonous 
Ambonese community attributed to themselves, albeit in a more friendly way 
as ‘the friendly, relaxed people who are enjoying the good life’.  
 
The traditional division between this Muslim migrant community and the 
autochthonous Ambonese has been reshuffled throughout the kerusuhan. Due 
to the economic downfall in Ambon, in particular those households that were 
dependent on formal wage labour for their income were hardly hit. As a 
consequence, many Ambonese were forced to enter ‘poor man’s jobs’ in the 
informal economy that before the conflict were considered as BBM 
                                                                                                                                           
grabbing and pollution of Jakarta and Java. These songs are often accompanied by a 
video clip in which endless images of the sea and the Ambonese beaches are shown. 
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strongholds. This downward social mobility particularly affected the 
Ambonese Christians as their involvement in insecure casual employment was 
further exacerbated by the fact that Muslim BBM were confined to the 
Muslim areas of the island and were unable to reach the Christian areas. 
Consequently, Christian Ambonese had a particular incentive to take over 
these businesses in the Christian parts of the island. Following the end of the 
conflict, the autochthonous Ambonese do not want to leave these jobs behind 
as opportunities in other economic sectors are limited. This has caused intense 
economic competition at the lower class levels of society that is taking on 
both an inter-ethnic and inter-religious character, given that a number of BBM 
that took refuge outside of Ambon have returned since the end of the conflict. 
In the meantime, the Ambonese Christians are increasingly being stripped of 
from their traditional elite status. This dynamic was poignantly illustrated by 
an Ambonese Muslim friend who stated: ‘Ambonese always had a lot of nice 
trousers while the BBM only had one dirty trouser. The difference however is 
that this dirty trouser had a pocket full of money. Now it has become time for 
the Ambonese to put on their dirty trouser’. This process will be illustrated by 
two case studies. One concerns the private transport sector in the city of 
Ambon and the other considers changes in petty marketing since the end of 
the conflict in the towns of Passo and Ambon.  
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7.2. Private transport in the city of Ambon 
 
Prior to the outbreak of the first riots, impoverished ethnic migrants largely 
dominated the business of tricycle taxis or the so-called becaks. This business 
is a typical example of informal and poorly remunerated self-employed urban 
labour that serves as a survival strategy for urban dwellers such as many 
BBM, among whom a majority are of Butonese descent. This dominance by 
the BBM began to languish once the violence unfolded in the beginning of 
1999 and the Ambonese became increasingly involved in this sector. As I 
already demonstrated in chapter 4, the first explanation for this phenomenon 
is the grave regional economic decline - particularly in industrial, 
manufacturing and construction activities - which resulted in a loss in income 
for many people. The shock induced by the violence and the subsequent 
economic decline was felt harder amongst men as men traditionally had a 
stronger presence in formal, recorded labour in comparison to women. As a 
consequence, in particular in Christian areas, women took up a central and 
wage-earning role through informal petty trading activities throughout the 
kerusuhan.  
 
Many men only started to take up jobs in the informal private transport sector 
from 2002 onwards, once a certain level of stability had returned to the 
region. Two major reasons should be given for this. First, most men 
considered it too dangerous to become involved in transport activities at the 
height of the kerusuhan. This was particularly the case for the rather slow and 
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immobile tricycle taxis. As a reaction, there was an increase in the number of 
motorcycle taxis or ojek. These ojek allowed reaching a particular place in a 
quicker pace than was the case with other modes of transport such as a 
tricycle. This was a serious advantage in a risky urban environment that was 
often plagued by the presence of snipers. These motorcycle taxis could also 
easily escape from unexpected riots or roadblocks by sneaking away in small 
alleyways, which gave them an advantage over other motorized vehicles such 
as cars or minibuses. As such, these ojeks were particularly in demand for 
certain high-risk undertakings. The job of ojek driver was therefore 
considered as dangerous. On the other hand, the money that could be earned 
with this business could easily exceed 100.000 Rp. or about 10 euro’s a day, 
which is high to Ambonese standards. Because of this high income, becoming 
involved in these sorts of activities was highly attractive for the many 
unemployed male youth. At the same time, throughout informal discussions, it 
became clear that many considered this as extremely dangerous. Some of 
these youth for instance stated that they had friends who were killed or 
became wounded when they were driving their ojek and therefore did not 
want to become involved in this business. An additional factor was the 
perception that men considered themselves as being more vulnerable for 
violence and aggression. Whether this was really true is hard to check but at 
least there existed a perception that it was safer for women than men to go out 
in daytime. Another factor was the fact that quite some men played a role in 
defense activities of certain neighbourhoods. For instance, in the camps of 
Wisma Atlit and THR there existed a rotation system in which men - in 
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particular at night time - were standing guard at strategic locations in the 
camp. This made some people conclude that while in daytime, women were 
out to look for the money, at the night time, men were responsible for the 
physical protection of the family. This however also meant that in daytime, 
many men were taking a rest. All these factors contributed to the fact that 
there were relatively few men engaged in the informal economy throughout 
the kerusuhan. Once insecurity started to decrease from 2002 onwards,  the 
engagement of the men in these activities, in particular transport activities, 
rose considerably.  
 
A second factor that should not be forgotten is the fact that the sharp 
economic decline which started in 1999 has largely continued despite the 
ending of the conflict. Simply stated, many of the private companies which 
left Ambon during the kerusuhan have not returned after 2002. For instance, 
in the year 2006 GDPR per capita grew by of 3,67% in Maluku, a figure that 
is lower compared to most other provinces in Indonesia (BPS 2007). This is 
also evident looking at the economic sectors that were among the hardest hit 
during the conflict. Between 2002 and 2006 manufacturing industries only 
grew by an annual growth rate of 4,3% and construction activities grew at an 
annual growth rate of 2,6% (BPS 2007). Therefore, many of the economic 
problems that started during the high-intensity conflict, still continue and 
many men still have huge problems finding a job in the private economy. One 
of the few options left are precarious jobs in private transport.  
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In particular Ambonese Christians became involved in the transport business. 
This is due to the spatial transformation by which the city of Ambon became 
separated into two mono-religious zones, divided by a frontline that could not 
be crossed for several years. Although many Christians only started to engage 
in transport from 2002/2003 onwards, during that period, still very few people 
dared to cross the religious borders in Ambon city. This dealt a serious blow 
to the ethnic Muslim migrants dominating the transport sector. First of all, 
Christian consumers which consisted of more than half of the total urban 
population fell away and secondly, the fact that the Muslims were pushed in a 
small area decreased the general demand for private transport among the 
remaining Muslim population. As a result, the number of BBM being engaged 
in private transport decreased. The opposite was the case in the Christian 
areas. As the traditional tricycle drivers were ‘trapped’ in the Muslim part of 
town, this economic sector was quickly taken over by Christian men. A 
further incentive for unemployed Christian men to take up jobs in private 
transport came from the fact that many of the becaks, traditionally driven by 
the BBM, were left behind in the Christian part of the town. Muslims who 
owned a becak but lived in Christian areas took refuge in the Muslim part of 
town during the riots, after which Christian youth saw the chance to steal the 
becaks.3
                                                          
3 This was not only the case for becaks but occurred with all kinds of goods at both 
sides of the conflict. 
 Many becaks were also taken over because they were rented from 
local businessmen who were of ethnic Chinese origin and lived in the better-
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off Christian neighbourhoods. Due to the violence, the Muslim BBM could no 
longer reach the Christian areas and these businessmen started to rent or even 
sell the becaks to Christians. Importantly, rather than a real economic 
opportunity, the involvement of Christian men in the becak business should 
be viewed as a form of economic survival. It is hard to give the exact daily 
income of a becak driver as this depends on different factors such as the 
strategic location of the taxi rank or the weather (becaks are more popular 
during the rainy season because they offer protection against the rain). 
However, it can be estimated that a full–time becak driver earns a daily 
income of between 25.000 Rp. and 50.000 Rp. The income for the few men 
who possess a private becak and do not rent their tricycle is higher as the 
average daily rent for a becak amounts around 25.000 Rp.4
 
  The remuneration 
for an ojek driver is largely similar. Although the average income is slightly 
higher compared to a becak driver, the biggest problem here is the daily cost 
for petrol.  
Interrupted by a short period of riots around April – May 2004, from 2003 
onwards, relations between the Muslim and the Christian communities in the 
                                                          
4 In general, the majority of becaks are hired from local companies owned by ethnic 
Chinese. Private ownership of a becak is rather rare and if this is the case, this mostly 
occurred through a system of leasing after which a certain period of paying rent, the 
becak has become the property of the driver. In the case of the ojeks, private 
ownership is more common. Renting is generally done from private individuals and 
not from established companies. For instance, some ojek drivers confided me that 
they rented the motorcycle of civil servants who were out for work in daytime. After 
working hours, the motorcycle had to be given back. 
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city of Ambon gradually began to thaw and Christian and Muslim becak 
drivers increasingly operated in each other’s areas. Although the Muslim 
BBM drivers could drive around safely in Christian areas, they quickly 
realized there was new competition that was not there before the conflict. The 
first arena where this competition was evident was in the problems they faced 
to access taxi ranks and more specifically taxi ranks that would allow them 
access to many customers. Between 2001 and 2004, taxi ranks in the Christian 
part of the city were taken over by the Christian becak drivers. This created a 
segregation between Muslims and Christians who dominated the taxi ranks in 
their respective neighbourhoods. Highly problematic for the BBM is that 
many of the profitable taxi ranks such as the ones situated nearby the few 
hotels and government buildings are generally situated in the Christian part of 
the town. As a consequence, the BBM becak drivers are pushed away to the 
poorer and smaller Muslim neighbourhoods of Ambon city which results in 
lesser income.  
 
In all the becak and ojek taxi stands I went to, I always asked where people 
lived. Apart from a few exceptions, I never spoke to a driver living in a 
Muslim neighbourhood and having a permanent taxi rank in a Christian 
neighbourhood and vice versa.5
                                                          
5 Most of the exceptions were encountered in front of the main entrance of the 
governor’s office in Ambon city where apparently, Muslims and Christians, work 
together.  
 It is thus clear that there exists a spatial 
division based on religious identity in these standing places. In the meantime, 
competition to access space within one and the same religious community has 
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intensified. Although I was always aware that this was a pressing issue, it was 
only throughout my last fieldtrip in the summer of 2008 that I started noticing 
signboards such as the ones below indicating that there were no more places 
left in the taxi stands in Ambon city. Although I did not conduct a systematic 
study of all taxi stands in the city of Ambon, it looks as if these sorts of 
cardboards appeared in particular in the busy inner city of Ambon, close to 
strategic locations. Asking in these taxi stands why they hang up these 
cardboards, the predictable answer was that there was no more space for new 
ojeks/becaks and that they would lose their income when there would be too 
many ojeks/becaks at their stand.   
 
 
Transcription: Ojek depot. Tax: No admission of new ojeks (Ambon town, 
July 2008) 
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This ojek depot is situated close by the popular Mutiara hotel in the inner 
town of Ambon. All the ojek drivers I talked to in this taxi stand came from 
nearby urban Christian neighbourhoods. All but one worked before the 
outbreak of the violence in perusahaan (industry). The other person worked 
on a Korean fishing ship. The majority of them started their ojek business in 
2003. They confirmed that around 2003 they could still make a good living 
with their business. Since a couple of years however, the number of ojek 
drivers has dramatically increased and therefore, their income has decreased. 
For that reason, the ‘original’ owners of the taxi stand have put up the 
cardboard signaling that new ojek drivers can only use their place if they pay 
tax (pajak). These taxes are not paid to one owner but to a group of people 
who considered themselves the original owners over the place. I could note at 
least eight people who belonged to this group of original owners. The number 
of drivers paying tax was impossible to define. Among this group of owners, 
there existed a daily rotation system in which one member of the group 
received the money. In other cases however, such as the one pictured below, 
this taxation system was not in place and the ojek drivers simply indicated 
they did not want any new ojek drivers at their stand.  
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Transcription: Ojek depot Sultan Hairun Street… no admission of new ojeks 
(Ambon town, July 2008) 
 
Still another system can be labeled as ‘community-based entrance’. In these 
cases, only members of a delineated community are allowed to access a 
certain taxi stand. An interesting example is the Swan Island community, 
pictured below. The Swan Island community is not a particularly famous 
neighbourhood in Ambon and many random Ambonese I spoke to admitted 
that they had never heard of this community/neighbourhood. Yet, under the 
guidance of their local neighbourhood leader, some men decided in 2003 to 
set up a taxi stand that only allowed people belonging to this ‘Swan Island 
community’ based on the name of their small alleyway (gang). 
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Swan Island community ojek/becak depot (Ambon town, July 2008) 
 
A similar dynamic could be observed within the Muslim neighbourhoods in 
Ambon city, although I never came across similar signboards. Also here, 
many men interviewed indicated they had a job in the formal private economy 
before the outbreak of the kerusuhan. In particular a large number who were 
traditionally employed at the harbour lost their job during the conflict. A 
number of other people indicated that their working place has been burned 
down or destroyed. As a consequence, the number of Ambonese Muslims 
who became engaged in this private transport activities rose considerably and 
the competition to access space for taxi stands increased. For instance, people 
in a becak stand in Batu Merah indicated that there were about 30 people who 
were allowed to conduct their activities at their stand. This number of 30 
however was already reached in 2005 and this was the maximum amount of 
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drivers their place could take. Since then, no new drivers have been admitted. 
Throughout collective interviews in these Muslim taxi stands, I have always 
felt restrained to collect data about ethnic background as these ethnic 
divisions are rather sensitive. Moreover, I could not ask people where they 
were living in order to find out their ethnic background as Ambonese 
Muslims and non-Ambonese Muslims are living together in the same 
neighbourhoods. However, throughout some private interviews, it became 
clear that the BBM communities increasingly feel the competition with the 
Ambonese Muslims.  
 
 
7.3. Petty trade in Passo and Ambon city 
 
Another arena where similar competition to access space can be witnessed are 
petty marketing activities. This is not only the case in the city centre of 
Ambon but also in Passo. Passo is a small town that is situated along the main 
road of the island linking the airport to the city of Ambon (see map No. 2). 
Shortly after the start of the conflict, the minority Muslim community living 
there had to flee. In the meantime, Passo attracted many Christian migrants 
coming from all over the region. These IDPs moved in with family or friends 
or settled in camps. Due to the inflow of migrants and its strategic location in 
which the place was reachable by the sea from two sides, all sorts of 
businesses were thriving during the conflict and the price for land and real 
estate soared. Also after the conflict, Passo was further upgraded with the 
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building of many new government buildings. As a consequence, Passo is 
currently often referred to as the second Ambon. Just like in the Christian part 
of Ambon town, Christian Passo was confronted with the emerging scarcity of 
high-quality food such as fresh fish and vegetables, shortly after the outbreak 
of violence. Before 1999, both the majority of producers and sellers of food 
crops in Passo consisted of ethnic Butonese. From the moment the Muslim 
Butonese could no longer access Passo to sell their produce and the Muslim 
Butonese minority living there was chased away, the supply of fresh, high-
quality food dwindled. However, once the Christians were deprived of their 
access to locally produced food crops, new distribution networks were 
established which supplied the area with food. Just like in Ambon city, these 
alternative trade networks were often organized under the supervision of the 
TNI which was paid good money for this. Importantly, Christians living in 
Passo took over the selling of these food crops in the local market thereby 
replacing the Butonese petty traders. Due to the traditional low capital input 
that is required to start engaging in petty trade, the many internally displaced 
who were among the economically hardest hit, but also original Passo 
inhabitants, considered it inevitable to start engaging in this petty trade. In the 
meantime, the Butonese communities who traditionally cultivated land that 
belonged to Passo customary clans, were chased away and these deserted 
lands were taken over by Christians, in particular IDPs. These IDPs then sold 
their vegetables straight away at the market of Passo. Amongst others, the 
expelled community of Benteng Karang is actively involved in these petty 
marketing activities.   
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Although communal relations between Muslims and Christians gradually 
started to normalize from late 2003 onwards, it was only from 2005/2006 that 
Muslims started to return to the market of Passo attempting to retain the 
position they had before the conflict. The principal arena through which this 
renewed competition is fought is access to space, and more specifically 
market space that allows for better economic profit. During and after the 
conflict in Passo, the local market became overcrowded with petty traders 
largely selling the same sorts of food crops. When in mid 2001, the whole 
Waai community fled to Passo, the old marketplace has been abandoned due 
to lack of space and a new market has been set up at the other side of the road. 
Since then, also this market continued growing. In this sort of context, the 
place where one sells becomes a defining advantage or disadvantage and 
access to space becomes very contentious. In Passo, one witnesses therefore a 
clear religious rationale behind the distribution of space. More specifically, 
market stalls occupying the frontline along the main road allow for a greater 
financial profit compared to market stalls that are hidden at the rear of the 
market. As a consequence, the market is religiously segregated with the 
Christians from Passo selling their food crops at the front of the market near 
the busy main road (jalan raya). These places were already occupied during 
the period of high-intensity conflict and vigorously maintained once the 
Butonese started to return to Passo. All the petty traders I talked to and who 
have their stall near the jalan raya, started their business between 1999 and 
2002. Interestingly, none of these people were already involved in petty 
marketing before 1999. In contrast, the Muslims are pushed aside to the rear 
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of the overcrowded marketplace which can only be reached by crossing some 
narrow and muddy alleyways. All of these traders I talked to started their 
activities in 2005 or 2006. Already at first gaze, it is clear that business is not 
particularly thriving at this rear of the market, compared with the places up 
front. Because of this spatial advantage, Christians in Passo manage to retain a 
competitive edge against the Butonese and curb a real influx of Butonese 
petty traders into the Passo market.  
 
Similar dynamics are at play in the city centre of Ambon. The difference 
however is that this competition for market place is spread all over the inner 
city centre and does concentrate less in one and the same marketplace. As has 
been described in chapter 4, multiple Christian petty traders became involved 
in new markets or pasar kaget, situated in the Christian parts of the city 
during the conflict. Since the ending of the conflict, these pasar kaget have 
somewhat lost their relevance when Christian costumers increasingly started 
going back to the old Mardika market. Moreover, this market is closely linked 
to the Mardika transport terminal and is easily reachable for people living in 
the many peri-urban villages surrounding Ambon city. The Mardika market 
therefore attracts a broad range of customers spread all over the city and has 
largely retained its traditional role as the main centre of food selling in 
Ambon town. Here, the Christians encounter the same disadvantages as the 
Butonese in Passo, namely that they can no longer manage to access a 
profitable position in the market place as these have already become occupied 
by Muslims (both Butonese and Ambonese) during the conflict and have been 
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maintained once the conflict ended. Interestingly, the few Christians petty 
traders I spoke to at Mardika already had a stall in Mardika before the 
outbreak of the kerusuhan and were involved in the local selling of perennial 
crops such as mango and coconut or a semi-perennial crop such as banana. 
These people came from villages on the Leitimur part of the island, in 
particular the village of Ema and some surrounding villages. The sellers from 
this area occupied one strategic corner at the market. Another ‘Christian 
enclave’ in Mardika consisted of Christians living in Soya. These people sold 
the same sorts of perennial or semi-perennial crops. Importantly, these petty 
traders from Ema and Soya had their own means of production, did therefore 
not depend on a middlemen and were already involved in the selling of these 
products before 1999. Asking these people how they managed to access 
market space in Mardika, they answered that everybody in the market knew 
that this was their legitimate place to sell as they already occupied this place 
before the outbreak of the kerusuhan. This sort of Christian sellers in Mardika 
however constituted a minority. Moreover, no Christian sellers could be found 
in Mardika who did not have own means of production, therefore depended 
on middlemen and started their business during the conflict.  
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The overcrowded Mardika market (July 2008) 
 
How did the many Christian women who became involved in food petty trade 
throughout the kerusuhan cope with the fact that the Mardika market retained 
its traditional role as the main centre of food distribution in the town? First of 
all, a large group has quit the business. For instance, the large majority of the 
Christian petty traders from Wisma Atlit have abandoned their petty trading 
activities. The foremost reason is that they lost their Christian costumers and 
could no longer compete with the sellers in Mardika. The Mardika market 
itself could not be accessed by the women of Wisma Atlit as all the market 
places were already occupied.6
                                                          
6 It should also be noted that many of these women stated that they would not feel 
‘comfortable’ selling at Mardika, even if it would be possible. Although these women 
 Moreover, they could not claim a ‘legitimate’ 
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space in Mardika they already occupied before the conflict as was the case 
with the sellers from Soya or Ema. As a consequence, it looks as if gender 
roles as they existed before the conflict have been largely reinstated among 
this Protestant community. As has been described, throughout the high-
intensity violence, many women took up an outward oriented, income 
generating role while many men stayed home and had no source of income. 
An opposite dynamic has occurred since the ending of the conflict. Many 
women gave up their job in petty trading and men increasingly started to 
engage in the informal transport business. In this regard, many women 
returned to their pre-conflict, more inside-oriented role while many men 
retained their traditional outside-oriented role. This hypothesis was also 
confirmed throughout the many household interviews I conducted in 2007 in 
the relocation camp of Kayu Tiga. It was striking to observe how in daytime, 
this camp was primarily inhabited by women and the elderly, while young and 
adult men were almost totally absent.     
 
In the meantime, many of the pasar kaget in the Christian areas that were 
established throughout the kerusuhan such as the ones in Belakang Soya and 
Batu Meja were still at place during my last field visit in the summer of 2008, 
although their size had obviously decreased compared to my first visit in 
2004. Conducting interviews at these markets throughout 2007, it was 
obvious that these sellers held very much on to these markets despite some 
                                                                                                                                           
did no fear direct physical threats, many still considered this as a somewhat hostile 
place where they do not feel at ease.  
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notable economic disadvantages. For instance, the majority of petty traders I 
spoke to at these markets bought their vegetables, fruits and fish at middlemen 
in Mardika. This meant that their transportation cost for bringing their food to 
their market place was higher compared to the petty traders at Mardika. This 
slightly increased the price of their products. Moreover, they only attracted 
customers who lived at walking distance from their market while the sellers at 
Mardika had a wide range of customers due to the proximity of the transport 
terminal who brought people from all over the city to Mardika. Also, all of 
them admitted that the profits they made were higher throughout the 
kerusuhan as they had lost many customers since the ending of the conflict. 
Yet, these petty traders also stated that they saw this as their sole possibility to 
earn some income. Therefore, the constant rumors about the closing down of 
their market by the city government, were a constant worry. Unfortunately, I 
never managed to interview government officials responsible for the 
regulation of markets in the city of Ambon. Therefore, it is impossible to give 
the ‘exact’ story about the government plans in this issue. In July 2008 
however, many informal market stalls on the market of Mardika were 
destroyed in an effort to smoothen the traffic to the transport terminal.7
                                                          
7 Important in this regard is the fact that Ambon won several times the title of the 
most clean city in Indonesia in the nineties. This contrasts the current outlook of the 
city in which many areas are packed with informal businesses which often cause 
traffic jams and which are by many Ambonese considered as dirty (kotor). It looks as 
if the city government has the plan to gradually eradicate these ‘dirty places’.  
 There 
was a general expectancy that the same would happen for the market stalls 
that were situated in Belakang Soya and Batu Meja. Apparently, the reason 
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this had not happened yet was the resistance encountered by many Christian 
market women and the fear of the city government to provoke tensions by 
violently removing the stalls. Anticipating to this expected move that many of 
the pasar kaget in the Christian part of the city will be abolished in the near 
future, the city government already decided to establish a new market for 
these Christian petty traders. The popularity of this market, called Tagalaja, is 
limited. While the markets in Belakang Soya and Batu Meja are still situated 
along a so-called jalan raya, this Tagalaja market can only be reached through 
a small alleyway. Moreover, in contrast to Mardika, the market is not situated 
near a busy transport terminal and transportation cost is high considering that 
these petty traders still have to buy their food crops from agents situated in 
Mardika. Therefore, as can be derived from the picture underneath, business is 
not particularly thriving in Tagalaja and the market stalls provided by the 
government largely remain empty. Even in case the markets in Belakang Soya 
and Batu Meja would be abolished, selling at this markets was not considered 
a viable option for the majority of traders.   
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The largely empty Tagalaja market (July 2008) 
 
 
7.4. Conclusion: downward social mobility and prestige 
 
The world of the Ambonese and the Muslim ethnic migrants had few 
junctures in urban environments during the New Order. While many BBM 
were involved in the informal economy, autochthonous Ambonese searched 
for a more ‘secure job’ through formalized wage labour either in the private 
economy or in the state bureaucracy. These case studies illustrate how these 
two worlds have increasingly become intertwined because the conflict 
induced a process in which Ambonese were forced to search for alternative 
income generation strategies in insecure and informal economies that before 
the conflict were dominated by Muslim ethnic migrants. This was further 
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enforced by some of the spatial transformations that occurred throughout the 
kerusuhan. Although most of the Christians who entered the informal 
economy were employed as blue collar labourers or were simply unemployed 
and therefore belonged to the lower class of society, this transformation meant 
a bitter fall in terms of prestige and is experienced as a real downward social 
mobility. As a Christian tricycle driver told: ‘the conflict all made us equals’. 
Another sector in which this loss in prestige is particularly felt is garbage 
collection. Before the conflict, these ‘dirty jobs’ that are very low in prestige 
were solely done by BBM. Since the start of the conflict however Ambonese 
Christians have become involved in collecting, recycling or sorting garbage.   
 
Remarkably, this vigorous economic competition at the lower class level of 
society is both religiously and ethnically framed. A complaint regularly heard 
among many Christian becak drivers is that they no longer possess the 
networks to become ambtenaar and therefore have to earn an income in 
underpaid casual employment. For instance, some of them complained that 
their current downward social mobility is due to the so-called ‘orang Pelauw’, 
by which they refer to a clique of powerful Muslim political leaders coming 
from the village of Pelauw on the island of Saparua. In this narrative, this 
clique is responsible for the fact that young Christians no longer have a 
chance of entering the state bureaucracy because practices of KKN 
(Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism) favour Muslims. Importantly, with this 
narrative they explicitly indicate that the religious tensions evident in the 
build up to the conflict are currently still alive in Ambon. In the meantime, the 
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economic frustrations that are felt among many Ambonese Christians are 
often voiced by ethnic migrants and particularly the aggressiveness by which 
they try to push out ‘local people’ out of this informal economy, thereby 
depriving them of their last option to generate income.  
 
Due to this downward social mobility of autochthonous Ambonese, classic 
fault lines that existed in Ambonese society before 1999 are being redefined. 
During the New Order, religion essentially functioned as an identity marker to 
control access to the state bureaucracy. This serves as one of the main 
explanations why the conflict in Ambon was religiously framed as group 
mobilization in the lead up to the violence was organized around contentious 
state access (Van Klinken, 2007). As state access was defined by an implicit 
distribution code between a Muslim and a Christian Ambonese power block, 
the overall conflict ensuing from this struggle was also organized through 
these same conflicting religious identities. On the other hand, at the lower 
class bazaar level of society, the trust networks that regulated the economy 
were largely ethnic in nature. As a consequence, skirmishes with a strong 
ethnic connotation have always been commonplace in the city of Ambon. 
Often these fights were provoked by economic competition between BBM 
and autochthonous Ambonese and the inability of unemployed Ambonese 
youngsters to penetrate some of the informal businesses that were dominated 
by the BBM. Already before the conflict, Ambonese youngsters were willing 
to take up jobs in the informal economy. This was not because of the 
attractiveness of these jobs but rather due to economic hardship and the fact 
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that Ambon before 1999 was already characterized by an exceptional high 
level of officially recorded unemployment of 21,4 % (Mawdsley et.al. 2005). 
As our two case studies have illustrated, due to the high-intensity conflict, 
some incentives were created for Ambonese to penetrate these informal 
economies. First, the BBM had to flee to Muslim neighbourhoods or to 
neighbouring Sulawesi and a further economic downfall made the search for 
alternative sources of income even more pressing. As a consequence, the 
traditional ethnic segmentation of this lower class informal economy has been 
challenged by the penetration of downwardly mobile rival groups such as 
Ambonese Christians, and to a lesser extent, Ambonese Muslims. 
Similar to the Ambonese Christians, many Muslim ethnic migrants have a 
feeling that they are the ones who are the ‘losers’ of the conflict as they 
currently face vigorous competition on economic terrains they nearly 
monopolized before the violence. This did not directly result in a loss of 
prestige as the BBM already were at the bottom of the societal spectrum 
anyway. This, however, seriously decreases their financial profits in these 
informal businesses. In the Christian part of the island, they are largely 
pushed out and it does not look as if they will recapture these businesses in 
the near future. As has been illustrated, this does not immediately pose a 
problem for informal petty trade but is particularly felt in the sector of 
informal transport activities. Among many BBM there is a feeling that they 
are being invaded on their own economic terrain and that the involvement of 
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new actors in petty trading and private transport is the principal reason for 
their current economic difficulties.  
 
 VIII 
 
 
Repairing a broken order. 
Forced migration, adat and a purified present1
 
 
 
In Ambon, a revitalization of adat is shaped by a dynamic aiming to induce a 
reconciliation between the distrustful Christian and Muslim communities. 
This chapter illustrates how this particular resurgence of adat is reflected in 
the way indigenous communities cope with spatial relocation resulting from 
the recent kerusuhan. As has been illustrated in chapter 5, adat can be defined 
as customary land tenure that is deployed in relation to issues of village 
governance and competition for access to resources. This deployment of adat 
in post-Suharto Indonesia is closely related with a decentralization move in 
which the regions gained more autonomy in matters of resource management. 
Meanwhile, part of the attraction of adat also lies in its evocation of ideals of 
purity, authenticity and tradition (Biezeveld 2004, 2007, Davidson and 
Henley, 2007, Li 2007, 2000). The redeployment of adat in Ambon, switches 
between these two characteristics. On the one hand, it has been used in an 
utterly ethnicized sense, serving the political and economic interests of 
indigenous adat law communities. On the other hand, some of the values that 
                                                          
1 The outline of this chapter is based on the article: ‘Repairing a broken order. Forced 
migration, adat and a purified present on the island of Ambon, Indonesia’, Ethnology 
(accepted) 
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are ascribed to adat such as purity, unity, tradition and authenticity also 
feature prominently in Ambon.2
 
 
More in particular, there has been a specific interpretation of adat in Ambon 
due to its close connection with strategies of reconciliation (Frost 2004, 
Bräuchler 2007). There exists a strong belief across broad sections of 
Ambonese society that adat needs to be revived for two related purposes. 
Adat should reconcile a religiously fractured society, according to this view, 
but in the meantime has to stand as a defense against future attempts by 
external actors to pit Ambonese against each other through religious fault 
lines. Within this belief, the revival of adat has obtained a territorial 
interpretation among indigenous communities that have been relocated due to 
the recent inter-religious violence. Relocated indigenous communities in 
Ambon can be termed as communities in exile as they express feelings of 
territorial alienation and explicitly wish to return to the home village where 
they possess a genealogical relation to the land they lived on. Rather than 
following an economic agenda, this willingness to return expresses an urge to 
instate a renewed adat order and a purified present where mental and spatial 
religious segregation has been overcome. The return to the historical home 
village is therefore represented as a part of the overall project to restore an 
                                                          
2 A similar distinction has also been made by Cooley (1962: 2), almost 50 years ago. 
According to Cooley, adat in Ambon is used in two ways. First, in a very general way 
as a vestige of indigenous religion and secondly, it contains a more concrete 
customary usage 
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adat order based on ideals of authenticity and unity. Simply stated, the ‘back 
to adat’ belief has been translated into a ‘back to the adat home village’ idea.  
 
 
8.1. Life realities versus legal categories 
 
Assumptions about relocation being a durable and final solution to forced 
migration have greatly influenced the policy regarding internal displacement 
in Ambon. In those cases in which communities could not return to the place 
they were living before their forced expulsion, both the local government 
(Keputusan Gubernur Maluku, No.261, November 14, 2002) and international 
NGOs considered relocation as the end station of a cycle. This cycle started 
with the violent eviction of these populations, their time in an IDP camp and 
finally their permanent relocation to a neutral, one could almost say ‘normal’ 
environment. This meant two things. First, because Muslims have been 
relocated to Muslim territories and Christians to Christian territories, mono-
religious zones that became established throughout the kerusuhan have been 
enforced. Secondly, once relocated, these people became devoid of any 
further humanitarian assistance and were expected to become self-reliant. In 
short, relocated populations were no longer considered a problem for the 
government and aid agencies.   
 
In contrast to this static and legal interpretation of relocation as the end of the 
trip, in all four sites that have been studied, a different understanding of 
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relocation was discovered. In fact, the term relocation or the Indonesian 
counterpart relokasi only figures in policy documents provided by 
international NGOs and the local government and the term is hardly used 
among the relocated populations themselves. Rather, the term penungsi which 
is generally translated as refugee but in everyday language also includes the 
category of internally displaced person is used by these relocated people to 
describe themselves. Therefore, little distinction is made between the place 
one is currently living in and the time that was spent in IDP camps before the 
official relocation. While the term‘camp penungsi’ (refugee camp) is used to 
refer to these officially designated IDP camps, the term ‘tempat penungsi’ 
(refugee place) is commonly used to indicate the place these people are 
currently living. Camp in this sense is understood as something of a chaotic 
nature while a place is more orderly and consists of housing facilities of better 
quality. Yet, both places are labeled as ‘refugee’ and very few distinctions are 
made between the context of internal displacement and permanent relocation. 
The official name for these places, ‘tempat relokasi’ (relocation place) was 
not encountered once in the everyday language of these relocated populations. 
In other words, relocation is considered as an extension of a situation of 
forced migration and relocation in a legal sense is not followed by relocation 
in a mental sense.  
 
An important factor explaining this tenacity to the status of refugee in all four 
relocation sites is a feeling that injustice has been done to them. Throughout 
the conflict, officially obtaining the legal status of penungsi opened the door 
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to reconstruction funds in a region characterized by insecurity and economic 
decline. At the same time, claiming the status of refugee has always been 
contested as clear definitions of what exactly constitutes internal displacement 
were obscure and people who were not forced migrants by any standard tried 
to obtain access to these funds. Once this label of penungsi was officially 
obtained, many people were much attached to its status. Disassociating from 
this label and accepting a new context of relocation - which presumes a return 
to some sort of normality - means that one disassociates from the eventual 
reconstruction funds related to this status. However, as livelihood 
opportunities after relocation are particularly meager due to restrained access 
to arable land and an overall slow recovery of the economy after a period of 
steep decline, many people still think they have a legitimate right to these 
funds and feel abandoned by the government and NGOs. Moreover, a 
widespread perception that much of the refugee funds for the internally 
displaced coming from Jakarta ended up in the hands of local politicians and 
real estate companies has further fed the belief that one maintained a 
legitimate right to this humanitarian assistance.3
 
    
Holding on this ‘refugeeness’ and denying relocation also stands central in 
struggles to obtain access to lost property. Discussing access to land in all 
four relocation sites, one is immediately confronted with the central role still 
                                                          
3 Similar issues have been noted in other contexts such as war-torn Sri Lanka where 
attempts to register IDPs as ‘local citizens’ have failed because many of the IDPs 
feared that access to aid would be lost in this sense (Brun 2003: 386-387).   
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played by the home village and the fact that some of the lands and other 
property that have been left behind are not considered as lost. Disassociating 
from the status of refugee and accepting a new context of normality implies 
that one disassociates from the right to reclaim the property that has been 
taken over after forced migration. On the other hand, holding on to the status 
of refugee implies that one still claims rights over these properties. For 
instance, many Butonese living in the camp of Kate-Kate were frustrated that 
many of the land and houses they considered as rightly theirs were taken over 
during their flight. This was also the case for the camp of Kayu Tiga where 
the lack of compensation for property - in particular housing facilities - that 
was taken over throughout the conflict was a source of enduring frustration. 
Therefore, the refusal to accept a new context of relocation/normality can to a 
large extent be explained by this feeling of deprivation in which relocation is 
considered a defeat to a perpetual struggle of reclaiming lost property. 
 
 
8.2. The preservation of a communal identity 
 
Despite this tenacity to the status of refugee in all four relocation sites, some 
considerable differences could be encountered between these different sites. 
Among the two relocated indigenous adat law communities in Tanah Putih 
and Liang, this was inextricably linked with ideas about return to the place 
these people were living before the conflict. Moreover one witnessed a much 
stronger preservation of a communal identity compared to the relocated non-
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adat communities in Kate-Kate and Kayu Tiga. This should primarily be 
understood in a negative way as these adat communities express a feeling of 
alienation and a sense they are currently living in a place that is a historical 
anomaly to them. 
 
While the term penungsi among relocated non-indigenous communities was 
primarily understood in a legal sense, among the relocated adat communities, 
this also reflects an overall context of alienation. The term expresses a feeling 
of being driven out and an indication that the place one is currently living is in 
fact an anomaly, a historical and geographical incorrectness. Revealing in this 
regard are the connections that are made with the conflict in the Middle East. 
Although references to the Israeli-Palestinian violence could be witnessed in 
different contexts in Ambon, these links obtained a particular interpretation 
among relocated indigenous communities. For instance, the Christians in 
Tanah Putih often stated that they felt akin to the people of Israel having been 
driven out of their home lands by a Muslim aggressor. These sorts of 
pronouncements expressing a feeling of alienation and being uprooted were 
barely present among non-adat relocated communities where the primary 
concerns were about the dire circumstances in which they had to live. Closely 
related to this observation is a stronger preservation of  a communal identity 
based on the inhabitation of the village where these two indigenous 
communities lived before their forced eviction. This is seen in the way these 
communities wish to represent themselves by a name that includes their 
former village. The community living in Iha explicitly stated they prefer to 
VIII: Repairing a broken order 
 
226 
 
address their new place as Iha-Liang. The same goes for Hila-Tanah Putih 
where people demanded that in coming to their place, I should tell the minibus  
drivers to stop at Hila-Tanah Putih rather than Tanah Putih or Tawiri. 
Interestingly, even T-shirts are made and worn within the camp that depict 
‘Hila. The White Land’ (‘White Land’ is the English translation for Tanah 
Putih). Questioning the reasons behind the making of these T-shirts, it was 
explained that it was of utmost importance that people from the surrounding 
area would know and remember them as people coming from Hila.  
 
 
Hila-Tanah Putih/Tawiri (July 2008) 
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Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that their relocation is linked to 
a loss of prestige. Because of their forced migration and subsequent 
relocation, adat communities find themselves in a subordinate position, no 
longer being able to claim a historical relationship to the territory they are 
living on. Apart from the legal and socio-economic consequences I elaborated 
on in chapter 7, this means a considerable decline in prestige. Illustrative in 
this regard is the often cited fear in the camp of Iha-Liang of being viewed in 
the same light as the migrant Butonese settlements in Liang. In particular, the 
notion that some of the typical stereotypes regarding the Butonese 
communities such as their supposed dirtiness and aggression would be 
ascribed to their community was a constant worry. In this regard, there is a 
strong sense that their dignity as an indigenous adat community is affected 
and the preservation of their indigenous identity should be understood as a 
detachment from the surrounding non-Ambonese migrant communities.  
 
Moreover, in Iha-Liang and Hila-Tanah Putih, people wished to preserve the 
unity of their community. This was not the case in the other two relocation 
sites where this strong collective identity was hardly present and people 
definitely made no efforts to preserve this collective identity. For instance, 
some Protestant Batu Merah inhabitants who were relocated to Kayu Tiga 
openly stated that their primary aim to claim a house in Kayu Tiga was to sell 
this house and use this money to start living in another place. As a 
consequence, people not originating from Batu Merah increasingly came to 
live in Kayu Tiga and this relocation site transforms into a normal Christian 
VIII: Repairing a broken order 
 
228 
 
neighborhood at the outskirts of Ambon city, thereby gradually losing its Batu 
Merah connection. The situation of the Butonese living in Kate-Kate is 
slightly different. Here I did not encounter clear examples of Eerie people 
who had the intention to sell their house with the aim to start living in another 
place. Yet, the Butonese from Eerie only constituted a small minority in the 
whole camp of Kate-Kate.  This is a different picture compared to Hila-Tanah 
Putih and Iha-Liang. In these relocation sites, there were no people living who 
originated from another village. Moreover, there were explicit efforts to 
preserve the unity of the community. For instance, in Hila-Tanah Putih, a 
constant worry was the fact that newlywed couples would not have their own 
house within the site and would be forced to live somewhere else. It was 
feared that, in the long term, this could mean the end of their unity and 
collective identity as the Christians originating from Hila. Therefore, 
throughout 2007, different new houses were built at this site in order to 
provide all newlywed couples their own house.  
 
 
8.3. Return to the home village 
 
Related to this maintenance of a communal identity among relocated adat 
communities and the characterization of living in an incorrect place, was a 
prominent determination to return to the place one lived before the outbreak 
of the conflict. As I explained, the former village one lived in before the 
eviction still plays a central role and much of the property people possessed 
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there is not considered lost. Yet, the non-adat communities primarily stated 
they wanted to reclaim lost property to be able to sell their lost possessions 
but a real discourse of return was not encountered on these sites. The state of 
the people on these sites can therefore be understood as being ‘in transition’. 
Whilst there is no acceptance yet of the new context of relocation/normality, it 
can be expected that this tenacious attachment to the status of refugee will be 
loosened once compensation has been awarded which is considered 
proportionate to the losses endured and the prospect for more viable and 
durable livelihood opportunities increases. Many people stated that they can 
reconcile themselves with their new habitat but they want fair compensation 
and the prospect of a viable and decent life. One can therefore imagine that a 
process of re-territorialization in which new communal identities are 
constructed within a new area will relatively quickly develop in these sites. 
Moreover, one noticed a growing mental alienation with regards to the place 
these people were living before the conflict. For instance, people in Kayu Tiga 
explicitly told that they no longer recognize the area they grew up in since so 
many new people have come to live in Batu Merah since the beginning of the 
kerusuhan. They no longer have the feeling Batu Merah is their original 
neighbourhood. In other words, they perceive the nature of this 
neighbourhood as fundamentally different compared to the time they still 
lived there. During the interviews I conducted in Kayu Tiga on different 
aspects of displacement, the story often went that Muslims who came to live 
in Batu Merah during the conflict were radicalized Muslims with strong anti-
Christian feelings. In their view, this has altered the tolerant nature of their 
VIII: Repairing a broken order 
 
230 
 
former neighbourhood.4
 
 Proof of this is found in the fact that the area was the 
site of a strong Laskar Jihad presence during the conflict. A visual expression 
of the changing nature of their place, at least through the eyes of the 
Christians in Kayu Tiga, can be found in the wearing of the burka by some 
women nowadays in Batu Merah. Even if it would be possible to start living 
in Batu Merah, many people stated they would not feel at ease and therefore 
preferred to remain in Kayu Tiga or another place.  
On the sites of Hila-Tanah Putih and Iha-Liang on the other hand, narratives 
of return to a historical home territory remain omnipresent despite the fact that 
both communities were relocated much earlier than the non-adat 
communities. There are no intentions to reclaim lost land with the aim of 
selling it, but rather the objective is to return. In Hila-Tanah Putih, this idea of 
return was somewhat contested with some people openly stating that their 
relocation is permanent and that it is no use to dream about ever returning to 
Hila. Yet, a majority still considered return to Hila as a priority and could not 
imagine their community would have to stay forever in Hila-Tanah Putih. 
This contestation can partly be explained by the fact that their status as an 
adat community is not entirely pure and is subject to divergent interpretations 
both within and outside this community. Suffice to say however that some 
families within this Christian community definitely belong to the indigenous 
                                                          
4 I wish to stress that I translate the feelings of many Christians living in Kayu Tiga 
rather than my own opinion about these matters. See also Duncan (2008) on return in 
North Maluku.  
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adat law community of Hila and some families have very close ties with adat 
law communities due to intermarriages in Hila and Kaitetu through which 
they could obtain ownership rights over land. Furthermore, these people lived 
for some 300 years in Hila/Kaitetu, giving at least the feeling they possess a 
historical, adat relationship with the territory they were living on. On the 
other hand, this community has never been part of the adat system of village 
governance in Hila. 
 
On the site of Iha-Liang, the idea of permanent relocation was totally out of 
the question and discussing this issue is largely taboo. Closely related to this 
is a fear that due to their relocation, their lands will be taken over by other 
communities and this would irrevocably lead to the permanent loss of their 
adat status. Borrowing this term from Lisa Mallki (1995a, 1995b), these 
communities can be considered as living ‘in exile’. In her work, Malkki 
compared Burundese refugees in Tanzania who lived in an urban setting with 
refugees living in a camp. Among the camp refugees, a collective identity 
developed of being a nation ‘in exile’. The town refugees on the other hand 
developed a more cosmopolitan, individual identity and were better integrated 
in local society. To a certain extent, these findings by Malkki reflect what was 
found among the internally displaced in Ambon. Although the word 
cosmopolitan is probably slightly exaggerated, the relocated non-indigenous 
communities showed a great willingness to integrate in the new place they 
were living, albeit livelihood opportunities were scarce. Also, the issue of 
their common descent and a related collective identity was less present 
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compared to the relocated indigenous communities. In short, they behaved 
more pragmatic and individually oriented compared to their indigenous 
counterparts. The displaced indigenous communities on the other hand can be 
compared to the Burundese camp refugees as being ‘in exile’. At first, this 
denotes some sort of ‘aestethicizable realm’ (Malkki 1995b: 513), including 
characteristics described above such as alienation, distance and loss. Being in 
exile is also inextricably linked to the notion of returning home. As some 
people in Iha-Liang stated, they feel like sojourners on a land that is not theirs. 
Yet, despite this determination to return, there seemed to be little concrete 
implementation of this plan. Conversely, discussions about the reclaiming of 
property with the aim to sell among relocated non-indigenous communities 
quickly turned concrete. People talked about strategies to obtain certain legal 
documents, lobbying high ranking civil servants or politicians or in the case of 
Kayu Tiga even directly asking me to search in Dutch archives to seek proof 
of the legitimate ownership of land by the GPM on which most Protestants 
lived in Batu Merah. When trying to unravel the strategies people in Hila-
Tanah Putih or Iha-Liang had in mind in order to return home, answers 
remained elusive and most of the time, this was framed as a struggle that 
could take generations. For instance, when people in Hila-Tanah Putih 
compared their own situation to the people of Israel, this not only expressed a 
feeling of being driven out of a historical homeland but also referred to the 
decade long struggle it will take to reclaim this home land. Both in Hila-
Tanah Putih and Iha-Liang, people stated that at best it would be future 
generations that could reclaim their adat land. Some farmers in Hila-Tanah 
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Putih even admitted that in this regard their displacement could turn out to be 
crucial to the economic survival of their children in the longer run. As they 
stated, it is essential to keep the land of their home village in some sort of 
quarantine whereby they retrieve the ownership rights but they do not 
cultivate or inhabit these lands. After a few decades, when people would have 
forgotten about the religious tensions and land scarcity would be more 
pressing than today, their children could take over the place they formerly 
lived in. This would enable them to provide their children with new land for 
their houses and agricultural cultivation while they would remain in Hila-
Tanah Putih. This was seen as the sole opportunity to give their children a 
decent livelihood in agriculture and to not let their children move to the city of 
Ambon or leave the island in search of job opportunities.  
 
However, it would be a mistake to reduce return to an economic strategy. For 
instance, in the camp of Iha-Liang everybody agreed that livelihood 
opportunities were better in their site of relocation and return would likely 
result in the impoverishment of the community. In Iha on Saparua, the 
community indeed possessed ownership rights over land due to their 
indigenous status but the amount of land that could be accessed was extremely 
limited. Yet, despite some economic improvements, narratives about  
returning to Saparua remained omnipresent and seriously considering a 
permanent residence in Iha-Liang was taboo. Remarkably, some informal 
discussions with children who are too young to remember the violent 
expulsion of their community in 2000 revealed that they had a very idealized 
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notion of their village in Saparua as being filled with fertile land and a sea full 
of fish without ever having been there. Some even thought it quite puzzling 
why their parents did not go back to this place considering all the advantages 
that would be encountered there.   
 
While this distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous relocated 
communities in Ambon mirrors some of the contrasts found by Malkki 
between camp and town refugees, the explanation is fundamentally different. 
According to Malkki, the development of a collective ‘in exile’ identity 
among the camp refugees has to be situated within their forced migration 
(Malkki 1995a: 16). In other words, it are the differences in displacement 
(town versus camp) that explain the divergent development of these identities. 
In the case of Ambon however, these differences cannot be situated within the 
displacement itself as all four communities ended up in quite similar sites 
dispersed over the island. Rather, the contrasts encountered in Ambon should 
be explained by the differences in societal status (indigenous versus non-
indigenous) these communities already possessed before their forced 
migration. 
 
 
8.4. Instating a purified present 
 
Rather than a feasible plan, narratives about returning to an idealized ‘home 
territory’ should be understood as an ideal reflecting a more general discourse 
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in Ambon in search of an order and common ground that transcends religious 
differences. Among broad parts of the Ambonese population, government and 
local NGOs, there exists a sincere belief that adat has the potential to build 
bridges between the Christian and Muslim community by stressing a common 
identity based on Ambonese adat. Illustrative in this regard is the resurgence 
of pela which are traditional inter-village alliances between two or more 
villages. Some of these alliances already existed before the first colonial 
intrusions in the 16th century. Although different sorts of pela can be 
distinguished, they all basically are mechanisms of reciprocal mutual help in 
times of need between a few villages, independent from their religious 
background (Bartels 1977, 2000). For centuries, these pela relationships 
remained intact and throughout colonial rule, they were often used as 
solidarity mechanisms among Moluccans against the foreign, colonial rulers. 
Due to these threats from colonial expansion, many of these pela relationships 
were even set up throughout the period of Dutch domination (Bartels 1977: 
134-140). From the late 1970s onwards however, these mechanisms started 
losing relevance (Bartels 2000). One of the reasons was a purification of 
religion in which Christian and Muslim religious leaders increasingly 
condemned all things ‘traditional’ such as pela as mere superstition. For 
instance, throughout the eighties, different academics from the local Unpatti 
university researching and promoting local culture, were threatened different 
times being thrown out of the GPM for their interest in adat. Yet, since the 
end of the conflict through so-called ‘bikin panas pela’ (heating up the pela) 
ceremonies, these mechanisms have been increasingly used to bring about a 
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reconciliation between Christians and Muslims, despite the fact that these 
village alliances were never set up for this purpose (Bartels 2000).  
 
Apart from this aim of healing wounds in a religiously fractured society, the 
resurgence of adat also fits within a broader, more long-term vision of 
preventing future conflicts, in particular the sort of religious communal 
violence witnessed recently. Within this idea, adat - and in particular a 
common identity based on adat - has to stand as a defense against external 
influences that want to divide Ambonese society. This idea is strongly related 
with the provocateur hypothesis I explained in chapter 3. Generally, these 
provocateurs are considered to be military elites with links to the old New 
Order regime and the inner circle around Suharto. Interestingly, in many 
cases, these actors are placed alongside those of the Dutch colonial era. This 
idea that alien provocateurs in 1999 managed to incite Christians and Muslims 
against each other is often portrayed as a prolongation of the Dutch politics of 
divide and rule in which the Ambonese made the same mistake of letting 
foreign influences divide them. Many people expressed the opinion that the 
whole Ambonese history is characterized by external manipulation in order to 
extract the rich resources in the region and the Ambonese have always been 
too stupid not to unite against these divide and rule tactics.    
 
Since the end of the conflict, many people say they have learned from these 
mistakes of the past and will no longer allow external influences to pit them 
against each other. As both local NGO activists, traditional leaders and 
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ordinary peasants stated, from now on the Ambonese will have to do it by 
themselves and search for common ground beyond religious differences. The 
guiding principle of this view is found in adat. In this regard, the resurgence 
of adat in Ambon reflects a strange mix of conservative elements presented in 
a future-oriented agenda. There is a tendency to claim that the purity of 
Ambonese society has too often been intruded on - one could almost say 
contaminated - by alien influences, largely explaining the many wars in 
Ambonese history. As a consequence, Ambonese society needs to be purified 
from these external influences and a traditional Ambonese order needs to be 
restored in order to avoid future conflict. This somewhat conservative 
response can also be perceived in the resurgence of the viewing of adat 
through a generational framework. In this discourse, the lack of knowledge 
about adat among youngsters is seen as one of the key reasons why they 
could be easily mobilized into violent conflict. Therefore, a form of external 
modernity to which particularly young people tend to be receptive needs to be 
replaced by a more rigid and ‘correct’ knowledge of local culture and history 
in order to avoid future troubles.  
 
Yet, at the same time, it would be wrong to denigrate this resurgence of adat 
as a return to the past. It fits within a future-oriented strategy and many 
Ambonese see it as the way to continue after the fall of the New Order and the 
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end of the conflict.5
 
 In this regard, the revitalization of adat primarily aims to 
install a purified present rather than a purified past. As Frost (2004) points 
out, the resurgence of adat in the Moluccan archipelago takes multiple forms, 
varying between essentialist notions about reinstating a true ‘historically 
correct’ adat and more flexible approaches aiming to re-imagine tradition. 
Yet, in relation to adat as a tool of reconciliation, static interpretations were 
marginal and most people agreed that adat had to serve as an inspiration to 
search for common ground in the future. Therefore, the deployment of adat in 
terms of peace building is largely uncontested and has received an almost 
talismanic status in Ambonese society.  
 
8.5. The territorial repairing of a broken order 
 
Discourses about return among these two relocated indigenous adat 
communities, mirrors this overall wish to mentally and spatially reinstate a 
natural and harmonious adat order. This ideal is not only about the spatial 
reparation of a pre-conflict order that has been heavily disturbed since the 
outbreak of violence. Rather, adat needs to be revitalized in a much more 
radical manner as the loss of adat throughout the New Order is one of the 
factors which explains the inter-religious violence which occurred once this 
                                                          
5 This is particularly the case for indigenous Ambonese (Muslim and Christian). 
These opinions about adat as reconciliation are less present among non-indigenous 
communities.  
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New Order ended. Adat was already considered weak and the conflict and 
subsequent forced migration have only further reinforced this weakness. An 
essential step to halting this process is the return of relocated adat 
communities to the place where they possess a genealogical adat relationship 
with the land. The ideal of adat assumes some sort of geographical order in 
which indigenous communities possess a genealogical and historical 
relationship with a certain territory. In addition, the attachment to return 
should be framed by ideals of unity. In the case of Iha-Liang, this is closely 
related to the wish to be reunited as a community. Due to arguments over 
where to relocate in 2002, this community has split up with one part going to 
Iha-Liang and one part going to Sepa on the island of Seram. Therefore, their 
relocation is linked to the breaking up of their community and the loss of their 
bapak raja who decided to go to Seram. This was a traumatic experience and 
left the community feeling deserted, one could almost say orphaned. The 
desire to repatriate is linked to the reunion of their community as a whole adat 
community and many people even state that return to Iha-Saparua only makes 
sense if the whole community can be reunited. Interestingly, this recent break 
up is historically aligned with events which began in the 17th century when the 
old Iha kingdom took up arms against the Dutch colonizers. Numerous wars 
against the colonial oppressor not only divided the Iha kingdom into Christian 
and Muslim parts but also led to large population movements in which 
different parts of the kingdom’s population decided to relocate to different 
places in the region. The expulsion and further division of the Muslim Iha 
community who lived at Saparua is lined up with these previous population 
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movements and a further breakup of the once mighty Iha kingdom. Moreover, 
motives behind the historical break up are ascribed to external forces. In this 
community, the idea that alien provocateurs incited the conflict - just like the 
Dutch did in the past - is also omnipresent. Return to the home territory in 
Saparua therefore stands as a firm denial to let alien influences further divide 
them. 
   
These ideals about unity also have an inter-religious connotation in which 
removal from the genealogical adat territory is understood as a loss of all 
sorts of inter-religious solidarity mechanisms. Typical in this regard are the 
constant references to gotong royong which are practices of inter-religious 
reciprocal helpfulness that go beyond religious fault lines and are considered a 
vital part of adat. A typical example of gotong royong is the 
construction/reparation of the roof of the mosque by a Christian community 
and vice versa. These sorts of practices were often cited among the people of 
Hila-Tanah Putih as proof of their integration which transcended religious 
identities in the area they lived in before their forced eviction. Due to their 
forced eviction and subsequent relocation, these gotong royong practices have 
gone lost which is deeply felt as symbolizing the mental estrangement 
between the Christian community of Hila-Tanah Putih and their former 
neighbouring Muslim villages.6
                                                          
6 Just like in the case of customary ownership rights which are gradually being 
regained since 2005/2006, this can also happen with these gotong royong practices. 
At the time of research however, these mechanisms were not yet reinstated.   
 Similar ideals of inter-religious unity and 
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harmony - more particularly the existence of different social security 
mechanisms the Muslim community of Iha enjoyed with neighbouring 
Christian villages on the island of Saparua - were cited in Iha-Liang. An 
example includes the picking up of the cloves. As explained, the village of Iha 
in Saparua only had limited land. Therefore, an agreement existed with 
surrounding Christian villages that the people of Iha were allowed to pick up 
cloves for selling when these had fallen on the ground during certain parts of 
the year. Another example is the free cutting of coconut during certain parts of 
the season in the village of Ihamahu as vast farming land was particularly 
meager in Iha. The disruption of these mutual social security mechanisms has 
left a scar that cannot solely be understood in a purely economic sense. 
Rather, this fits into a larger picture about the disruption of unity by the 
violence and the fact that relocation - understood here as permanent 
displacement - has only further reinforced this disruption. If this disruption is 
not restored, people fear their children will ultimately forget about these inter-
religious solidarity mechanisms considered as essential to preventing future 
violence. Yet, there is more at stake than just repairing the solidarity 
mechanism that existed prior to the conflict. As people explained, these 
relationships based on adat were not that strong any more before 1999. A 
typical example that is referred to is their relationship with Ihamahu, a 
neighbouring Christian brotherhood village descending from the same old Iha 
kingdom. The weakening of inter-religious ties based on adat serves as an 
explanation for the people of Iha-Liang for why this neighbouring village did 
not protect them when they were attacked by other Christian villages. In other 
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words, the weakening of adat ties between these two villages serves as one of 
the explanations why the Muslim community of Iha was forcibly evicted. 
Therefore, rather than a restoration of the pre-conflict adat relationship, it is 
the whole relationship as such that needs to be revitalized. The first 
prerequisite in this process therefore is the return to the historical home 
village on Saparua. 
 
 
8.6. Conclusion 
 
Most authors agree that adat contains two related meanings. First, adat can be 
understood as a tool of socio-political bargaining in order to access resources 
and second, as a broader ideal of unity and harmony. Despite this dual 
meaning, in particular the revitalization of adat in its first, politicized sense 
has been stressed in many publications. Since the end of the New Order in 
Indonesia in 1998, certain opportunities have emerged to deploy adat in 
socio-political struggles, in particular at the province and district level. Less 
attention so far has been paid to adat as an ideal of unity, harmony and a 
blueprint how an ideal society should look like. In particular in environments 
characterized by high-intensity violence, this second meaning of adat proofs 
to be omnipresent as this serves as an inspiration to reconcile a fractured 
society. Obviously, this fits within a wider, almost worldwide, discourse in 
which local culture is increasingly applied in efforts to bring about peace 
building and reconciliation (Lederach 1997). Also in Ambon, this belief that 
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cohesion and order based on a common adat needs to be restored is present. 
This is particularly the case in the way relocated indigenous communities 
cope with their forced relocation. In four relocation sites that have been 
studied, it was noted how relocation in a legal sense was not followed by 
relocation in a mental sense. Although relocation was considered as the end of 
a cycle by the local government and aid agencies, these communities did not 
accept this new context of ‘normality’. Instead, the place they live is referred 
to as a refugee place.  
 
Elaborating on the attachment to this ‘refugeeness’, some remarkable 
differences could be encountered in the four different sites. Among the two 
relocated non-indigenous communities, the tenacity to the status of refugee 
should be understood as part of a deliberate strategy to reclaim lost property. 
Many of these forcibly migrated populations perceive themselves as the losers 
of the conflict because most of their property has been taken over throughout 
their eviction. Therefore, constant attempts are made to reclaim these lost 
properties. Moreover, because livelihood opportunities are limited in most of 
these sites due to restrained access to agricultural land and an overall slow 
economic recovery, many people still think they have a legitimate right to 
reconstruction funds. Accepting a new context of relocation/normality would 
imply that people distance from these rights. Yet, people did not express a 
willingness to return to the place they lived before the outbreak of the conflict. 
For this reason, these communities can be seen as being in transition.  
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Although similar frustrations could be encountered among the two relocated 
indigenous adat communities, narratives about return were omnipresent. 
Among these communities, there exists a deep-rooted feeling that one is 
living in a historically incorrect place. This was particularly apparent in Iha-
Liang where people openly stated that despite notable economic 
improvements, they do not feel at home and discussing the issue of staying in 
Liang was even considered not done. Therefore, these communities can be 
seen as living in exile as they express feelings of alienation and loss, remain 
strongly attached to a pre-conflict communal identity and consider return as 
imperative. Rather than a feasible plan for economic improvement, these 
narratives about returning to an idealized ‘home territory’ should be 
understood as an ideal reflecting a more general discourse in Ambon in search 
of a common ground based on adat that transcends religious differences. 
Return therefore mirrors an overall wish to mentally and spatially reinstate a 
natural and harmonious adat order that needs to be restored in order to avoid 
future violence.  
 IX 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
It is a regularly voiced conviction among Ambonese Christians and Muslims 
working in peace building and reconciliation that all Ambonese people were 
subjected to loss and suffering throughout the conflict. Ultimately, it was this 
shared suffering which made people put an end to the inter-religious 
hostilities. This belief is closely related to the search for a common identity, in 
this case founded on Ambonese adat, in order to overcome religious 
differences. As a young Muslim Ambonese woman who works on trauma 
counseling among children stated: ‘We started to realize it was us, the 
Ambonese people, who were losing and the others (considered the Javanese 
military in this conversation) who were on the winning hand.’ This 
dissertation has illustrated that underneath this superficial rhetoric, lies a more 
complex picture. Most, if not all, Ambonese have indeed suffered throughout 
the recent inter-religious communal warfare. Nevertheless, this constant 
emphasis on the ‘suffering-aspect’ misses the point that Ambonese were and 
still are agents shaping, interpreting, ending, imagining and coping with the 
conflict in different and complex ways. This agency-oriented perspective runs 
through this dissertation like a red thread and differs from most studies on 
communal violence in Ambon, which generally attempt to understand this 
conflict from a structuralist and top-down perspective.  
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At a first level, I related this agency-oriented perspective to the question of 
how and why ‘ordinary folk’ engaged in or disengaged from the conflict. 
More particularly, I studied the reasons why and how people were expelled 
from certain areas, and why many of them could not return to these places 
once the high-intensity violence subsumed. Through this indirect angle of 
forced migration, I have attempted to illustrate how conflict brought about 
particular opportunities to access space by chasing away religious minorities. 
These expulsions could often be traced back to long-term communal tensions, 
in many cases already dating back to colonial times. This emptied space was 
then used for farming or certain activities within the informal economy. This 
observation partly explains the profound and rapid escalation in time and 
space of this conflict and criticizes images of religious zealots being driven by 
irrational fervor or the naïve Ambonese simply being provoked by external 
provocateurs. At the same time, this observation warns against explanations 
which view the violence solely as a consequence of national, political changes 
after the fall of Suharto in May 1998, despite this being a crucial turning 
point. Instead, there are overlapping narratives as to when ‘the conflict’ 
started and these narratives do not solely relate to the question of contested 
state access. Moreover, looking through the recent communal conflict through 
this indirect perspective of forced migration refutes images of an all-out 
religious war. Instead, many people disengaged from the violence or even 
protected religious minorities at risk.  
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These findings are closely linked to the successful attempts that have been 
made to legally enforce these expulsions through the formalization of an 
exclusive interpretation of customary adat law. New land legislation in which 
indigenous adat law communities are recognized as the only legitimate 
owners of the land have been actively used to block processes of return or the 
reclaiming of lost property by non-indigenous, displaced communities. Put 
together, parts of society attempted to improve their socio-economic status 
through violent and legal means. This leads to a refinement of the notion that 
all Ambonese lost and suffered as a result of the inter-religious violence. 
Ambonese society did not consist of an amorphous mass following greedy 
elites. Instead, the Ambonese were proactive agents shaping the conflict in 
their own way. Furthermore, the understanding of a conflict does not stop the 
day a conflict begins. Although this argument may seem evident, there is 
scarce literature on communal violence in post-Suharto Indonesia, and Ambon 
in particular, which pays attention to the ongoing dynamics of violence. In 
much of the literature, a historical overview is given to explain the build-up to 
the start of the conflict, but deeper elaborations on the genesis of the conflict, 
remain limited. In this dissertation, it has been illustrated how the violent 
expulsions of certain groups were not necessarily directly related to the 
reasons why the kerusuhan began on January 19th, 1999. To a certain extent, 
one can claim that forced expulsions continued once the high-intensity 
violence ended, as some of these population movements came to be legally 
confirmed.  
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Aside from an elaboration on the rationales behind forced migration and 
permanent relocation, I have attempted to explain how people responded to 
these evictions by renegotiating, regaining or reimaging access to certain 
places. As explained in the introduction, any conflict is more than just 
destruction but inevitably contains a developmental side. In studying this 
developmental side of the inter-religious communal warfare, the everyday life 
experiences of these evicted populations were taken as the starting point of the 
analysis. On the other hand, this dissertation has clearly illustrated how 
agency is constrained and survival strategies are not endless. This definitely 
holds true among the displaced, disadvantaged, and lower-class sections of 
society living in environments such as Ambon which are characterized by 
high levels of insecurity and profound economic decline. One can even doubt 
if the word strategy is a suitable term for the everyday socio-economic 
experiences of these communities. In general, the word strategy - in particular 
livelihood strategy - is understood as a long-term response (White, Titus and 
Boomgaard, 2001). This long-term response presupposes a certain stability, 
predictability, one could even say control over the situation one lives in. In 
conflict-ridden Ambon, this control was, to say the least, limited. This can 
also be derived from the language people sometimes used to describe the 
kerusuhan. For instance, some people referred to this as a hurricane or a 
tsunami, thereby sketching the impression this was a disaster over which man 
did not have any control. In this regard, following Michel de Certeau (1984), 
what many of these people did throughout and after the conflict can be seen as 
tactics rather than strategies. According to de Certeau (1984:34-35), tactics 
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should be understood as ‘a calculated action determined by the absence of a 
proper locus’. This implies that the space where this tactic is performed is the 
‘space of the other’, a space which is not his/her own and over which the 
agent has limited or no control at all. The tactic, in contrast to the strategy, 
does not have the option of deliberate planning based on an ability to predict 
and can therefore be considered as the art of the weak. 
 
This limited agency among forcibly migrated communities is illustrated in 
chapters 4 and 7. In these chapters, I demonstrated how in urban environments 
plagued by violence, attempts to obtain access to the informal economy, in 
particular petty trading activities, became a manner of coping with the 
economic decline brought about by the conflict. This process brought women 
to the forefront in the household in terms of income generation and provoked 
a crisis of masculinity due to the implosion of the formal economy in which 
many men were traditionally engaged. It was only once the high-intensity 
violence started to wane that the informal transport economy became a major 
attraction for many men at the lower class end of society. As important, 
however, is the observation that the opportunities or constraints to engaging in 
the informal economy were, amongst others, shaped by the spatial 
transformations brought about by the conflict. Therefore, this initial study at 
the household level of society served as a fruitful entry point to understanding 
how inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in Ambonese society and the 
pre-conflict stereotypes ascribed to certain of these ethnic and religious 
identities have fundamentally altered. In particular, Christians faced 
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opportunities of taking over informal economies in mono-religious Christian 
areas which before the conflict were largely monopolized by lower class 
Muslim migrants. In a somewhat contradictory manner, these spatial 
opportunities brought about a downward social mobility for Christians in 
terms of societal prestige. Throughout the conflict, Christians - traditionally 
considered as the elite of Ambonese society - became increasingly engaged in 
‘poor man’s jobs’ such as the tricycle taxi business or petty trade. Throughout 
and after the conflict, this has given rise to a renewed vigorous competition 
which is concentrated around the issue of place in urban environments in 
order to perform these economic activities. In the city of Ambon, Christian 
women who became involved in petty trading throughout the kerusuhan have 
been largely thrown out due to the centrality of the Mardika market which is 
situated in a Muslim area. In the Christian village of Passo on the other hand, 
they could hold on to their places at the market and Muslims have been - 
literally - pushed to the rear of the market. The same goes for the tricycle 
business in which Muslims have lost their pre-conflict taxi stands in areas 
which became Christian dominated. Within this spatial and social 
transformation, lower class Muslim migrants have thus lost their near 
monopoly over these sectors within the informal economy.  
 
This link between spatial and social transformation is also pertinent with 
regards to access to arable land. As has been illustrated, there are notable 
differences between the relocation sites studied with regards to land access. It 
is therefore hard to put forward an all encompassing conclusion on this issue 
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apart from the fact that for all relocated communities, access to arable land is 
characterized by high levels of insecurity as this is based on oral users’ rights. 
However, throughout certain relocation sites, access to land is hardly 
available, which has led to a dramatic increase in impoverishment and social 
vulnerability. This is particularly the case amongst the Muslim Butonese 
community of Eerie, currently living in the relocation camp of Kate-Kate, 
who at best access land through illegal squatting. These squatting practices are 
a perfect example of tactics, instead of strategies, being a weapon of the weak. 
In an almost literal sense in this regard, as de Certeau (1984:37) states, the 
space of the tactic is the space of the other, with all the related disadvantages.  
 
In the last chapter, I have attempted to elaborate on subjective experiences 
and the way issues such as conflict, forced migration and return are imagined. 
I increasingly came to realize throughout my fieldwork that apart from more 
classic, ‘real’ developmental and legal issues, forced migration is inevitably 
an emotional experience. Illustrative of this is the fact that the narrow 
interpretation of adat as customary resource management as it has been 
generally used throughout this thesis, has been complemented with a broader 
interpretation of adat as ideals and guiding motives of unity, culture and 
purity. More in particular, I attempted to illustrate how discourses about adat 
as reconciliation obtained a territorial interpretation among relocated 
indigenous communities. Rather than expressing a purely rational, economic 
agenda, the urge to return expresses a willingness to install a reinvigorated 
adat order and a purified present where mental and spatial religious 
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segregation have been overcome. At the basis of this territorial interpretation 
of adat lies the denial of accepting relocation as a new normality.  
 
All these different examples illustrate how people did more than just suffer 
during the recent inter-religious communal warfare but shaped, interpreted, 
sustained, imagined, ended and coped with the conflict and the interrelated 
forced migration in complex and dynamic ways. Nevertheless, there is also a 
second reason why the opinion that all Ambonese suffered throughout the 
conflict needs to be refined. The Ambonese population is not a homogeneous 
mass and, although I never used this normative term in my research, the level 
of ‘loss’ has at least been unevenly distributed. This observation stands 
central to understanding the emergence of new arenas of contention, 
resentment and reconciliation in Ambon since the end of the violence. It is 
illustrative that I have never heard one Butonese stating he thinks all people in 
Ambon have suffered. Many Butonese have largely lost the near-monopoly 
they had before the conflict on the informal economy. Moreover, an awful lot 
of them have been violently evicted and prohibited to return. These people 
find themselves currently in dire economic circumstances due to limited land 
access and some have started engaging in squatting practices, which are 
considered as having no legal ground whatsoever, not only by the host 
community but also by themselves. This has increased tensions with the host 
community and enforced the image among many Ambonese, of the Butonese 
being very aggressive in their economic strategies.  
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In this regard, the recent communal conflict in Ambon has created new forms 
of contention which are fundamental to understand current Ambonese society. 
On the other hand, one should be careful not to relate everything now 
happening in Ambon to the recent inter-religious communal warfare. It 
sometimes struck me how Ambonese tended to explain all (negative) human 
behavior they witnessed as a consequence of the kerusuhan. This could range 
from small children fighting, aggressive driving, domestic violence against 
women, traffic jams, dirt in the city… Often, this was explained as resulting 
from stress or trauma experienced throughout the conflict (see also Spyer 
2004). It is important to keep in mind that not everything can be explained 
away by the conflict and Ambon is still part of Indonesia and a globalized 
world economy and media. Due to the agency-oriented focus on changes at 
the micro-level of society and how these link up with changes at the 
intermediate level of Ambonese society, I have to admit that these global 
influences have sometimes been overlooked in my research. Moreover, many 
of the findings in this dissertation are not exactly new but rather, as the title of 
my dissertation suggests, should be understood as changes. For instance, 
access to certain sectors within the informal economy (Von Benda Beckmann 
2004) or land (Van Fraassen 1972, Von Benda Beckmann 1990) already were 
pressing concerns before the outbreak of the kerusuhan but nevertheless, have 
been fundamentally transformed. The same can be said about certain ethnic 
fault lines which already were pertinent before the outbreak of the violence in 
1999. 
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Many of these ‘new’ forms of contention are closely related to evictions 
brought about during the conflict and subsequent spatial transformations. A 
better insight into these forced expulsions explains how in certain places, 
processes of reconciliation have been relatively easy, while in other cases, 
communal relations remain chilly, to say the least. It is therefore interesting to 
return once again to chapter 3 where I described the violent expulsion of the 
Christians of Hila/Kaitetu and Waai. In the case of the Waai, rapprochement 
with Tulehu since their forced eviction has been relatively easy. As early as 
their escape to Passo, trade networks between the village of Tulehu and the 
Waai community emerged inducing the first overture. Similarly, throughout 
2002, people from Waai regularly visited Tulehu. The return of the Waai 
community has never been opposed by the majority of people from Tulehu 
and as early as August 2000, leaders from Tulehu expressed their desire to the 
governor to facilitate the repatriation of the Waai community. This was not 
the case in Liang where a stern opposition against the return of the Waai 
people existed, although, being an indigenous adat law community, they have 
ultimately been able to return to Waai. One reason behind this is the fact that 
the border dispute which was central to the escalation of the violence has 
remained a point of contention. In particular among the people of Waai, there 
remains deep resentment and a sense that they have lost out as a result of the 
conflict. Many explicitly state that ‘whenever they have the chance’, they will 
do what they can to reclaim this lost land which has been illegally taken away 
by the people of Liang. Some even admit they have deliberately stored 
weapons gathered during the recent conflict with the future aim of forcibly 
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reclaiming their land. Disconcertingly, this recent episode of violence and 
displacement is therefore presented as a chapter in an unfinished story that 
will likely have a sequel, according to some Waai villagers. In other words, 
contentions already existing before the conflict continue, albeit in a sharper 
form. In the Hila and Kaitetu case, rapprochement has been much easier 
between Kaitetu and the relocated Christian community, principally because 
the clove and other trees owned by the Christians in Kaitetu were left 
standing. From 2005 onwards, the Christians gradually started spending time 
in Kaitetu to harvest the trees, staying with friends and relatives. In contrast, 
relations with Hila remain chilly, in particular between the customary 
landowners, who took over the land the Christians lived on, and who are 
considered as ‘big liars’ by these Christians. These sorts of resentments are 
further enforced by the dire economic circumstances many people find 
themselves in. This is the case for many forcibly migrated communities but 
can also be felt in many other communities which fell outside the scope of 
this research. It should also not be forgotten that, compared to the period of 
high-intensity conflict, the economic performance in the province of Maluku 
has improved but there is definitely no ‘economic boom’. A more sustained 
economic growth therefore would definitely help to ease some of the tensions 
currently at play. 
 
How much of a destabilizing effect on Ambonese society do all these tensions 
have? It is definitely true that inter-religious and inter-ethnic relationships can 
at times be tense and result in low-intensity violence as can be observed by 
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incidents in a place like the market of Mardika. On the other hand, recent 
cases of low-intensity violence and the seriousness by which these were 
handled prove that the security apparatus is better equipped than was the case 
in 1999. Moreover, as far as I could see, there were no organizations 
mobilizing around these particular grievances through a discourse of violence 
and armed conflict. In chapter 6, I shortly discussed an ethnic Butonese 
organization like the BKMM-Sultra and the strong feelings of resentment 
expressed by them. However, their discourse was an inclusive one as their 
main desire was wanting to be seen and treated like normal Ambonese with 
the same legal rights. They framed this struggle in a democratic framework in 
which they intend to link up with certain powerful political parties or even 
establish their own party. They even admitted that money politics, typical for 
the high patrimonial character of the Ambonese political landscape, will be 
essential to this struggle. Nevertheless, the issue of arms, violence, the 
establishment of coordination posts etc. never came to the fore.  
 
At last, I wish to stress that the situation in Ambon since 2002 cannot be seen 
as a ‘neither war, nor peace’ situation, the concept by which many other so-
called post-conflict regions where violence tends to remain endemic after the 
signing of an official peace agreement, has been explained (Menkhaus 2004, 
Richards 2005). Despite all sorts of resentments still being present, large-
scale, collective violence has substantially dropped in Ambon. Since a couple 
of years, also the ‘terrorist’ sort of violence conducted by radicalized minority 
groups has ended. Apart from the many definitional flaws and the lack of 
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quantitative or qualitative parameters indicating when this post-conflict phase 
is over, this is the prime reason I decided not to integrate this term in my 
dissertation. Maybe the best illustration of this fundamentally different 
context was found in the tourism department where in late 2007, plans were 
mentioned to develop a kite surfing project in the bay of Ambon. This is the 
same bay where a couple of years before, people were forced to take 
speedboats in order to avoid being shot at by snipers. Many people I spoke to 
expressed a sincere belief and relief that the conflict is over and explicitly 
referred to current Ambon as ‘sekarang aman’, now there is peace. I sincerely 
hope, and tend to believe, it will stay this way.  
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ANNEX 
 
Questioner 
Nama (optional)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Alamat…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Sudah berapa lama tingal di camp ini………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Berapa anggota keluarga (berapa banyak orang tinggal dalam keluarga ini)……………………………………………….. 
 
1. Informasi tentang bapak 
 1. Pendidikan……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 2. Pekerjaan 
  2.1. Sebelum konflik, apakah bapak bekerja 
  2.1.1. Jika Ya 
  a. Pekerjaan apa yang dimiliki 
Pekerjaan 
Ya/tidak Status Keterangan 
Pegawai negeri       
Pegawai swasta       
Wiraswasta/Usaha Sendiri       
Petani       
Nelayan       
Pedagang (di pasar)       
Buruh bangunan       
Buruh pelabuhan       
Pemanbantu rumah tangga       
Sopir       
Lain-lain       
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   b. Lokasi dimana……………………………………………………………………………………… 
   c. Berapa jam sehari…………………………………………………………………………………. 
   d. Berapa besar penghasilan per bulan 
 
 
 
   2.1.2. Jika tidak; apa aktivitas sehari-hari 
 
 
   2.2. Sekarang selama konflik, apakah bapak masih bekerja? (Ya/tidak) 
   2.2.1. Jika tidak, dan bapak bekerja di tempat yang baru, berilah  
   informasi tentang pekerjaan yang baru 
   a. Pekerjaan apa yang dimiliki 
Pekerjaan 
Ya/tidak Status Keterangan 
Pegawai negeri       
Pegawai swasta       
Wiraswasta/Usaha Sendiri       
Petani       
Nelayan       
Pedagang (di pasar)       
Buruh bangunan       
Buruh pelabuhan       
Pemanbantu rumah tangga       
Sopir       
Lain-lain       
 
   b. Lokasi dimana……………………………………………………………………………………… 
   c. Berapa jam sehari…………………………………………………………………………………. 
≤ 500.000   
500.000 - 1.000.000   
1000000≤   
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  d. Berapa besar penghasilan per bulan 
 
 
 
  e. Mengapa berganti pekerjaan  
 
 
  2.1.2. Jika tidak; apa aktivitas sehari-hari 
 
 
 2.3. Setelah konflik, apakah bapak bekerja 
  2.1.1. Jika Ya 
  a. Pekerjaan apa yang dimiliki 
Pekerjaan 
Ya/tidak Status Keterangan 
Pegawai negeri       
Pegawai swasta       
Wiraswasta/Usaha Sendiri       
Petani       
Nelayan       
Pedagang (di pasar)       
Buruh bangunan       
Buruh pelabuhan       
Pemanbantu rumah tangga       
Sopir       
Lain-lain       
 
  b. Lokasi dimana……………………………………………………………………………………… 
≤ 500.000   
500.000 - 1.000.000   
1000000≤   
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  c. Berapa jam sehari…………………………………………………………………………………. 
  d. Berapa besar penghasilan per bulan 
 
 
 
  e. Alasan untuk bekerja 
 
 
   2.1.2. Jika tidak; apa aktivitas sehari-hare 
 
 
2. Informasi tentang ibu 
 1. Pendidikan……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 2. Pekerjaan 
  2.1. Sebelum konflik, apakah ibu bekerja 
  2.1.1. Jika Ya 
  a. Pekerjaan apa yang dimiliki 
Pekerjaan 
Ya/tidak Status Keterangan 
Pegawai negeri       
Pegawai swasta       
Wiraswasta/Usaha Sendiri       
Petani       
Nelayan       
Pedagang (di pasar)       
Buruh bangunan       
Buruh pelabuhan       
≤ 500.000   
500.000 - 1.000.000   
1000000≤   
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Pemanbantu rumah tangga       
Sopir       
Lain-lain       
 
  b. Lokasi dimana……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
  c. Berapa jam sehari………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
  d. Berapa besar penghasilan per bulan 
 
 
 
   2.1.2. Jika tidak; apa aktivitas sehari-hari 
 
 
 2.2. Sekarang selama konflik, apakah ibu masih bekerja? (Ya/tidak) 
 2.2.1. Jika tidak, dan ibu bekerja di tempat yang baru, berilah informasi tentang pekerjaan 
 yang baru 
 a. Pekerjaan apa yang dimiliki 
Pekerjaan 
Ya/tidak Status Keterangan 
Pegawai negeri       
Pegawai swasta       
Wiraswasta/Usaha Sendiri       
Petani       
Nelayan       
Pedagang (di pasar)       
Buruh bangunan       
Buruh pelabuhan       
Pemanbantu rumah tangga       
Sopir       
≤ 500.000   
500.000 - 1.000.000   
1000000≤   
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Lain-lain       
 
  b. Lokasi dimana……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
  c. Berapa jam sehari………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
  d. Berapa besar penghasilan per bulan 
 
 
 
  e. Mengapa berganti pekerjaan 
 
 
  2.1.2. Jika tidak; apa aktivitas sehari-hari 
 
 
 2.3. Setelah konflik, apakah ibu bekerja 
 2.1.1. Jika Ya 
 a. Pekerjaan apa yang dimiliki 
Pekerjaan 
Ya/tidak Status Keterangan 
Pegawai negeri       
Pegawai swasta       
Wiraswasta/Usaha Sendiri       
Petani       
Nelayan       
Pedagang (di pasar)       
Buruh bangunan       
Buruh pelabuhan       
≤ 500.000   
500.000 - 1.000.000   
1000000≤   
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Pemanbantu rumah tangga       
Sopir       
Lain-lain       
 
  b. Lokasi dimana……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
  c. Berapa jam sehari………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
  d. Berapa besar penghasilan per bulan 
 
 
 
  e. Alasan untuk bekerja 
 
 
  2.1.2. Jika tidak; apa aktivitas sehari-harI 
≤ 500.000   
500.000 - 1.000.000   
1000000≤   
